Israel ready to strike Iran with US, but specific joint goals remain unclear - sources

The reported plan is a possible joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran. It could begin after the November 3 midterm elections if President Donald Trump asks Israel to join. The central uncertainty is not whether both countries can strike, but whether they agree on the operation’s goals.

The United States would likely use its air force for a short campaign aimed at pressuring Iran over its nuclear program and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Israel’s military would focus more on reducing specific threats. Possible targets include nuclear facilities, missile-production sites, weapons-related locations, and strategic systems.

The operation remains uncertain. More than 10 US transport aircraft recently arrived at Israeli air bases, and air-defense systems reportedly moved into the region. Caine believes military pressure may be one of the last options left, but he is unsure a short campaign can achieve Trump’s goals.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It is a major route for ships moving in and out of the Gulf. Because traffic must pass through a relatively restricted corridor, military tension there can quickly affect regional security and international trade.

In the article, reopening Hormuz is one of Trump’s central objectives. The US president wants Iran to make concessions on the nuclear issue and allow the strait to function normally. That goal differs from Israel’s broader emphasis on ending threats from Tehran through extensive military force.

The practical problem is that a short US operation may not compel Iran to stop disrupting the waterway. Caine worries Iran could keep firing ballistic missiles after American bombing ends. Washington therefore faces a difficult choice: accept a limited campaign or risk a longer conflict to pursue wider security goals.

The buildup is significant but its exact scale remains unclear. Over one week, more than 10 US military transport aircraft arrived at Israel’s Nevatim and Uvda air bases. Their arrival appeared to prepare the ground for a serious operation against Iran.

The article also reports movements of US air-defense systems and interceptors to Israel and other Arab allies. However, it does not state how many systems or interceptors were moved. The key mechanism is preparation: transport aircraft can bring personnel and equipment, while air defenses help protect forces and allies from Iranian retaliation.

The military presence is not yet at its previous peak. The article explicitly says fewer US forces are in the region than during earlier periods. That makes the deployment a starting point rather than proof that an attack has been ordered. Further movements would reveal whether Washington is preparing for a limited strike or a larger campaign.

Israeli military planners appear focused on damaging capabilities that could threaten Israel or let Iran rebuild its nuclear and missile programs. The article identifies the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility as one possible target. It also mentions sites connected to highly enriched uranium, weapons development, ballistic missiles, and strategic systems.

Potential actions could include striking a new or repaired missile-production site, newly opened weapons-group facilities, or systems linked to space-related weapons. Israel might also try to reduce the danger that Iran could recover its 60% highly enriched uranium from the rubble of three previously bombed nuclear sites. Top energy facilities have also faced public Israeli threats.

The target list is not final. Israel and the United States disagree about the purpose of a renewed operation. Israel’s military stresses specific threats, while Netanyahu discusses regime change. It remains unclear whether top Iranian officials would be targeted, especially after previous assassinations failed to end the regime’s hardline position.

Different objectives could turn one operation into an uncontrolled conflict. Trump wants a brief campaign that pressures Iran into nuclear concessions and reopens Hormuz. Israeli officials have emphasized a longer-term end to threats from Tehran, using extensive kinetic force. Those aims require different timelines and definitions of success.

The mechanism is straightforward. If US bombing ends after a few days, Iran may continue firing ballistic missiles across the region. Israel could then decide that its threats remain active and continue attacking. Conversely, if Israel expands the campaign, Washington could lose control over the short operation it wanted and face pressure to defend its forces and allies.

The article does not predict the outcome, but it highlights the unresolved disagreement. Caine doubts a short campaign will reach Trump’s goals, yet views military pressure as one of the last options. A divided strategy could therefore produce escalation without securing either negotiations or lasting threat reduction.

The article describes several approaches short of a new attack. The United States has relied on economic pressure and attempted to obtain concessions through negotiations. Trump also issued earlier threats to attack, including in August and October, but pulled back. These efforts were intended to change Iran’s behavior without launching another major operation.

Their weakness, according to the article, is that Iran has not moved toward an agreement. Caine now believes Iran will not meet Trump’s minimum goals on the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz without additional military pressure. He also sees no sign that economic pressure alone will produce a deal at any discernible point.

The situation remains contested. Some advisers previously doubted whether attacking would be useful, and some sources reject claims that the US military has shifted position. Still, after the midterms, sources say the political and military barriers to force could be reduced. Military action is being considered because other methods have not secured concessions.

Regime change requires more than destroying buildings, weapons, or economic assets. A government can lose infrastructure while its leaders, security organizations, and political networks remain intact. Military pressure may also strengthen hardline forces by encouraging them to rally around the regime rather than abandon it.

The article provides a relevant example. Israel has killed dozens of top Iranian officials twice since June 2025, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet other senior figures maintained a hardline stance afterward. That suggests leadership losses did not automatically produce political collapse or concessions.

The current disagreement reflects this problem. Netanyahu continues to discuss regime change, while the IDF focuses on specific threat reduction. Trump instead wants limited pressure for nuclear concessions and the reopening of Hormuz. Even if attacks damage Iran’s economy and military programs, the article gives no evidence that they would remove the regime or make a short campaign achieve lasting political change.