Another 'exploding pager' plot? Israel eyes strike on Tehran’s top military bosses

A pager-style covert operation secretly modifies communication devices so they can later function as weapons. The aim is to strike users when the devices are distributed and operating inside an organization. It can potentially reach many people without a conventional missile attack. The method also creates uncertainty about which equipment is safe.

The article describes Hezbollah’s pagers and walkie-talkies as the clearest example. Explosives were allegedly concealed inside approximately 5,000 AR-924 pagers before delivery. Israeli intelligence then used the devices as remotely activated weapons. A second wave involved handheld walkie-talkies. The article does not explain the activation technology in technical detail, but says the devices exploded across Lebanon.

The approach remains a reported option for Israel against Iran’s military establishment. Former Mossad official Oded Ailam called it fully on the table. Its significance would be disruption and surprise, but the Hezbollah operation also killed at least 39 people and injured more than 3,400, making the method highly consequential.

The reported targets are Ahmad Vahidi, chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; Hossein Taeb, commander of the Basij; Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces; and Mohsen Rezaei, a security official. Former Mossad deputy head of global operations Oded Ailam named them as figures exercising real power in Tehran.

Ailam’s argument is that Iran’s military establishment has become the main centre of power. The article says political leaders are struggling to retain control over strategic decisions. That makes senior commanders important beyond their formal titles. Removing them could affect decisions made during a conflict and increase confusion among military institutions.

The report presents these names as part of a possible operation, not as confirmed targets in an announced attack. It also links military-political disagreements to Tehran’s complicated negotiations with Washington. Any future action would therefore carry consequences for both battlefield command and diplomatic decision-making.

The 2024 Hezbollah device attack was large enough to affect thousands of people across Lebanon. Hezbollah had ordered approximately 5,000 AR-924 pagers, according to the article’s account of Reuters reporting. A separate second wave targeted handheld walkie-talkies used by the group. The devices exploded in multiple locations.

The first wave struck on September 17, 2024. Thousands of pagers exploded almost simultaneously in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. The next day, walkie-talkies exploded in several places, including during funerals. The attacks were therefore spread across two days and multiple communities.

The reported human toll was at least 39 deaths and more than 3,400 injuries. Those figures show why the operation became a major example of covert sabotage using civilian-style equipment. They also explain why a similar plan against Iran’s leadership would carry potentially wide and unpredictable consequences.

The two-wave campaign targeted Hezbollah’s communications network in Lebanon. On September 17, 2024, thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah operatives exploded almost simultaneously. The blasts were reported in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. The scale made ordinary communications equipment part of a coordinated covert attack.

On September 18, a second wave struck handheld walkie-talkies. Explosions occurred in several locations, including during funerals. Reuters reported at least 39 deaths and more than 3,400 injuries from the two attacks. The article says the devices had been modified before reaching Hezbollah, with explosives concealed inside them.

Former Israeli intelligence officers later told CBS News’ 60 Minutes that planning began nearly a decade earlier with booby-trapped walkie-talkies. They said the pager component was developed from 2022 onward. The operation therefore combined long preparation with simultaneous attacks against widely used equipment.

Senior commanders connect political decisions, military planning and battlefield orders. If several are eliminated, authority may become unclear. Subordinates may wait for instructions, compete for control or struggle to coordinate operations. That could slow Iran’s response during a conflict and weaken the chain of command.

The article links this risk to four figures reportedly exercising real power in Tehran. They include the IRGC chief, Basij commander, armed forces chief of staff and a security official. Their roles span military forces and security structures. A coordinated attack on such figures could therefore affect multiple parts of Iran’s wartime leadership at once.

The potential disruption is presented as a reason Israel might consider the operation, not as a confirmed result. The article also says military hardliners and political officials disagree over strategic decisions. Eliminating senior figures could deepen that uncertainty, while also creating new leaders whose actions are difficult to predict.

Communication equipment can offer a covert route into an organization’s daily operations. If devices are modified before distribution, an attacker may be able to target users without first identifying every location physically. The method can also create surprise because the equipment appears ordinary until it is activated. Unlike a conventional strike, it is embedded in the target’s own communications system.

The Hezbollah operation demonstrates the reported mechanism. Approximately 5,000 AR-924 pagers were allegedly modified before reaching the group. Explosives were concealed inside them, and the devices later exploded across Lebanon. A second wave used handheld walkie-talkies. The attacks reached users in neighborhoods, public places and funerals.

Israel might consider such an approach because it could disrupt leadership and communications simultaneously. However, the article records severe consequences: at least 39 deaths and more than 3,400 injuries. It does not establish whether Iran’s equipment is compromised or whether Israel has approved such an operation.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is a major Iranian military and security institution. In established usage, it operates alongside Iran’s regular armed forces and has an important role in protecting the Islamic Republic. The article itself does not provide a full institutional history or structure, so this broader definition comes from well-established background knowledge.

Within the article, the IRGC matters because Ahmad Vahidi is identified as its chief and as one of four people exercising real power in Tehran. The article says Iran’s military establishment has become the principal centre of power. It also describes political leaders as struggling to control strategic decisions.

That positioning gives the IRGC’s leadership significance during a possible conflict. A strike against its chief could affect Iran’s wartime command system and relations between military hardliners and political officials. The article presents this as a reported option under consideration, not a confirmed Israeli operation or an established outcome.