Recognising Hamas as 'terror' outfit: Eisenkot lays down conditions for 'broad Zionist government'

Gadi Eisenkot wants a new government built around four shared principles. The first recognises Israel as a Jewish, democratic, liberal and egalitarian state. The second commits partners to the values of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. These conditions define the government’s constitutional and political direction.

The third condition requires compulsory military, civilian or national service for all Israeli citizens. The fourth recognises Hamas as a terrorist organisation and demands the destruction of its military and governing power in Gaza. Eisenkot presented these requirements as the basis for cooperation, not merely as campaign promises.

The offer is politically significant because the election produced no straightforward majority. Eisenkot said every elected lawmaker who accepts the four principles could be a possible partner. He hopes this broad framework can turn the opposition’s 67 seats into a functioning government, avoid another election and end the political crisis surrounding Benjamin Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition.

Recognising Hamas as a terrorist organisation means formally accepting Eisenkot’s description of the group and making that recognition a condition for joining his proposed government. It is a political test for coalition partners. The article does not spell out any separate legal or diplomatic consequences of the label.

Eisenkot pairs recognition with a concrete objective in Gaza. He calls for the destruction of Hamas’s military power and its governing power. In other words, the condition concerns both armed capability and the group’s ability to rule. It goes beyond opposing Hamas’s attacks alone.

This demand would shape any new government’s security policy. Eisenkot said the war’s objectives had not been achieved and that the war against Israel’s enemies was continuing. However, he said he would support military actions before a new government only when direct, immediate threats to Israel could not wait for its swearing-in.

The election produced a 120-member Knesset with no automatic governing majority. Anti-Netanyahu parties won 67 seats. The outgoing coalition won 53. Since a majority requires 61 seats, the opposition bloc was six seats above the threshold on paper.

The numbers alone do not settle who can govern. The 67 opposition seats include 48 held by Zionist parties and 19 held by the Arab-led Joint List and Ra’am. That composition matters because several Jewish opposition leaders are reluctant to cooperate formally with Arab parties. A bloc can therefore have enough seats mathematically but lack a workable political partnership.

Netanyahu’s Likud remained the largest single party with 27 seats. Eisenkot’s Yashar finished second with 21. Eisenkot wants to use the opposition’s parliamentary advantage to build a broad Zionist government, repeal judicial-overhaul laws and establish an inquiry into the failures surrounding 7 October.

A parliamentary bloc is not automatically a governing coalition. Eisenkot’s anti-Netanyahu side has 67 seats, but that total combines different political groups. The article identifies 48 Zionist seats and 19 seats from the Arab-led Joint List and Ra’am. They share opposition to the outgoing coalition, but that does not guarantee agreement on forming or sustaining a government.

The key mechanism is formal cooperation. Several Jewish opposition leaders are reluctant to work with the Arab parties. If those parties are excluded, the remaining Zionist opposition seats may fall below the 61-seat threshold. If they are included, leaders must accept a partnership that some have resisted. The article does not give a more specific reason for that reluctance.

Eisenkot therefore set principles that could allow wider cooperation. He said every elected lawmaker accepting them could be a possible partner. Whether that offer succeeds depends on enough lawmakers signing on and maintaining support after a government is formed.

The Knesset is Israel’s parliament, and the article presents it as the institution that gives confidence to the government. This means a government needs parliamentary backing to be established and sustained. The government does not, in Eisenkot’s formulation, determine whether it has the Knesset’s confidence.

That mechanism explains Eisenkot’s strategy after the election. He says the opposition has a clear parliamentary advantage and wants to use it immediately. His proposed steps include forming a new government, creating a state commission of inquiry into the 7 October failures, making service compulsory and repealing the outgoing government’s judicial-overhaul laws.

The election result still leaves the outcome uncertain. The opposition has 67 seats, but those seats are divided between Zionist and Arab-led parties. Eisenkot must therefore secure enough lawmakers’ support for a government and keep that support intact. Until then, the outgoing government remains in place, while he seeks a broader partnership.

The election’s opposition bloc contains two broad components. Zionist parties hold 48 seats, while the Arab-led Joint List and Ra’am hold 19. Several Jewish opposition leaders are reluctant to cooperate formally with those Arab-led parties. The article presents this as a political barrier, but it does not explain the leaders’ specific reasons.

The mechanism is straightforward. A government needs support from at least 61 members in the 120-seat Knesset. The 48 Zionist opposition seats alone are not enough. Working with the 19 Arab-led seats could provide a large numerical cushion, but it would require an agreement that some Jewish leaders do not want to make.

This leaves Eisenkot with a difficult coalition-building task. He opened the door to any elected lawmaker who accepts his four principles, including recognition of Israel’s character and dismantling Hamas’s power in Gaza. The proposal may widen cooperation, but the article does not say whether Arab-led parties accept those conditions or whether a government will result.

In a parliamentary democracy, a government needs enough lawmakers to support it in the legislature. If no single party wins a majority, parties negotiate a coalition. They agree on shared policies, divide governing responsibilities and rely on one another during confidence votes and other major decisions. The coalition must remain together to govern effectively.

The article provides a concrete example. Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, and 61 are needed for a majority. Anti-Netanyahu parties won 67 seats, but those seats include Zionist and Arab-led parties that may not cooperate. Eisenkot therefore proposed four principles as a basis for bringing potential partners into one government.

The result is not automatic. Parties can have enough seats collectively but still fail to agree on partners or policies. Eisenkot wants to avoid another election and a prolonged political crisis, but he must first secure a workable alliance. The article does not say whether negotiations will succeed or when a new government might be formed.