Israel's election revealed a divided country

The election exposed a sharp divide over Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership. Supporters saw his wartime record and international defence of Israel as outweighing the failure of 7 October. Opponents blamed him for that failure and argued that Israel could not heal while he remained prime minister.

The geographic contrast was striking. In Sderot, a town badly hit on 7 October, Netanyahu’s bloc won around 70% of the vote. In liberal Tel Aviv, voters delivered an overwhelmingly different verdict. The same election therefore produced two very different political maps.

The final numbers preserved the split. Netanyahu’s right-wing, far-right and ultra-Orthodox coalition fell below the 61 seats needed for a majority, but Likud remained the largest party. His rival Gadi Eisenkot also failed to dominate. Israel’s voters divided their support without producing a simple winner.

The Knesset is Israel’s national parliament. Its elected members belong to different parties, so governing usually requires several parties to cooperate. A majority gives a governing bloc enough seats to pass measures and support a prime minister in parliament.

The crucial threshold in this election was 61 seats. Netanyahu’s coalition included right-wing, far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties, but it finished well short of that number. Likud was still the largest party, yet being largest did not automatically give Netanyahu a government.

That gap made coalition bargaining decisive. Parties must decide whether to join a government, support it from outside, or remain in opposition. The article also notes that no party has ever won a majority alone. Therefore, election night identified the largest force but did not settle who would govern.

Arab citizens supplied the election’s clearest shift. They represent 20% of Israel’s population, and many had previously stayed home because of apathy, alienation, or doubts that voting could change anything. This time, turnout rose sharply, driven partly by opposition to Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Arab-led parties won 19 seats, more than they had ever won before. Their supporters celebrated with the chant, “Go home, Ben-Gvir.” Because Netanyahu’s bloc lacked the 61 seats needed for a majority, those 19 lawmakers could become central to coalition arithmetic.

Their influence remains uncertain. Most opposition parties promised voters they would not enter government with Arab parties. Yet a Hebrew University survey found that 61% of opposition voters favoured an Eisenkot-led government supported by one Arab party. The vote therefore increased Arab political weight, even without guaranteeing power.

Responsibility for 7 October mattered because the attacks became the main lens through which Israelis understood security and leadership. The article describes them as the deadliest day in Israel’s history. In a country shaped by the Holocaust, they revived the fear that Jews could remain unsafe even with a state of their own.

That focus pushed other issues aside. Many Israeli voters concentrated on who had failed to prevent the attacks and whether Netanyahu, the generals, or security chiefs carried the blame. What followed in Gaza, including the war’s cost to Israel’s reputation, barely registered in the campaign.

This explains the difference between outside and domestic views. Abroad, Israel faced accusations of genocide, sanctions and boycotts over Gaza and the Occupied West Bank. Inside Israel, international isolation was usually treated as a public-relations problem, not as evidence that policy itself needed to change.

The election became a referendum on Netanyahu because security was the foundation of his political brand. For decades, he presented himself as the leader uniquely capable of protecting Israel. That claim faced its greatest test when the 7 October attacks occurred while he was prime minister.

Voters therefore judged more than party platforms. Some supporters accepted that Netanyahu shared responsibility but believed his subsequent wars and defence of Israel abroad compensated for the failure. Others blamed generals and security chiefs instead. His opponents placed responsibility squarely on Netanyahu and called him unfit for office.

The results reflected those competing personal judgments. Netanyahu’s bloc remained powerful, and Likud became the largest party, but the coalition missed the 61-seat majority. Gadi Eisenkot ran largely as the “not Netanyahu” candidate, yet his Yashar party finished well behind Likud. The vote rejected a simple verdict.

Arab-led parties became potential kingmakers because Netanyahu’s coalition did not reach the 61 seats required for a majority. Their record total of 19 seats could provide enough parliamentary support to alter the balance between Netanyahu’s bloc and his opponents.

The mechanism is coalition arithmetic. If an Arab party supported an alternative government, or helped prevent Netanyahu from assembling a majority, Netanyahu could lose the prime minister’s office. A Hebrew University survey found that 61% of opposition voters favoured an Eisenkot-led government with one Arab party, suggesting public opinion may be more open than older attitudes indicated.

But seats do not automatically translate into government participation. Most opposition parties had promised voters they would not join a government with Arab parties. The article therefore presents the 19 seats as decisive in theory, but politically difficult to use. Their final impact depends on whether those promises soften.

In a proportional electoral system, parties receive parliamentary seats broadly according to their share of the vote. This allows several political movements to win representation. It also makes a single-party majority unusual, especially when voters are divided across ideological, religious and community lines.

The article shows the consequence clearly. Likud was the largest party, but Netanyahu’s wider bloc still fell short of 61 seats. To govern, parties therefore need agreements with other groups, such as right-wing, far-right, ultra-Orthodox or potentially Arab-led parties. Those negotiations determine who can command parliament.

Coalition bargaining matters because being first is not enough. The article states that no party has ever won a majority alone, so election results often leave the prime ministership unsettled. Here, Arab parties’ record 19 seats could affect the outcome, but opposition promises against joining them made the bargaining especially difficult.