Russia Launched 36 Ballistic Missiles, 1,940 Drones in the Last Week

Russia's reported weekly attack included three weapon categories: strike drones, guided aerial bombs known as KABs, and missiles. The scale matters because the barrage combines large numbers with fast, difficult-to-intercept weapons. It also targets systems civilians depend on during winter.

According to Volodymyr Zelensky, Russia launched 1,940 strike drones and more than 1,580 KABs. It also fired 44 missiles of various types. Thirty-six of those missiles were ballistic, meaning ballistic weapons made up most of the reported missile total.

The figures cover the week before Zelensky's Sunday announcement. The article links the attacks to damage against electricity infrastructure in several regions and says Russia is exploiting Ukraine's shortage of ballistic interceptors. Ukraine is therefore seeking faster deliveries of Patriot missiles and other air-defense support from partners.

A ballistic missile is a weapon that receives strong acceleration during launch and then travels along a fast, largely predictable arc toward its target. Some can change course, but the defining challenge is speed and the short time between detection and impact. That makes them especially dangerous near cities and infrastructure.

The article says Russian ballistic salvos give air-defense units only minutes to respond. Crews must detect the launch, identify the threat, calculate its path, choose an interceptor, and fire before the missile reaches its target. Every step consumes part of that narrow window.

This speed also reduces opportunities to use slower or less suitable defenses. Zelensky said Russia is making ballistic missiles its primary winter bet while Ukraine faces a shortage of ballistic interceptors. That shortage could leave power facilities and civilian systems more exposed during attacks.

Ballistic-missile defense requires more than detecting an incoming object. The system must track it quickly, predict where it will go, and launch an interceptor fast enough to meet it. Patriot PAC-3 and SAMP/T are specialized surface-to-air systems designed for this demanding task.

Their advantage comes from integrated sensors, rapid fire control, and interceptors built for high-speed targets. The interceptor is directed toward the incoming missile and attempts to destroy it before impact. Many other air-defense systems are optimized for slower aircraft, drones, or different engagement ranges, so they may not reliably handle ballistic threats.

The article specifically identifies Patriot PAC-3 and SAMP/T as systems capable of engaging the missiles described. It also says Ukraine's interceptor shortage is acute. As a result, even a large weapons supply cannot guarantee protection unless enough suitable interceptors are available in time.

When missiles damage substations, transformers, power plants, or transmission lines, electricity may no longer reach homes and public facilities. The immediate effects can include blackouts, disrupted water pumping, and interruptions to municipal heating. Winter temperatures make those failures more dangerous because families and cities need dependable heat.

The article reports strikes on energy facilities in Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi regions. It says the damaged equipment directly supplied residential neighborhoods and municipal heating circuits. On Oct. 30, attacks damaged heat and power plants in Kyiv and Shostka and four Dnipropetrovsk substations, cutting power to about 280,000 households.

Emergency crews worked to isolate damage and restore voltage, but hundreds of thousands of families remained without electricity as temperatures fell. Continued attacks could deepen infrastructure damage and make heating, water services, and daily life increasingly unreliable throughout winter.

Ukraine is asking for existing interceptors because its urgent problem is measured in weeks and months, not years. The country needs protection for power generation, water pumping, and heating systems during the approaching winter. Newly ordered missiles cannot help immediately if factories have long backlogs.

The article says the United States authorized a possible sale of 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles. However, diplomatic sources said these are new-production missiles whose deliveries extend past 2030. Zelensky therefore wants partners to transfer missiles from their active inventories now, rather than wait for that contract to be fulfilled.

Ukraine has proposed emergency loans of 10 to 30 missiles from European arsenals. It would reimburse those countries from the future American procurement. Kyiv has also requested 100 PAC-3 interceptors per month for winter, seeking a dependable defensive perimeter around critical infrastructure.

If enough Patriot interceptors cannot arrive quickly, protection would need several layers rather than one replacement system. Ukraine could combine other air defenses against drones and some missiles with early warning, camouflage, dispersal, and stronger protection around vital equipment. No single measure would fully replace a ballistic interceptor.

Infrastructure operators can also harden facilities, add physical barriers, separate critical equipment, and install backup transformers or generators. Utilities can prepare mobile repair teams and alternate power routes. Demand controls and planned outages may help preserve electricity for hospitals, water pumps, and heating networks when supply is limited.

These options are established defensive measures, but the article does not state that Ukraine has adopted a specific package of them. It emphasizes Patriot and SAMP/T systems, emergency repairs, and international deliveries. Without enough specialized interceptors, damage could still produce wider outages and leave winter services vulnerable.

Generators produce electricity that enters high-voltage transmission lines. Substations switch and route that power, while transformers reduce voltage for safer distribution through local networks. Smaller lines then carry electricity to homes, businesses, water systems, and heating equipment. Each stage must connect properly for service to continue.

A substation can serve as a major junction between long-distance transmission and several local networks. If a missile destroys its transformers or switching equipment, electricity may have no usable path into many communities. The result can be a large outage even when generators elsewhere remain operational.

The article describes strikes on high-voltage substations, power transformers, and primary transmission lines. Earlier attacks on four substations in Dnipropetrovsk helped sever power to roughly 280,000 households. Repair crews can isolate damaged sections and restore voltage, but repeated attacks make the grid harder to stabilize before winter.