Amnesty Programme spent N6.8bn on laptops, others – Report

Between May and December 2025, the Presidential Amnesty Office made at least N6.8bn in identifiable payments for goods and services. The spending matters because most of it went to laptop procurement, not a broad mix of programme activities. The figures come from GovSpend records covering 50 transactions.

The biggest item was N5.47bn for 4,000 laptops bought through 10 suppliers. The Office also paid N495.38m for 4,200 bags of rice intended for stakeholders. About N814.9m went to the Federal Inland Revenue Service for value-added tax, withholding tax, and stamp duties linked to the contracts. A separate N18.26m insurance-tax reimbursement was recorded.

These figures show the scale and concentration of spending during the eight-month period. GovSpend publishes payment records sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s government financial system. They identify payments, but the article does not establish whether every item was delivered, fairly priced, or received by intended beneficiaries.

The Presidential Amnesty Office purchased 4,000 laptops between July and December 2025. The identifiable contracts totalled N5.47bn. Dividing that total by the number of devices gives an overall average of about N1.37m per laptop. That average is an arithmetic estimate based on the article’s reported figures.

The July purchases involved two batches of 200 laptops. Altitude Global Links Limited received N290.12m, while Barbolad Global Services Limited received N291.98m. Those contracts implied approximately N1.46m per device. From October through December, eight batches of 400 laptops were bought, with unit prices of roughly N1.36m.

The contracts were spread across at least 10 companies. Punwon Investment Limited received two contracts totalling N1.09bn, while six other named suppliers each received one 400-unit contract. The records reveal what was paid, but the article does not provide technical specifications, delivery evidence, or an independent price benchmark.

The Presidential Amnesty Programme is a Federal Government initiative created for militants in the Niger Delta. The programme began on June 25, 2009, after late President Umaru Yar’Adua proclaimed amnesty under executive powers in Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution. Its purpose was to respond to militancy and support former fighters’ transition into civilian life.

The programme was built around three linked pillars: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. About 20,192 ex-militants surrendered arms during the initial 60-day window. In practical terms, the pillars connected weapons surrender with leaving armed groups and rebuilding participants’ lives through the intervention.

It was originally designed as a five-year programme ending in 2014. Instead, it has continued for more than 16 years. The programme received N65bn in both 2024 and 2025, while its 2026 allocation rose to N115bn. The article also reports at least N700bn in public spending over the past decade.

The programme was established after Umaru Yar’Adua proclaimed amnesty for Niger Delta militants on June 25, 2009. The intervention aimed to address armed militancy through a structured peace and transition process. The article places the proclamation within executive powers granted by Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution.

Disarmament meant surrendering weapons; about 20,192 ex-militants gave up arms during the first 60 days. Demobilisation meant moving participants away from active armed mobilisation. Reintegration meant supporting their return to civilian society through the programme. These meanings follow the three-part structure described in the article, which does not list every specific service under each pillar.

The initiative was planned as a five-year intervention ending in 2014. It continued beyond that deadline and has now operated for more than 16 years. Its persistence reflects the programme’s continuing public role, but the article also records criticism over opacity, alleged ghost agitators, and concerns about how its resources and beneficiaries are managed.

Concentrating large laptop purchases among many suppliers creates an oversight challenge. Officials and auditors must compare prices, specifications, delivery records, and beneficiaries across several contracts. When a programme is criticised for opacity, fragmented purchasing can make the full picture harder for the public to see. The article reports criticism, not proof that these contracts were improper.

For example, 4,000 laptops were bought through 10 suppliers. Two July batches implied about N1.46m per device, while later batches cost about N1.36m each. Differences may have explanations, but without published specifications and independent benchmarks, citizens cannot easily judge them. Multiple suppliers can also make responsibility for shortages or defects less clear.

Possible consequences include higher costs, unequal distribution, delayed delivery, or reduced trust if controls fail. These are established procurement risks, not findings in the article. Strong contract records, physical verification, beneficiary lists, and independent audits would help distinguish legitimate variation from waste or misconduct.

Citizens and journalists can begin with GovSpend payment records, procurement documents, contract awards, specifications, supplier names, quantities, and delivery dates. They can compare the reported unit prices with similar laptops bought by government or other large buyers. They should also request invoices, inspection certificates, acceptance reports, and distribution schedules. The article identifies payments, but not all of these supporting records.

Auditors can then trace a sample from contract to warehouse, school, or student. They can inspect serial numbers, test devices, check quantities, and match delivery notes against payment approvals. They can compare the 4,000 contracted laptops with scholarship enrolment and signed distribution records. Independent price and technical assessments can test whether the equipment meets the contract.

Students and institutions can confirm receipt through confidential surveys, signed acknowledgements, and serial-number checks. Results should be published, including exceptions and corrective action. This approach would address the article’s concerns about opacity, though the article does not state that such verification has already been performed.

A public budget sets the amount and purpose of government spending. Procurement rules then require a documented process for selecting suppliers, defining specifications, comparing offers, and approving contracts. Taxes and duties ensure that legally required payments, such as VAT, withholding tax, and stamp duties, are recorded and remitted. Each stage creates evidence for review.

In this case, the Office’s payments included N5.47bn for 4,000 laptops, N495.38m for rice, and about N814.9m in tax remittances. GovSpend records the payments, but payment data alone cannot prove delivery or value. Procurement files should show why suppliers were selected, while inspection and acceptance records should confirm what arrived.

Independent audits connect the stages. Auditors can compare the appropriation with releases, contracts, tax payments, deliveries, and beneficiaries, then report exceptions publicly. Follow-up should recover losses or correct failures. The article highlights opacity concerns and an audit demand, but it does not report a completed independent audit of these laptop purchases.