Iran's Khamenei warns US against attacks, orders military buildup

Mojtaba Khamenei announced a broad military-preparation plan for any renewed U.S. or Israeli attack. He said Iran would decide when and how a future conflict ended. The warning matters because it signals that Tehran wants retaliation to be faster and wider than before.

He ordered commanders to update target databases so all U.S. and Israeli assets, tangible and intangible, could potentially be targeted. He also called for stronger intelligence, domestic defense development, new tactics, and faster production of ammunition and weapons for reconnaissance, logistics, and combat. The military briefed him on readiness near the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and national borders.

Iranian army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia reinforced the message. He warned that a new U.S.-Israeli operation could spread beyond the earlier conflict's geographical limits. The directives show preparation for both direct attacks and a wider regional confrontation, while Iran continues monitoring U.S. military movements and regional tensions remain unresolved.

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider Arabian Sea. The source identifies it as a route carrying a significant share of the world's oil shipments. That makes it important far beyond Iran's immediate coastline.

It is central to the confrontation because Iran maintains pressure on maritime traffic there while the United States keeps military forces in the region. The article also reports disagreements over navigation and blockade measures affecting Iranian ports. Iranian commanders briefed Khamenei on readiness along the strait and nearby waters, showing its military importance.

Any confrontation there could affect shipping, energy supplies, and regional security at the same time. The June memorandum between Washington and Tehran did not settle disputes over regional security or navigation. Qatar-linked mediation has also failed to produce a lasting resolution, leaving the waterway a continuing pressure point.

The source does not state a precise share of the world's oil supply passing through the Strait of Hormuz. It only says that a significant share of global oil shipments uses the waterway. Established energy estimates commonly place the flow at about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption, though the exact figure changes with market conditions and definitions.

The key point is concentration. Large volumes of oil and petroleum products from Gulf exporters must move through a narrow maritime route before reaching international markets. Because the strait is difficult to bypass quickly, threats to navigation can affect supply expectations even before shipments stop completely.

That is why the article links the waterway to regional shipping and energy concerns. It reports continuing Iranian pressure on maritime traffic, a sustained U.S. military presence, and reported blockade measures affecting Iranian ports. These tensions make the strait a major source of market and security risk.

Iran's geography gives it direct access to the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. That proximity can let Iran monitor, intimidate, or interfere with shipping more easily than a distant power. The article confirms Iranian military readiness along these waters and says commanders are tracking U.S. movements across the region.

The source specifically mentions expanded target databases, stronger intelligence, weapons production, and improved reconnaissance and combat capabilities. Beyond the article, well-established reporting identifies Iran's missiles, drones, naval forces, mines, and regional partners as possible tools for threatening maritime activity. Those capabilities could raise risks without requiring a complete closure.

A maritime threat could include attacks, harassment, seizures, mining, or warnings that make commercial vessels avoid the route. The article does not describe a specific Iranian plan to close the strait. It does show that Tehran is preparing for a wider confrontation and maintaining pressure on maritime traffic while U.S. forces remain nearby.

If traffic through the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted, the first effect would be greater danger for ships and crews. Regional governments and outside powers could respond militarily, widening the confrontation. The article already connects the tensions to concerns about regional shipping and energy supplies.

Oil markets would likely react to the risk of lost or delayed shipments. Buyers and traders often bid prices higher when a major supply route becomes unsafe, even before physical shortages appear. Exporters might face longer journeys, higher insurance costs, and reduced access to customers. These price and logistics effects are established economic consequences, not specific forecasts in the source.

The scale would depend on how long the disruption lasted, how much oil was diverted, and whether fighting spread. The article says Iran is maintaining pressure on maritime traffic while U.S. forces remain in the region. It also reports that diplomatic efforts have not produced a lasting settlement, so the risk remains unresolved.

Oil exporters would not have one complete substitute for the Strait of Hormuz. They could redirect some crude through pipelines to ports on the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea, use storage inventories, and send available cargoes from terminals outside the Persian Gulf. Some shipments could also take longer sea routes around the Arabian Peninsula.

The main limitation is capacity. Alternative pipelines and ports cannot immediately handle every barrel normally moved through the strait. Longer routes require more ships, fuel, time, and insurance. Some Gulf producers have bypass infrastructure, but its availability differs by country and product. These transportation details are established background and are not specified in the article.

The article itself emphasizes why alternatives would matter: the strait carries a significant share of global oil shipments and remains a point of confrontation. If access became unsafe, exporters and importing countries would likely combine rerouting, inventories, and demand adjustments. The duration and scale of any disruption would determine whether those measures were sufficient.

Deterrence is the effort to prevent an attack by convincing an opponent that the consequences would outweigh any possible gains. Khamenei presented readiness and retaliation as essential to that goal. His message argues that a powerful, intelligent military posture can make adversaries hesitate before launching another operation.

The mechanism has several parts. Intelligence helps Iran detect threats and identify targets. Weapons production supports sustained action. Updated target lists create possible response options. Combat readiness reduces reaction time. Finally, the promise of an immediate and geographically unrestricted response raises the expected cost for the United States and Israel. The article says Iran would decide the timing and conditions for ending a future conflict.

Deterrence works only if the threat appears credible and if leaders believe the other side understands it. Iran's commanders reported preparations along major waterways and borders, while Akraminia said the army was monitoring U.S. movements. Yet these warnings could also increase escalation risks if rivals misread intentions.