Israeli opposition accuses Netanyahu of trying to 'delegitimise' election

To delegitimise an election is to undermine public acceptance of its result. To delegitimise a political party is to portray it as an illegitimate or unacceptable participant, even if it followed the rules. This matters because representative governments depend on voters’ choices being recognised and counted.

In this case, Likud alleged that Arab voters had been bribed and that Arab-led parties had “stolen” the election. The Shin Bet investigated possible foreign funding, but later clarified that the investigation did not implicate an entire community. The Central Elections Committee’s acting director general said there was no basis for claims of systematic election violations.

Gadi Eisenkot called Netanyahu’s response an organised campaign to delegitimise the results. The concern was practical as well as rhetorical. If Arab parties were treated as unacceptable partners, Eisenkot’s bloc could lose its only route to forming a government. The dispute therefore affected both trust in the election and coalition negotiations.

The Joint List and Ra’am won 19 seats together in the 120-seat Knesset. That was a record result for the two Arab party lists. Their seats mattered because the election produced no majority for either main political bloc.

Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 seats, while Gadi Eisenkot’s bloc won 48. A government needs support from more than half of the Knesset, so both sides were short. The Arab parties therefore held enough seats to become potential kingmakers. Their support could help one bloc move toward a majority or sustain a government through an agreement.

This position also made the parties central to the political dispute. Eisenkot’s bloc had previously rejected joining a government with Arab parties, but cooperation was its only stated route to power. A Hebrew University poll found that opposition voters most often supported an Eisenkot minority government involving Ra’am and outside support from the Joint List.

Treating Arab parties as illegitimate partners would remove the most direct path for Eisenkot’s bloc to gain governing support. The election left his bloc with 48 seats, below a majority. The Arab lists’ 19 seats could provide crucial backing, so rejecting them could prevent an Eisenkot-led government from taking office.

The key mechanism is coalition arithmetic combined with political acceptability. A party may have the seats needed to help form a government, but cooperation becomes impossible if other parties refuse to work with it. The article says Eisenkot and every member of his bloc except one had previously rejected entering government with Arab parties.

That leaves other possibilities, including a unity government with Netanyahu, a right-wing coalition using defectors from Eisenkot’s bloc, or an Eisenkot minority government supported by Arab parties. If government formation fails through the prescribed stages, new elections will be called.

After an election without a majority, Israel uses a staged government-formation process. The president appoints a party leader whom the president believes has the best chance of building a majority. This gives coalition negotiations a formal starting point instead of automatically rewarding the largest bloc.

The first nominee has up to 42 days to form a government. If that attempt fails, the task passes to a second nominee, who receives 28 days. If necessary, a third candidate receives a further 14-day period. These deadlines create successive opportunities for parties to negotiate support.

If no government is formed after those stages, new elections are called. In this election, that possibility mattered because Netanyahu’s bloc had 53 seats and Eisenkot’s had 48, while the Arab parties held 19. The president therefore had to consider who could assemble a workable coalition, not simply who led one bloc.

The Joint List and Ra’am are Arab-led party lists that competed in the election. Together, they won a record 19 seats in the Knesset. Their result gave Arab political representation unusual influence because neither major bloc reached a majority.

The main mechanism was turnout. For years, many Arab citizens boycotted Israeli elections because they believed voting would legitimise a system treating them as second-class citizens. This time, turnout rose as many sought to remove Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition. The stronger vote translated directly into more parliamentary seats.

Those seats made the two lists potential kingmakers. Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 seats and Eisenkot’s bloc won 48, leaving both short of a majority. The election therefore shifted attention toward possible agreements with Ra’am or the Joint List. A Hebrew University poll found support among opposition voters for an Eisenkot minority government involving Ra’am and outside support from the Joint List.

The election produced three plausible coalition options because neither main bloc could govern alone. Netanyahu’s bloc had 53 seats, while Eisenkot’s bloc had 48. The Arab lists held 19 seats, making them central to one possible governing arrangement.

The first option was a national unity government involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot. The second was a right-wing coalition involving Netanyahu and defectors from Eisenkot’s bloc. The third was an Eisenkot-led government supported by Arab parties. The article specifically describes this as a possible government involving Arab support.

Each option faced a political obstacle. Cooperation between Netanyahu and Eisenkot would require unity between rivals. Defections would change the balance inside Eisenkot’s bloc. Eisenkot’s bloc had largely refused to enter government with Arab parties, although speculation suggested an agreement might still be reached. A poll found opposition voters preferred a minority government with Ra’am and outside Joint List support.

Legal acceptance of election results is essential because representative democracy depends on votes being counted and political power changing according to lawful procedures. A result cannot be accepted only when it benefits one side. If a minority community’s votes are dismissed, that community loses meaningful representation and the wider system becomes less credible.

This election showed why the principle matters. The Joint List and Ra’am won 19 seats after increased turnout among Arab citizens. Their seats could determine which bloc forms a government. Netanyahu’s allegations of bribery and foreign interference therefore affected not just the parties involved, but the status of voters whose choices changed the parliamentary balance.

The institutions described in the article did not confirm widespread wrongdoing. Shin Bet said its investigation did not implicate an entire community, and the acting CEC director said there was no basis for systematic violations. Respecting that process leaves coalition decisions to elected parties rather than accusations alone.