Israel, US have plan ready for third Iran war, Tehran's hidden weapons pose challenges - analysis

The reported plan begins with a coordinated air campaign. Israel and the United States would divide Iran into operational sectors and attack different parts of the country. The first objective would be air supremacy, allowing later strikes to continue with less resistance.

Israel would concentrate on western Iran and Tehran. American forces would focus on southern Iran and some targets around Tehran. The article says this arrangement worked previously and could be repeated. Israeli F-35s reportedly attacked Iran’s radar four times from April 2024 onward, helping F-15s and F-16s conduct major bombing raids.

The campaign would then expand through drones and additional attacks. Drones could remain over targets for long periods, although they are easier to shoot down than fighter jets. The article argues that Iran has little ability to prevent Israeli and American aircraft from dominating the skies, but it could still attack regional targets and disrupt daily life.

Air supremacy is control of the airspace over a battlefield. In this article’s scenario, it means Iran could not effectively stop Israeli and American aircraft from reaching targets. That matters because later attacks would depend on repeated sorties, surveillance, and access to sites across Iran.

The article describes Israeli F-35s outwitting and eliminating Iranian radar four times since April 2024. F-15s and F-16s then carried out large bombing raids. Once hostile radar and air defenses are weakened, drones can stay above targets for extended periods and support continuing attacks, even though drones are easier to shoot down than fighter jets.

The article says Israel and the United States have little difficulty establishing aircraft dominance. However, air supremacy would not automatically end Iran’s ability to fight. Iran could disperse missile forces, fire smaller barrages, adapt its targets, and attack bases and Israeli territory despite losing control of the skies.

The reported air campaign would be enormous. The article says more than 200 Israeli fighter jets struck Iran in the first wave. It also describes a division of labor between Israeli and American forces, suggesting that the campaign would involve repeated attacks across several sectors rather than one limited raid.

Israel has reportedly used F-35s to defeat Iranian radar, followed by F-15s and F-16s for major bombing raids. Against nuclear sites, the United States used 12 Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs weighing 30,000 pounds each to attack the deeply buried Fordow facility. The article presents these as the largest weapons used in that operation.

The weapons may still have limits. Fordow was considered deep enough that some Israeli military officials doubted smaller Israeli weapons could damage it permanently. Pickaxe Mountain is described as deeper still, raising questions about whether even American MOP bombs could destroy it completely.

Deeply buried facilities are difficult to destroy because their important rooms, equipment, and tunnels are shielded by enormous layers of mountain. A bomb may damage entrances or cause collapses without eliminating the entire complex. This makes underground sites harder to assess and harder to disable permanently from the air.

Fordow illustrates the problem. It was buried deeply enough that many senior Israeli military officials believed smaller Israeli weapons could not cause lasting damage. The United States therefore used 12 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs against it. The article describes Pickaxe Mountain as much deeper than Fordow.

That depth creates uncertainty over whether even American MOP bombs could destroy Pickaxe Mountain. The facility is also described as large and sprawling, with tunnels, shafts, and other visible assets. Destroying one section might not stop operations elsewhere, especially if Iran can repair collapsed areas or move material through alternate routes.

If bombs cannot destroy an underground facility outright, the goal becomes disruption. The article describes causing cave-ins across the complex before Iran moves important nuclear material, machinery, or technical know-how inside. This would aim to make the site unusable or delay its operation rather than guarantee total destruction.

A survey by the Institute for Science and International Security identifies two possible ventilation shafts at Pickaxe Mountain. It also highlights eastern and western primary tunnel entrances as likely routes for transporting nuclear assets. Striking these points could interfere with airflow, access, and movement into the mountain. Other visible assets might also require attacks.

The approach remains uncertain because Pickaxe Mountain is large and sprawling. The article says all identified locations would need to be struck at minimum, but even that might not be enough. The broader lesson is that underground facilities may require repeated attacks and careful timing before they become operational.

Iran adapted by making its missile force harder to eliminate in one campaign. Instead of firing huge, concentrated barrages from a few centralized sites, it spread missile crews across the country. It often launched only small barrages at a time, creating a more distributed and persistent threat.

The mechanism was endurance through dispersion. Smaller launches did not threaten massive nationwide destruction, according to the article, but they were frequent and continuous. As a result, much of the country regularly shut down. Iran also watched where Israel concentrated air defenses and shifted attacks toward less-protected areas.

The article gives a sharp example: Iran struck southern Israel with high lethality only days after Israeli officials said the area could return to normal because Iranian launches there had declined. Iran also reportedly destroyed American bases in several countries in early 2026, causing at least $5 billion in damage. Control of the skies therefore did not end the missile threat.

Highly enriched uranium is uranium with a greatly increased concentration of the isotope used to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. Centrifuges are machines that separate uranium isotopes and raise that concentration. These definitions come from established scientific knowledge; the article itself does not define either term.

Their combination matters because enrichment requires both suitable material and operating equipment. If Iran moved highly enriched uranium and centrifuges into a deeply hidden facility, outside forces might struggle to monitor what happens there. Pickaxe Mountain is described as a possible site where such assets could be concealed under a mountain.

The concern is nuclear breakout: a rapid move from having the necessary materials and equipment to producing a weapon before opponents can intervene. The article says that if Iran moved both assets into Pickaxe Mountain and made the facility operational, it could conceivably move toward a nuclear weapon without anyone knowing or being able to stop it from the air.

If Iran moved highly enriched uranium and centrifuges into Pickaxe Mountain and made the site operational, the facility could become a concealed nuclear-production center. The concern would not be merely the existence of an underground site. It would be the combination of nuclear material, enrichment machinery, and protection from attack.

The article says Iran could conceivably sneak out to a nuclear weapon without anyone knowing or being able to do anything from the air. Pickaxe Mountain is reportedly much deeper than Fordow, and experts question whether even 30,000-pound American MOP bombs could destroy it. Its tunnels and ventilation shafts could also support hidden operations and movement.

That possibility explains President Donald Trump’s focus on the facility, even though sources told The Jerusalem Post it was not yet operational. Israeli officials have pressed Trump to act. Iran’s harsh responses to his threats indicate that Tehran also views the facility as a major strategic asset.