Ukraine's 'shoot the archer' strategy is far from a silver bullet

“Shoot the archer” means attacking Russian ballistic-missile launchers inside Russia before they can launch missiles at Ukrainian cities. Ukraine is considering this because it expects to enter winter with too few Patriot interceptors to defend against Russian ballistic-missile attacks. The goal is prevention at the source.

The plan would use Ukrainian drones, aircraft, or other weapons to locate and strike mobile Russian systems. Proposed American support includes Starlink access over Russian territory, targeting assistance, command and control, and counter-electronic-warfare help. Extended-range attack munitions fired from upgraded F-16s are another option.

The strategy could improve Ukraine’s ability to disrupt attacks, but the article says it offers no guarantee. Russian launchers hide, move quickly, and use “shoot-and-scoot” tactics. The proposal could therefore consume American support while bringing the United States closer to direct conflict with Russia.

Ukraine is seeking American help to find and destroy Russian ballistic-missile launchers inside Russia. Its highest priority is permission to use Starlink over Russian territory. The proposed support would help Ukrainian drones receive targeting information, command and control, and assistance against electronic warfare.

A second proposal involves ERAMs, or extended-range attack munitions, fired from Ukrainian F-16s. The United States has approved the sale of these munitions, but Ukraine currently uses them only with older Soviet aircraft. Its F-16s lack the needed software and hardware integration for updating targets during an operation.

The required F-16 upgrade is described as fairly straightforward. Even so, neither option guarantees success. Russian launchers are concealed, mobile, and able to move off-road, so intelligence and weapons must find them before they relocate. The support would also increase American involvement in attacks inside Russia.

The supplied text does not provide an estimate for the number of Russian missile launchers Ukraine might destroy. It also gives no measurement for how much Russian territory proposed Starlink access could cover. Those figures cannot be calculated reliably from the information provided.

The article describes capabilities rather than a numerical forecast. Starlink could support targeting, command and control, and counter-electronic-warfare assistance for Ukrainian drones. ERAMs fired from upgraded F-16s could add another way to attack mobile launchers. Neither option is presented as a guaranteed solution.

The available evidence points to uncertainty, not a fixed strike total or coverage area. Launchers are hidden in forests, tree lines, industrial buildings, and warehouses. They can also move quickly across off-road terrain. Because the source omits the requested figures, a precise answer would require speculation.

Russian ballistic-missile launchers are difficult targets because Ukraine must locate them during a narrow window before they move. Russia positions Iskander and other systems near Ukraine, often hiding them in dense forests, tree lines, old industrial buildings, or warehouses. Concealment limits what surveillance can see.

The launchers can travel quickly across off-road terrain. Russian crews can fire and then relocate, a method described as “shoot-and-scoot.” By the time Ukrainian forces identify a launcher, its position may already have changed. Mobile targets are harder to hit than fixed facilities.

Night operations create another problem. Many Ukrainian efforts would occur after dark, when finding and tracking launchers becomes more difficult. Starlink, targeting intelligence, and dynamically updated ERAM targeting could improve the hunt, but the article says the fundamental challenge would remain. Better tools do not guarantee timely detection or destruction.

If Ukraine destroyed only some Russian launchers, the remaining systems could continue attacking Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The article warns that an offensive against launchers would not guarantee protection. Ballistic-missile defense depends on finding enough mobile systems before they fire, not merely damaging a portion of them.

Russian launchers can hide, relocate, and use shoot-and-scoot tactics. That means a strike might miss, hit an empty location, or destroy one launcher while others survive elsewhere. The United States struggled with similar problems in Iraq and Iran despite stronger conventional capabilities and advanced intelligence.

Ukraine could therefore spend scarce weapons and accept greater escalation without solving its air-defense challenge. The article presents source attacks as an added capability, not a replacement for reliable protection. If most launchers remain operational, Russian missile attacks could continue, leaving cities and infrastructure vulnerable through the winter.

The Gulf War and recent U.S. campaigns suggest that air power alone rarely eliminates mobile missile launchers as completely as planners expect. Finding a launcher is difficult, and a detected system may move before aircraft can strike. Superior technology improves the search but does not remove the problem.

During the 1991 Gulf War, the United States flew 1,500 sorties searching for Iraqi Scud launchers. It achieved few, if any, confirmed successful hits. The Pentagon then used special forces to roam the desert looking for launchers. Against Iran, more than 10,000 American sorties still failed to suppress missile fire fully.

Some reports say Iran retains 50% of its launchers, many hidden underground. These cases warn against describing Ukraine’s proposal as easy or foolproof. Ukraine faces its own obstacles against Russian systems concealed near the border, moving quickly, and operating at night. Air strikes could disrupt attacks, but they cannot promise elimination.

The risk comes from making American systems part of attacks on Russian territory. Intelligence identifies targets, Starlink could provide command and control, and upgraded aircraft could deliver weapons against mobile launchers. These forms of assistance would connect U.S. capabilities directly to combat operations rather than merely supplying equipment.

The proposed Starlink role illustrates the mechanism. Ukraine wants access over Russia to support drones with targeting and counter-electronic-warfare assistance. F-16 upgrades would let ERAMs receive dynamically updated target locations. If American-enabled operations struck Russian launchers, Moscow could view the United States as directly participating.

The article therefore frames the plan as another step toward direct U.S.-Russia war. It also warns that accepting such a role could expose the U.S. homeland in future conflicts. Even if the strikes improved Ukraine’s ability to disrupt missiles, they could create strategic risks beyond the immediate battlefield.