From Mangolpuri shoe factory to Uphaar cinema: The major fires that keep bringing Delhi under scrutiny

The Mangolpuri fire began around 9.30pm in the basement of a three-storey shoe factory in Phase-I of the industrial area. Six people were rescued unconscious and taken to Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Hospital. Four were declared dead, while two others were receiving treatment. The cause had not yet been ascertained.

The response involved more than 20 fire tenders. Firefighters battled the blaze for over three hours before bringing the emergency under control. Their immediate tasks were reaching the basement, extinguishing the fire, and removing trapped occupants. The article does not state how the fire started or identify specific safety violations at this factory.

The incident has renewed scrutiny of Delhi’s fire preparedness. It followed several other deadly fires in factories, hotels, hospitals, and commercial buildings. Across those cases, investigations found problems such as illegal construction, restricted exits, overcrowding, and weak inspections. The Mangolpuri cause and any accountability findings remained pending in the information provided.

The incidents listed in the article caused 122 deaths in total. The count combines four deaths in Mangolpuri, 23 in Hauz Rani, nine in Vivek Vihar in 2026, nine in Palam, seven newborns in Vivek Vihar in 2024, 27 near Mundka, and 43 in Anaj Mandi. The total covers only the fires described in the supplied text.

Anaj Mandi was the deadliest, killing 43 workers in an illegal manufacturing unit on December 8, 2019. Mundka followed with 27 deaths in a commercial building on May 13, 2022. Hauz Rani ranked third, with 23 people killed at Flourish Stay on June 3, 2026, including 14 foreign nationals.

The figures show that deadly fires occurred across different settings. Victims included factory workers, hotel guests, commercial-building occupants, and newborns. The repeated pattern matters because inquiries linked many tragedies to unsafe buildings, illegal activity, poor access, and failures in oversight rather than fire alone.

A fire department no-objection certificate is generally a formal clearance issued after fire-safety requirements are checked. It indicates that a building or business has been assessed for measures such as escape routes, access for firefighters, alarms, and firefighting equipment. The exact process can vary by jurisdiction, and the article does not define the certificate in detail.

Its importance is clear in Anaj Mandi. The five-storey building housed several unlicensed manufacturing units and had very few windows and a narrow entrance. The factory did not have a fire department no-objection certificate. When the fire broke out, many workers were inside, including people sleeping on the premises, and 43 died.

An NOC is not a guarantee that a fire can never occur. It is a regulatory safeguard that can identify dangerous conditions before people occupy a building. Regular inspections and action against non-compliant businesses are also needed. Hauz Rani showed how an establishment could continue despite repeated warnings and licensing failures.

Illegal construction can add rooms, floors, or uses that were never approved or safely planned. Blocked or locked exits prevent occupants from leaving quickly. Overcrowding increases the number of people exposed and can make movement chaotic. Narrow lanes slow fire tenders and restrict the equipment firefighters need, costing crucial time during a rapidly spreading blaze.

Hauz Rani allegedly operated 31 rooms despite permission for six and lacked a proper fire exit. In the 2026 Vivek Vihar case, restricted escape routes, a locked terrace, poor ventilation, and congested approach lanes worsened the tragedy. At Palam, illegal overhead cables obstructed an aerial platform. These examples show how building conditions and access problems combine.

The danger is not limited to one type of property. Factories, hotels, hospitals, and commercial buildings can all become deadly when occupancy, layout, and access rules are ignored. Preventing these hazards requires approvals, inspections, clear exits, usable equipment, and enforcement before an emergency occurs.

Across the incidents, authorities repeatedly found buildings being used beyond their approvals. Examples included unauthorised factories, unlicensed manufacturing units, illegal room expansions, missing occupancy certificates, and structural changes that violated sanctioned plans. Fire exits were absent, restricted, or locked. Congested lanes, few windows, poor ventilation, and overcrowding further reduced the chance of escape.

The emergencies also exposed failures in response systems. At Palam, overhead cables blocked an aerial platform, and there was no effective backup when equipment failed. The inquiry also cited inadequate training and manpower shortages. In Vivek Vihar, the first tender’s water supply ran dry within minutes. At the baby care centre, the storage and handling of oxygen cylinders raised serious questions.

The pattern suggests that prevention and response both broke down. Licensing, inspections, monitoring, equipment readiness, and enforcement must work together. The Hauz Rani inquiry indicted several agencies after an illegally expanded establishment continued operating despite repeated warnings, showing the cost of gaps between rules and action.

The article links several authorities to fire-safety oversight. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi is connected with building permissions, occupancy issues, and municipal monitoring. The Delhi Police and tourism department were among agencies indicted after the Hauz Rani establishment’s licensing and inspection failures. BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd was also named in that inquiry. The article does not provide a complete division of duties.

Delhi Fire Services is the emergency-response agency described in the incidents. Its firefighters sent tenders to Mangolpuri, while its equipment and personnel were examined after the Palam fire. Fire-service access was also affected by illegal overhead cables. Police later filed a chargesheet in the Hauz Rani case, showing an enforcement role after the tragedy.

Effective safety depends on coordination rather than one agency acting alone. Building approval, occupancy certification, business licensing, inspections, fire preparedness, utility safety, and emergency response must connect. The inquiries described in the article show what can happen when warnings, approvals, monitoring, and response arrangements do not work together.

Occupancy certificates confirm that a building can legally be used after construction and required checks. Building codes set conditions for structure, access, ventilation, and safe use. Emergency exits provide escape routes, while fire equipment supports detection, suppression, and rescue. Regular inspections are meant to catch changes or failures before people are placed at risk.

The article shows how these safeguards work together. In 2026 Vivek Vihar, flats lacked occupancy certificates and had major structural alterations. Hauz Rani operated 31 rooms despite permission for six and had no proper fire exit. Anaj Mandi had no fire department no-objection certificate, few windows, and a narrow entrance. Each failure reduced safety or delayed escape and response.

These measures prevent loss of life only when authorities verify and enforce them. Repeated warnings did not stop Hauz Rani’s illegal operation. Inquiries also found equipment, training, manpower, and access problems. Future protection therefore requires active inspections, accurate approvals, usable exits, ready equipment, and action against violations.