Serbia after Vucic: The winners are losing patience

Serbia’s October 25 election ended Aleksandar Vucic’s long dominance. The Student List won the vote, while Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party, or SNS, came second. The result changed who holds the electoral mandate, although the outgoing party still controls important state institutions and political levers.

The Student List emerged from the student revolt that followed the Novi Sad railway-station disaster. Its members include professors, activists and artists. Their campaign drew support from anger over alleged corruption, media control and the collapse of the station’s concrete canopy, which killed 16 people.

Vucic remains a powerful political figure, but he is no longer leading the winning side. He and senior officials promise to become a strong opposition and expect a comeback. Meanwhile, the Student List must form a government while confronting institutions shaped by years of SNS rule.

The Student List won 53% of the vote in the October 25 election. Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party, or SNS, received 39%. The 14-point difference gave the Student List a clear electoral mandate and placed the SNS behind it.

The figures matter because Vucic had dominated Serbia’s political spotlight for years. His party’s defeat signals a major shift in public support. It also gives the Student List authority to demand changes across the government, media and justice system.

The result has not instantly transferred all power. The new parliament has not yet been convened, and the SNS still controls many levers of power. Investigations and institutional changes are already beginning, but the winning List must turn its vote share into effective control while managing resistance from the outgoing system.

A power vacuum occurs when the old authorities are weakened but the incoming authorities have not yet taken full control. Decisions become uncertain, and institutions may hesitate over whom to obey. In Serbia, the election changed the political balance, but the formal transfer of power remains incomplete.

The new parliament has not yet been convened. At the same time, the SNS still controls many levers of power. Citizens have already removed Vucic’s portraits from municipal buildings, while prosecutors investigate possible electoral fraud and officials face demands to resign.

That gap explains the impatience. Dejan Bursac said society had been oppressed by a party acting like a feudal lord and now expects justice. Supporters want action against alleged corruption and abuses, but delays create fear that old officials could preserve influence or damage the incoming government before the transition is complete.

The investigations could test whether Serbia’s previous governing system broke electoral, legal and democratic rules. Their scope includes alleged electoral fraud, corruption in public contracts, pressure on media outlets and possible links between Vucic, state institutions and organized crime. The consequences could reach both individuals and institutions.

The public prosecutor’s office for organized crime has opened investigations, while a special commission is examining the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade. Critics accuse that office of serving Vucic and persecuting opponents. Senior RTS editors were dismissed, and journalists’ groups want Informer’s license revoked after years of complaints.

If evidence is established, officials could face charges, dismissal or loss of influence. The process could also restore trust in prosecutors, broadcasters and public contracting. But the article does not state which cases will succeed or what punishments will result. Investigations therefore create accountability possibilities, not guaranteed outcomes.

An outgoing government can retain practical power even after losing an election. Officials who remain in ministries, agencies, police bodies or courts may make decisions before replacements arrive. Those decisions can limit the new government’s choices, consume public money or complicate later investigations.

Zlatko Minic warned that officials could award contracts and create financial obligations without necessarily committing a criminal offense. The article also says whistleblowers were asked to come forward if the outgoing government tried to destroy documents. Such records could be crucial for tracing contracts, decisions and alleged abuses.

The Student List may be able to block some actions because it has contacts with police and administrative officials opposed to Vucic’s style of government. It has demanded resignations from leading police and judicial officials. Still, the danger remains: contracts can create lasting costs, while missing documents can make accountability much harder.

The source does not state that the Student List intends to keep Serbia’s foreign-policy positions unchanged. It focuses almost entirely on domestic issues: the election, corruption allegations, media control, prosecutors, police and the transfer of power. Any specific foreign-policy explanation would therefore go beyond the article.

As general political context, a new government may separate domestic reform from foreign policy. It can try to clean up institutions, investigate alleged abuses and change public contracts without immediately reopening every external commitment. Continuity can also reduce disruption while a new administration is still securing control at home.

That possibility should not be presented as the Student List’s confirmed strategy. The article provides no information about its positions abroad, diplomatic priorities or international commitments. What it does show is a government-in-waiting facing urgent domestic demands and an outgoing party that still controls important state levers.

The Serbian transition shows democracy as both an election and an institutional handover. The Student List won a clear majority, but the SNS still controls many levers of power. That gap matters because media, prosecutors, police, public contracts and administrative offices can shape what a new government is able to do.

The article gives concrete examples. Citizens removed Vucic’s portraits, prosecutors opened electoral-fraud investigations, and a commission examined a prosecutor’s office accused of serving him. The Student List also demanded resignations and asked whistleblowers to report possible document destruction. These steps show that accountability depends on institutions, not only ballots.

The transition remains unsettled. The parliament has not yet convened, and officials can still award contracts or create obligations. Democracy therefore requires both a legitimate result and safeguards that prevent defeated leaders from using state machinery to obstruct, weaken or outlast the incoming government.