Hormuz shipping traffic remains 70% below pre-war levels, UKMTO says

A 70 percent reduction means current traffic is roughly 30 percent of its pre-conflict level. It does not mean the strait is closed. Ships are still passing through, but far fewer are doing so, reflecting a major change in maritime activity.

During the seven days ending October 28, UKMTO recorded 277 transits. That total was approximately 70 percent below pre-conflict levels. AIS-observed movements rose from 47 to 64, while US-reported facilitated movements stayed broadly stable. About 80 percent of transits involve energy carriers.

The reduced flow matters because Hormuz carries large volumes of energy cargo. Continued attacks, navigation interference, and other security risks can discourage operators or delay voyages. Traffic may recover if conditions improve, but the article reports no such recovery yet. Instead, October became the worst month for attacks since the conflict began, reinforcing pressure on shipping activity.

UKMTO recorded 277 vessel transits during the seven days ending October 28. The total included 155 inbound movements and 122 outbound movements. Together, these figures show activity in both directions, rather than counting only ships entering the strait.

The total used two sources. One was automatic identification system, or AIS, observations from vessels broadcasting their positions. The other was US-reported facilitated transits. AIS-observed movements increased from 47 the previous week to 64, while the US-reported figure remained broadly stable.

This method gives UKMTO a wider picture than AIS alone. Some vessels may not appear in AIS observations, while facilitated movements are separately reported by the United States. The combined count therefore tracks recorded passage through the strait, although the article does not provide a separate weekly breakdown for each category.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between Iran and Oman. It connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, which opens toward the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean. This geography makes it a gateway between Gulf ports and international sea routes.

The article does not define the strait’s location, but it identifies traffic moving through it and across the Gulf. It also reports that about 80 percent of transits involve energy carriers. That figure shows why the passage matters beyond the nearby coastline.

A narrow gateway concentrates shipping into a limited route. When vessels face attacks or interference there, operators must assess whether to continue, delay, reroute, or seek other transport options. The article records 88 incidents since February 28, showing how security conditions have affected this strategically placed waterway.

UKMTO is the UK Maritime Trade Operations body. In this report, it assesses shipping activity, records security incidents, and tracks vessel movements through the Strait of Hormuz. It combines AIS observations with US-reported facilitated transits to measure traffic.

NCAGS means US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping. The article identifies it as the source of an estimate that about 80 percent of strait transits involve energy carriers. Its name indicates a cooperation and guidance role for commercial shipping, while the article specifically gives its estimate rather than describing all its activities.

Together, these bodies help build a security picture for ships and observers. UKMTO reports the number and direction of movements, route choices, and attacks. NCAGS contributes an assessment of the cargo mix. Their information helps show both how much traffic is moving and why the route matters.

Ships avoid or delay a risky passage because attacks can threaten crews, cargoes, and vessels. Navigation interference can also make it harder for crews to determine a safe route or maintain reliable communications. These dangers raise uncertainty around each voyage, even when the waterway remains open.

The article records 88 incidents in the Strait of Hormuz since the conflict began on February 28. It says data suggests at least 35 attacks on shipping in the Gulf and the strait during October. That made October the worst month for attacks since the war began. March followed with about 30 attacks.

Such conditions help explain why traffic remains about 70 percent below pre-conflict levels. Operators may wait for better security information, use another route, or reduce exposure by changing schedules. The article also reports increased traffic along the southern route, suggesting some vessels are adjusting how they pass rather than abandoning the region entirely.

If Hormuz becomes too risky, energy shippers can consider routes that avoid the strait. Options may include pipelines to ports outside the Gulf, overland rail or road links, stored cargoes, or longer sea voyages around another coastline. These alternatives are not equally available for every type of energy.

Oil and some petroleum products can sometimes move through pipelines or be held in storage before shipment. Liquefied natural gas generally depends on specialized terminals and ships, so replacing a sea route may be harder. A longer maritime route can preserve ocean transport but adds distance, time, fuel use, and cost.

The article does not identify specific alternative routes or methods. It does report increased traffic along the southern route, while most AIS-broadcasting vessels continued to use the Iranian route. That suggests ships are already adjusting route choices within the area, but the 70 percent traffic decline shows alternatives have not fully offset the security disruption.

A chokepoint matters because many ships must pass through a limited stretch of water. If attacks or interference reduce traffic, energy cargoes can arrive later or require more expensive alternatives. Since energy markets connect producers, traders, and buyers across countries, a local disruption can affect decisions far beyond the strait.

The article reports that about 80 percent of Hormuz transits involve energy carriers. It also records 277 vessel movements in one week, about 70 percent below pre-conflict levels. Fewer passages mean fewer energy shipments using the normal route, while ships that continue may face greater security concerns.

The article does not report actual global price changes. However, the combination of heavy energy use and sharply reduced traffic shows why the strait has international significance. If reduced passage continues, markets may need to rely more on delayed, rerouted, or costlier deliveries. If security improves, traffic could rise again, though no recovery is reported yet.