Why India’s bridges are under troubled waters

India’s recent infrastructure failures range from surface damage to catastrophic collapse. Roads have developed potholes and cracks soon after opening. Approach roads have caved in. Railway overbridges have suffered partial structural failure. Bridges have collapsed, sometimes sending vehicles into rivers and killing people. These failures matter because major infrastructure carries commuters, goods, and emergency traffic.

The Kanpur-Lucknow expressway developed dozens of potholes within weeks. The Dehradun approach road collapsed 16 days after inauguration. A Buxar railway overbridge came apart days after opening. The Gambhira Bridge collapsed into the Mahi river, killing 22 people. The Morbi suspension bridge collapsed five days after reopening, killing around 140 people.

The article links failures to weak construction quality, poor drainage, unsuitable materials, structural decay, fatigue, and possibly corner-cutting. Government figures recorded 72 collapsed or seriously deficient national-highway projects from 2020 to 2025. Media reports counted more than 170 bridge and flyover failures between 2021 and 2025.

The reported scale depends on which source and definition are used. Government figures list 72 projects that either collapsed or showed major deficiencies on national highway stretches between 2020 and 2025. This count covers more than complete collapses. It also includes projects with major defects.

Media reports give a broader and higher figure. They suggest over 170 bridge and flyover failures between 2021 and 2025. The two totals cannot be treated as identical because they cover different categories, years, and reporting methods. The article presents both figures rather than choosing one definitive national total.

Together, the figures show that failures are not isolated incidents. They include newly opened roads, bridges, and overbridges, as well as older structures affected by decay. The scale raises concerns about design, materials, construction supervision, maintenance, and pressure to complete projects quickly or cheaply.

Infrastructure failure can turn a transport route into a danger zone. People may die or suffer injuries when bridges collapse under traffic. Survivors and commuters can face diversions, delays, closures, and restricted vehicle access. When a route is severed, communities lose a vital connection for travel, trade, and daily services.

The Gambhira Bridge collapse sent vehicles into the Mahi river, killed 22 people, and severed a vital transport link. On the Kanpur-Lucknow expressway, repairs forced traffic onto diversions and stopped heavy vehicles from using the road. Industrial fans, excavators, and roadrollers operated along the route while damaged sections were repaired.

These disruptions also affect local economies because bridges and highways support connectivity and commerce. The article does not provide a specific financial estimate for local businesses. However, its examples show that failures impose immediate repair costs, lengthen journeys, restrict freight movement, and weaken public confidence in infrastructure meant to serve as a reliable lifeline.

The Kanpur-Lucknow expressway failed quickly because its foundation could not reliably support the pavement in wet conditions. An IIT Kharagpur expert team reportedly identified highly plastic soil beneath the upper layers as the likely cause. The soil was fine-grained silt that weakened when wet and shifted under heavy loads. That made the road surface unstable.

The problem was worsened by inadequate drainage. The expressway’s unpaved shoulders, intended for future expansion, allowed water to collect and become trapped beneath the pavement. Plastic soil is usually stabilized with chemicals to reduce moisture sensitivity, but the article does not state whether that treatment was properly used here. About 80 patches are currently being repaired.

The result was rapid deterioration. Dozens of potholes appeared by early August, only weeks after the mid-July opening. NHAI partially closed the route, used diversions, and barred heavy vehicles. The case shows why soil testing, stabilization, drainage, and construction checks matter before a road opens.

The article identifies different levels of explanation for the two bridge disasters. Gambhira’s collapse was attributed to structural failure. Morbi’s suspension bridge collapsed shortly after reopening, causing a much larger death toll. In both cases, the failures show how support systems, inspection, and post-repair safety checks can determine whether a public bridge remains safe.

A state probe found systemic corrosion at Gambhira, along with crushing of the pedestal and articulation joints supporting the deck. Those joints disintegrated under vehicular pressure, decay, and structural fatigue. The Morbi bridge had undergone six months of renovation by a private company and reopened during Diwali season; it collapsed five days later, killing around 140 people. The article does not state that overcrowding or poor repairs caused it.

The human consequences were severe. Gambhira killed 22 people and severed a vital transport link. Morbi killed about 140, including 55 children, and injured many more. These cases underline the need for competent inspection, careful repairs, and continuing maintenance before and after reopening.

Safe construction is not checked by one person alone. The project owner or public authority normally sets requirements and appoints qualified designers, engineers, inspectors, and independent reviewers. These professionals assess whether a contractor has suitable skills, equipment, manpower, quality systems, and site supervision. Contractors are responsible for providing those resources and following approved designs and methods.

The article names NHAI as the authority that partially closed the Kanpur-Lucknow expressway for repairs. It also says NHAI engaged experts from IIT Kharagpur to investigate the road’s failures. However, the supplied text does not identify which agency or person approved the contractor’s original skills, equipment, staffing, or supervision. It therefore cannot support a more specific attribution.

The wider lesson is shared accountability. Owners must scrutinize bids and monitor work. Engineers must inspect materials, foundations, drainage, and structural details. Contractors must build to specification and report risks. Independent checks and documented inspections can help catch defects before infrastructure opens. This paragraph uses standard engineering practice beyond the article, because the article does not assign those precise duties.

Engineering choices determine whether infrastructure can carry traffic safely over time. Soil must support the pavement or foundations, and sensitive soil may need stabilization. Drainage must remove water rather than trap it below a road. Structures also need load limits based on their design. Regular inspections and maintenance help identify corrosion, cracks, fatigue, and damaged joints before they become critical.

The expressway shows the mechanism clearly. Its highly plastic soil lost strength when wet and shifted under heavy loads. Inadequate drainage and unpaved shoulders trapped water beneath the pavement, contributing to cracks and potholes. At Gambhira, systemic corrosion and fatigue weakened support points. The bridge’s pedestal and articulation joints were crushed and disintegrated under pressure, decay, and structural fatigue.

These examples show that opening a project is not the end of safety work. Materials, water movement, traffic loads, and structural condition must be checked throughout its life. The article does not prescribe specific load limits or maintenance schedules, but standard engineering practice uses design calculations, inspections, repairs, and restrictions to reduce risk.