Who Holds Power in Albania as Protests Grow

A parliamentary republic divides leadership between a governing prime minister and a largely ceremonial head of state. The prime minister leads the government and depends on parliament’s support. The president represents the state and performs constitutional duties, but does not normally run day-to-day government. This structure makes parliamentary control central to political power.

In Albania, parliament chooses the president. President Bajram Begaj appointed Edi Rama’s fourth cabinet on 12 September 2025, and parliament backed it in a confidence vote days later. Rama’s Socialist Party won the 2025 election and governs without coalition partners.

That arrangement gives Rama direct control of government policy while parliament remains the institution that can support or oppose his cabinet. The president’s role is separate from Rama’s executive authority. During the current unrest, Rama has refused to resign, and his party’s parliamentary strength has allowed his government to remain in office.

Edi Rama’s Socialist Party controls 83 of Albania’s 140 parliamentary seats. It won 53.27% of the vote in the 11 May 2025 election and governs without coalition partners. This is a clear majority, so Rama does not need another party’s support to form or sustain his government under ordinary parliamentary conditions.

The Democratic Party alliance holds 50 seats, while four smaller parties share the remaining seven. The numbers give Rama’s party control of the main parliamentary balance. Parliament backed his fourth cabinet in a confidence vote days after President Bajram Begaj appointed it in September 2025.

That majority matters because street protests alone do not automatically remove a prime minister. Rama can remain in office while his party retains parliamentary support. However, the majority does not end public pressure, legal scrutiny, or possible political costs. The article gives no indication that the Socialist majority has collapsed or that an election date has been set.

The protests have several strands rather than one single organizer. Democratic Party-led demonstrations began in November 2025. The Flamingo Revolution began in May 2026 near Vlorë and opposed a luxury resort project linked to Jared Kushner’s investment firm. The current movement is student-led and became violent on 13 October 2026.

The article does not state one formal list of student demands. It does show that the protests are testing Rama’s government, because Rama has refused to resign. Police said they had arrested 167 people by 17 October. They used water cannon, tear gas, and rubber bullets, while seven officers were suspended over alleged abuse.

On 30 October, Interior Minister Ervin Demo said 347 people had been injured over two weeks. The stated breakdown included 200 police officers, 107 protesters, and 39 bystanders, including journalists. The government also approved large fines for people remaining in crowds that become violent, subject to parliamentary approval.

Sali Berisha, a former prime minister and president, leads the Democratic Party, Albania’s main opposition. His alliance won 32.93% of the vote in 2025 but secured 50 seats, compared with the Socialists’ 83. The opposition therefore challenges a government that has a strong parliamentary majority and no coalition partner.

The OSCE described the election as competitive and professionally run. It also reported misuse of public resources, pressure on voters, and an uneven playing field. Those findings give the opposition grounds to question the fairness of the political system, even though the election result stands in the article’s account.

Courts and prosecutors add another layer. SPAK brought a passive-corruption case against Berisha over a Tirana sports-complex privatisation, and his trial opened in July 2025. Former deputy prime minister Belinda Balluku faces a separate alleged tender-rigging case. Both are presumed innocent, and the article does not confirm Berisha’s latest court stage.

If protests continue, Albania could face more clashes, arrests, injuries, and restrictions on public gatherings. The government has already approved fines of up to 500,000 lek for people who remain in crowds that turn violent. Parliament must approve that measure within 45 days, so the response could become a further political flashpoint.

The protests do not automatically remove Rama. His Socialist Party holds 83 of 140 seats and governs alone. That majority gives him parliamentary support, while no election date has been set. Rama has also refused to resign, showing that street pressure has not yet produced a formal transfer of power.

The likely immediate consequence is continued political strain rather than an automatic change of government. More violence could damage trust in police and institutions, while opposition protests could grow. The article does not state that parliament is preparing a no-confidence vote, that Rama will resign, or that early elections are planned.

Albania is a NATO member and an EU candidate country, so political stability, policing, courts, and public trust matter to its international relationships. The article does not state that unrest has changed Albania’s NATO standing or triggered a response from the United States. Any effect on those relationships therefore remains uncertain.

The clearest immediate external marker is the EU’s yearly report on candidate countries, due on 4 November. The report will arrive after weeks of protests, police violence allegations, arrests, and government efforts to penalize people who remain in violent crowds. Those events could become relevant to outside assessments of Albania’s institutions and reform progress.

The United States connection also appears through the Flamingo Revolution. That movement opposes a luxury resort project linked to Jared Kushner’s investment firm, and Kushner is the son-in-law of President Donald Trump. The article records the connection but reports no US government position or diplomatic consequence.

Elections give governments authority, but legitimacy also depends on whether voters face a fair choice. Courts must apply rules consistently, police must protect people without abusive force, and citizens must be able to protest peacefully. These safeguards let people challenge power without violence and help governments keep public trust after elections.

Albania’s 2025 vote shows why these standards matter. The OSCE called it competitive and professionally run, but also reported misuse of public resources, pressure on voters, and an uneven playing field. During the protests, police used water cannon, tear gas, and rubber bullets. Seven officers were suspended over alleged abuse, while courts are handling corruption cases involving senior political figures.

These facts do not by themselves decide whether Albania is democratic or legitimate. They show the institutions being tested. A government can hold a parliamentary majority and still face serious questions about fairness, accountability, policing, and protest rights. The article reports no final judgment on those questions.