Trump wants Myanmar's rare earths. He's talking to the wrong people.

The Trump administration is reversing the Biden-era policy of isolating Myanmar’s military rulers. Instead of demanding an immediate return to democracy, Washington is testing direct engagement with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. The shift matters because the United States once sanctioned the junta and accused it of genocide, while the military now controls only part of Myanmar.

The goals are practical and limited. Washington sought the release of Adam Castillo, a former American Chamber of Commerce leader, cooperation against online scam centers, and access to Myanmar’s rare earth deposits. Assistant Secretary Michael Vance held the highest-level U.S. contact since the coup in Naypyidaw in September.

Castillo has been released, but the other aims remain uncertain. The regime is linked to the scam-center problem, and rare earth areas lie mainly beyond its control. Engagement could therefore produce limited gains while giving the junta political legitimacy, a concern raised by the National Unity Government.

Rare earths are a group of metallic elements with properties useful in magnets, electronics, batteries, defense systems, and renewable-energy equipment. Despite their name, many are not exceptionally rare in Earth’s crust. The challenge is finding deposits that can be mined economically and processing the minerals into usable materials.

Their value comes from the supply chain, not just the rock underground. Mining, separation, refining, and manufacturing require specialized facilities and expertise. A country that controls these stages can influence prices and access. Governments therefore treat rare earths as strategic resources, especially when industries and defense programs depend on reliable supplies.

The article identifies Myanmar’s rare earth deposits as a target for U.S. officials. It also says China currently controls the market and that resistance groups hold most deposits. That makes Myanmar’s minerals valuable geopolitically, but it also means Washington cannot assume talks with the central government will provide access.

The junta retains formal sovereignty over Myanmar, but its actual territorial control is sharply limited. The article estimates that the military controls about 21% of the country. Resistance forces hold approximately 42%, while the remaining territory is contested. This gap matters because legal authority does not guarantee physical access to resources.

The military still controls major economic assets, including ports, factories, and offshore gas. Rare earth deposits are different. After four years of war, the junta lost access to most of them. The article places those deposits in areas held by minority groups such as the Wa, Karens, and Shan.

That geography weakens Washington’s bargaining strategy. U.S. officials may negotiate with the central government, but the government does not control the main rare earth regions. Access would require dealing with other armed and political actors, in a conflict where alliances shift and authority is divided.

The article identifies minority groups, including the Wa, Karens, and Shan, as controlling most of Myanmar’s rare earth deposits. These groups are connected to ethnic armed organizations that operate alongside, or separately from, the National Unity Government. Their control reflects the war’s fragmented political and geographic structure.

The article does not specify exactly how each group uses rare earth revenues. It does establish that the military lost access to most deposits while retaining ports, factories, and offshore gas. Control over deposits can sustain armed authorities by providing leverage over extraction, trade, and access negotiations, but the source gives no figures or detailed revenue system.

This uncertainty is central to the U.S. strategy. Washington is talking to the junta, yet the main deposits are held elsewhere. Any durable access arrangement would involve the groups controlling the territory, as well as foreign powers connected to the conflict. The fragmented war makes a single government-to-government deal inadequate.

Talks may fail because the military’s formal authority exceeds its practical control. The junta governs important assets such as ports, factories, and offshore gas, but controls only about 21% of Myanmar’s territory. Resistance forces hold about 42%, and the rest is contested. Agreements signed in the capital may not reach every armed group or region.

The scam-center problem shows the same contradiction. U.S. officials want the regime to shut down online scam operations, yet the article describes the regime as part of the problem. That makes the junta an unreliable enforcement partner. Rare earth access faces an even clearer obstacle: most deposits are held by Wa, Karen, and Shan groups outside military control.

The first U.S. objective, Adam Castillo’s release, was achieved. The other goals remain uncertain. Engagement could also help Min Aung Hlaing overcome his political-legitimacy crisis, according to the National Unity Government’s foreign minister, while delivering little practical control over scams or minerals.

Before 2021, Myanmar already had minority insurgencies operating in several regions. The coup changed the scale of conflict. When the military violently cracked down on anti-coup protests, thousands of activists fled to the countryside. Many entered areas where ethnic armed groups had fought the state for decades.

Ousted lawmakers from the National League for Democracy created the National Unity Government. Some militant groups joined the NUG, while others remained independent. Activists, ethnic armies, and the military then fought across different regions. Their goals, alliances, tactics, and foreign relationships were not identical, making the conflict fragmented rather than a simple two-sided war.

Over four years, the military lost much of the country to the NUG and ethnic organizations, although it retained major economic levers. Russia and China later supplied new tactics and drones during the military’s counteroffensive. The war has displaced more than 3.7 million people and produced over 100,000 recorded conflict-related deaths.

Rare earth supply chains matter because modern industries and governments depend on specialized minerals and the ability to process them. Control can provide leverage over access, prices, and strategic production. For Washington, reducing dependence on a market controlled by China would make Myanmar’s deposits politically important, not merely commercially valuable.

The article places this ambition inside Myanmar’s territorial struggle. The military lost access to most rare earth deposits, while groups such as the Wa, Karens, and Shan hold them. China currently controls the market. Thus, a U.S. conversation with Min Aung Hlaing does not automatically create a route to the minerals. The key mechanism is control of territory and trade, not diplomatic recognition alone.

This creates a geopolitical dilemma. Engagement may be intended to compete with China, but the chosen partner lacks control over the resource zones. Washington would need access arrangements involving other armed actors, while also weighing whether engagement strengthens the junta’s legitimacy. The article leaves the outcome unresolved.