US, South Korea, Japan call for ‘complete denuclearisation’ of North Korea

“Complete denuclearisation” means removing North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability, not simply reducing activity. The core demand is that Pyongyang give up its nuclear arsenal. It matters because the United States, South Korea and Japan view North Korea’s weapons as a major security challenge, while Pyongyang treats them as permanent.

In practice, such a process would normally require declaring nuclear materials and facilities, dismantling weapons, and stopping production. The article does not list a detailed verification plan. It does state that the three countries reaffirmed their “resolute commitment” to complete denuclearisation and supported UN measures targeting nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes.

North Korea has repeatedly ruled out surrendering its weapons. Its government has written its nuclear-armed status into law and called its arsenal permanent and irreversible. That makes complete elimination a distant goal, especially as Trump seeks another meeting with Kim Jong Un and some South Korean officials have discussed a freeze instead.

The three countries are the United States, South Korea and Japan. Their pledge matters because they are coordinating pressure while also debating whether diplomacy can restart with North Korea. Their foreign ministers repeated a longstanding demand: complete denuclearisation of North Korea.

They also promised the “full implementation” of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The article specifically identifies restrictions on supporting revenue for North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes. That means countries and other actors should not help fund or sustain those activities under the sanctions regime.

The commitment came during a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 in Atlanta. It followed repeated US overtures to Kim Jong Un, including Trump’s wish for another meeting. The pledge therefore combines pressure with diplomacy. North Korea, backed by Russia and China, has rejected what it calls the sanctions “racket” and says sanctions cannot change its nuclear status.

North Korea rejects giving up its nuclear weapons because its government has formally defined the country as a nuclear-armed state. The article says Pyongyang has enshrined that status in law and declared its atomic arsenal permanent and irreversible. Those statements directly conflict with the US, South Korean and Japanese demand for complete denuclearisation.

North Korea’s position is illustrated by its response to a joint statement from countries monitoring sanctions. Pyongyang said the “stereotyped sanctions racket” of the US and West could not influence its position as a nuclear weapons state. This shows that it presents sanctions and disarmament demands as external pressure it will not accept.

The article does not provide a fuller explanation of North Korea’s strategic reasoning. It does show that the country is backed by Russia and China, while long-running UN sanctions remain in place. That combination makes immediate surrender unlikely and keeps diplomacy focused on whether talks should seek elimination or a nuclear freeze.

The article does not state how many countries possess nuclear weapons worldwide. Widely used international assessments generally count nine nuclear-armed countries today: the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. This broader count comes from established outside knowledge, not from the article.

North Korea is included in that group. The article says it has enshrined its status as a nuclear-armed state in law. It also reports Pyongyang’s statement that sanctions cannot influence its position as a nuclear weapons state. Those claims describe North Korea’s declared status, even though the article does not provide a warhead count or technical assessment.

That status is central to the diplomatic dispute. The United States, South Korea and Japan still demand complete denuclearisation, while North Korea calls its arsenal permanent and irreversible. Trump has also acknowledged that North Korea is “sort of a nuclear power,” showing how diplomacy increasingly confronts an existing nuclear capability.

If sanctions remain, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes would continue facing restrictions on revenue and outside support. The article does not quantify the programmes’ resources or predict a definite technical outcome. It does show that the United States, South Korea and Japan support enforcing UN measures intended to limit that support.

If sanctions relief were granted, North Korea could receive fewer economic restrictions. The article connects that possibility to a proposed deal: South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung suggested seeking a freeze in return for sanctions relief. A freeze would pause or limit activity, but it would not necessarily remove existing weapons.

Critics say this approach could tacitly accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. They also warn that Pyongyang might receive sanctions relief without giving up its arsenal. The current reality is unresolved: North Korea calls its weapons permanent, while Washington continues to discuss both pressure and a possible new meeting with Kim.

Freezing North Korea’s nuclear programme and eliminating it are different goals. A freeze would seek to stop further growth or production, while allowing the weapons North Korea already possesses to remain. Elimination would require the country to give up its arsenal and remove the capability to rebuild it.

The distinction appears in Lee Jae Myung’s September proposal. He suggested that Washington seek a freeze rather than immediate elimination, possibly in exchange for sanctions relief. That approach could produce a narrower and more achievable limit, but it would not meet the three countries’ stated demand for “complete denuclearisation.”

Critics argue that a freeze risks tacitly accepting North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. They also worry Pyongyang could receive sanctions relief without surrendering its weapons. North Korea’s own position makes the gap clear: its government calls its atomic arsenal permanent and irreversible, while the United States, South Korea and Japan continue to demand its removal.

Nuclear deterrence is a security strategy based on threatened retaliation. A government signals that an attack could trigger a devastating nuclear response. The intended effect is to make an enemy believe that starting a war would bring unacceptable costs, so the enemy chooses not to attack.

The article does not explain deterrence directly, but North Korea’s declared nuclear status provides the context. Pyongyang says its atomic arsenal is permanent and irreversible. By keeping those weapons, a government may believe it gains leverage and protection against stronger opponents. The United States, South Korea and Japan reject that outcome and continue calling for complete denuclearisation.

Deterrence is not the same as disarmament, and it is not a guarantee that conflict will never occur. It depends on threats being credible and leaders avoiding escalation. The current dispute shows the tension: North Korea presents nuclear weapons as essential and permanent, while other governments see their removal as necessary for security.