Ukraine is now attacking via gas pipelines too – NYT reporter describes the sight underground as post-apocalyptic

Operation Veles was a rare Ukrainian counterattack near Kupiansk in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. Instead of advancing mainly across the exposed surface, troops used underground pipelines to reach positions behind Russian forces. The operation mattered because the battlefield above ground is heavily saturated with drones, making concealed movement increasingly important.

According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, troops from Ukraine’s 2nd Army Corps travelled more than 15 kilometres through underground pipes. Ukraine says the attack caused more than 100 Russian military casualties and led to the capture of over 30 prisoners. The abandoned network had once carried natural gas between Ukraine and Russia.

These results have not been independently verified. Still, the operation highlights a wider battlefield adaptation: both sides are trying to use buried infrastructure as well as surface routes. Ihor Obolenskyi called Veles Ukraine’s first comparable attack of the war, suggesting underground operations may receive more attention.

A gas pipeline is a network of connected pipes built to transport natural gas between locations. When such infrastructure is abandoned, its tunnels and service spaces may still provide a continuous underground route. That can allow soldiers to move while remaining largely below the surface, rather than crossing open ground.

Near Kupiansk, journalists described a huge underground service centre at least three metres high and hundreds of metres long. It connected to a hidden network of former gas pipelines. The network once carried gas between Ukraine and Russia, but parts of it were no longer in use. Ukrainian troops reportedly used it as a route during Operation Veles.

The route was not simply an ordinary road underground. Soldiers needed to navigate service areas and pipes, then emerge near the intended target. The article presents this as a way to exploit existing infrastructure in a battlefield where movement above ground is exposed to drones.

The reported distance of the attack was more than 15 kilometres underground. That is the distance Ukrainian forces allegedly covered through pipelines while moving towards the Russian rear near Kupiansk. The figure suggests a substantial operation rather than a short movement between nearby positions.

The wider abandoned gas network in the Kupiansk area is much larger. Maria Varenikova reported that it extends for about 129 kilometres in total. She also described a subterranean service centre that was hundreds of metres long and at least three metres high. These spaces were built for gas infrastructure, not originally for military operations.

The figures show both the route’s reach and its potential scale. However, the reported Ukrainian results, including the distance, come from Ukrainian accounts and have not been independently confirmed. The article does not establish how much of the 129-kilometre network was usable or used during Operation Veles.

Underground movement can help troops avoid the main surveillance problem described in the article: a surface battlefield saturated with drones. Pipes and service spaces place soldiers beneath the visible terrain, making them harder for airborne observers to spot while they move. This matters because a force that is not seen is harder to track and target.

Operation Veles reportedly used an abandoned gas network near Kupiansk. Ukrainian troops travelled through the pipes instead of crossing exposed ground. The network included a concealed service centre and routes that once carried gas between Ukraine and Russia. These structures gave the soldiers cover during at least part of their approach.

The protection is not absolute. Underground routes can be difficult, confined, and vulnerable once troops emerge. The article also says Ukraine’s claims have not been independently verified. Even so, the operation illustrates why both sides are exploring underground infrastructure as an alternative to movement across drone-observed terrain.

Earlier Russian attacks showed Ukraine that pipelines could serve as military routes. During fighting in Russia’s Kursk region, Russian forces carried out a similar assault through an underground gas pipeline near Sudzha. Russia described that operation as a success, making it a visible example of the tactic’s possible value.

Ihor Obolenskyi, commander of Ukraine’s 2nd Army Corps, told The Atlantic that Ukrainian forces learned from the Russian method. They then used a comparable approach in the Kupiansk area during Operation Veles. The basic mechanism was the same: move underground through existing gas infrastructure and emerge in or near the opposing force’s rear.

The article also reports that several dozen Russian soldiers may have suffocated during the Sudzha operation, according to some accounts. That detail shows the danger of such routes. Ukraine’s use of the tactic was therefore both an imitation and an adaptation, while Obolenskyi called it Ukraine’s first comparable attack of the war.

The main public claim comes from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. He said Ukraine’s 2nd Army Corps advanced more than 15 kilometres through underground pipes, caused over 100 Russian military casualties, and captured more than 30 prisoners. Ihor Obolenskyi, the corps commander, also described the operation and its origins.

The account is supported in the article by descriptions from Maria Varenikova, a New York Times journalist who followed Ukrainian preparations underground. Her reporting describes the service centre and former gas network near Kupiansk. She provides context about the physical route, but that does not independently confirm the claimed casualties, prisoners, or full operational outcome.

The article explicitly states that Ukraine’s information about the results could not be verified by independent sources. Therefore, the claims should be treated as Ukrainian-reported figures, not established facts. The operation may still be significant as an example of underground tactics, even while its exact success remains uncertain.

Modern armies use underground spaces to hide people, equipment, and movement from sensors and precision weapons. Burial provides physical cover, while concealed entrances and existing infrastructure can make routes harder to detect. This can reduce the advantage gained by forces watching the surface. The article directly illustrates this through the Ukrainian use of abandoned gas pipelines near Kupiansk.

In Operation Veles, troops reportedly moved more than 15 kilometres through a former gas network. The route included a large underground service centre and pipes that once carried gas between Ukraine and Russia. By using infrastructure already hidden below ground, the force sought to approach the Russian rear without relying only on exposed surface movement.

The article does not detail wider military systems or methods, so this broader explanation uses established military knowledge. Underground routes remain difficult and dangerous, and troops must eventually emerge. The reported operation nevertheless shows how buried infrastructure can help armies adapt when drones and accurate weapons dominate the surface battlefield.