Araghchi says Hormuz could be reopened within two days if conditions met

Abbas Araghchi said Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz within two days if Washington accepts Iran’s conditions. The proposal would restore navigation on the second day, making the timeline much shorter than Iran’s original seven-day plan. The statement matters because Hormuz is a major international shipping route.

On day one, the United States would implement a set of measures. These include lifting sanctions imposed after the Islamabad memorandum collapsed, restoring June oil waivers, reducing US military forces in the region, releasing frozen Iranian funds, and recognizing the Iran-Oman shipping route. The conditions also call for closing other routes and ending the war on all fronts, especially attacks on Lebanon.

Araghchi said the two-day schedule came after Qatar asked Iran to shorten the original timetable. Under the proposal, Washington acts first, and Iran reopens the strait the next day. The article does not say whether the United States accepted these conditions or whether reopening occurred.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. It connects the gulf with the Gulf of Oman, which opens into the Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean. Iran lies along its northern side, while Oman controls territory on its southern side.

Its geography makes it a gateway rather than a destination. Ships carrying crude oil, refined fuels, and liquefied natural gas must use the strait to move between many Gulf ports and international markets. Because the passage is relatively narrow, disruptions can affect many vessels at once. Ships also follow designated navigation channels to reduce collision risks.

The article focuses on a new route designated by Iran and Oman. Araghchi said Iran wants the United States to recognize that route and close all others as part of a reopening agreement. The article does not provide the route’s exact coordinates. Its broader importance comes from the large volume of energy normally transported through Hormuz.

Iran wants Washington to formally recognize a new shipping route designated by Iran and Oman. It also wants every other route closed. In practical terms, that would make the jointly designated channel the agreed pathway for ships using the Strait of Hormuz. The demand is one of several conditions for restoring navigation.

The article does not explain why Iran selected this route or provide its coordinates. It does show how the condition would work: the United States recognizes the route, other routes are closed, and navigation returns after the other measures are implemented. This creates a single, clearly specified channel rather than several competing routes.

The requirement also gives the issue legal and political weight. Recognition would mean Washington accepts the route as part of the proposed arrangement, not merely as a temporary shipping option. The article does not say whether the United States accepted the demand. Therefore, its immediate effect remains conditional on negotiations and implementation.

The article does not give a volume or percentage for energy passing through Hormuz. Established energy-flow estimates commonly place the strait’s oil traffic at around one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption, though the exact share changes with market conditions. It also carries roughly one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade.

These estimates count flows moving through the waterway, not necessarily all energy produced by nearby countries. The route connects Gulf exporters with customers in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere. A blockage can therefore affect international supply chains even when oil and gas production continues. The scale explains why governments and markets closely watch any threat to navigation.

The precise percentage varies by year and by whether analysts count crude oil, petroleum products, or total liquids. Because the source article does not state a figure, the estimates here come from established energy-market reporting rather than the supplied text. They provide context for why Araghchi’s proposed two-day reopening could matter beyond Iran and the United States.

If navigation through Hormuz remains blocked, oil supplies would not necessarily disappear immediately, but deliveries would become slower and less predictable. Tankers might wait, turn around, or seek longer routes. Buyers could compete for fewer available cargoes, creating pressure in regional and global markets.

Shipping costs would likely rise because vessels would need extra time, fuel, crews, and insurance coverage. Traders may also pay more for emergency transport and alternative supplies. Oil prices could increase if markets fear that a large share of exports is unavailable. Countries with limited storage or few alternative suppliers would face the greatest strain.

The eventual impact would depend on the duration of the blockage, available pipeline capacity, stockpiles, and exporters’ ability to reroute cargoes. A brief interruption could cause volatility without a lasting shortage. A long disruption could raise fuel costs, affect transport and industry, and increase inflation. The article itself does not quantify these consequences.

Oil exporters have several possible responses if tankers cannot cross Hormuz. They can send crude through pipelines to ports outside the strait, load cargoes at alternative terminals, or use stored oil to maintain deliveries. Some exporters may also redirect shipments through longer maritime routes when geography and port capacity allow.

Pipelines can provide the fastest bypass, but only countries connected to suitable systems can use them. Alternative ports may lack enough loading capacity, while longer voyages require more ships, fuel, time, and insurance. Governments can release strategic reserves to cushion temporary shortages. Buyers may also switch suppliers or use different grades of crude if available.

These methods reduce pressure but do not create unlimited replacement capacity. Some producers depend heavily on Gulf terminals inside the strait, and routes outside the area may already be busy. The article does not identify any specific alternative route or method. The practical result would depend on infrastructure, reserves, shipping availability, and how long navigation stayed blocked.

Economic and military tools create leverage because they affect what another country can sell, buy, access, or safely transport. Sanctions can block trade and financial transactions. Frozen funds prevent access to money already held abroad. Oil waivers can allow limited exports despite broader restrictions. Military forces can deter movement, protect shipping, or increase pressure.

In the article, Washington’s possible concessions cover all four areas. Araghchi called for lifting US sanctions, reinstating oil waivers granted in June, releasing frozen Iranian funds including money in Qatar, and reducing the US military presence in the region. Iran linked those steps to reopening Hormuz and restoring navigation.

This turns trade-route access into part of a wider bargain. The United States could offer economic relief and reduce military pressure, while Iran would reopen the waterway under the proposed schedule. The article also lists recognition of the Iran-Oman route and ending the war on all fronts as conditions. It does not say whether Washington agreed.