ODM fights to shift power balance ahead of talks with Ruto’s UDA party

ODM is trying to shift negotiations from President William Ruto’s goodwill to a balanced party-to-party bargain. The issue matters because UDA has been expanding inside ODM’s traditional bases while some ODM leaders publicly support Ruto without conditions. That weakens ODM’s ability to negotiate as one bloc.

The proposed mechanism is a written coalition agreement. ODM figures including Oburu Oginga, Gladys Wanga, and Junet Mohamed want the partnership documented, while Simba Arati says cooperation must have conditions. They argue that ODM should enter talks with a clear, unified position rather than rely on individual promises.

The balance remains unsettled. Ruto’s development projects and recruitment of grassroots leaders have increased UDA’s influence in Nyanza and other ODM areas. Cabinet participation has also divided ODM leaders. Unless the party restores internal discipline, it may reach negotiations with less leverage and fewer guarantees for the next government.

A written pre-election coalition agreement is a formal pact made before an election. It would define how ODM and UDA cooperate, what each party contributes, and what each expects from the next government. ODM supporters want this clarity because they fear verbal assurances may not protect the party after the election.

The article identifies the main condition as documented, conditional cooperation. Junet Mohamed says there should be a properly documented coalition government, while Simba Arati rejects unconditional support. The article does not specify a complete list of demanded offices, policies, or appointments. It presents protection of ODM’s interests as the central concern.

The disagreement is now a major internal fault line. Some leaders want written guarantees, while others prefer to rely on Ruto’s goodwill. Ruto and his allies have not commented publicly. Without an agreement, individual commitments could override ODM’s official negotiating position and reduce its leverage.

The article names five influential ODM figures serving in President Ruto’s Cabinet. They are John Mbadi, Opiyo Wandayi, Wycliffe Oparanya, Beatrice Askul, and Hassan Joho. Their Cabinet roles place them inside the Kenya Kwanza administration while ODM negotiates its future partnership with UDA.

Four positions are specifically given. Mbadi is National Treasury Cabinet Secretary, Wandayi is responsible for Energy, Oparanya for Cooperatives, and Askul for EAC. The article names Hassan Joho among the Cabinet figures but does not state his government portfolio. Therefore, the count is five people, but only four portfolios can be identified from the text.

Their presence in government creates competing pressures. Cabinet members may have reasons to support the administration’s political survival, while ODM needs to protect its bargaining position. The article links this overlap to the party’s difficulty speaking with one voice before the 2027 election.

Separate commitments would turn ODM’s political strength into fragmented influence. If leaders and grassroots supporters make their own deals with UDA, the party cannot credibly claim that all its regions and elected representatives stand behind one negotiating position. That makes its support less valuable as a collective asset.

The article gives a clear example in Nyanza. ODM leaders attend meetings with government officials and UDA politicians, sometimes publicly contradicting ODM’s official position. At the same time, Ruto’s allies are recruiting grassroots leaders and using development projects to build support without depending on ODM leaders. These actions bypass the party’s central command.

The likely result is weaker leverage over the next government’s arrangements. ODM could struggle to secure written guarantees or protect its interests. Oburu Oginga therefore urges leaders to speak with one voice and postpone 2032 succession battles, which he calls a distraction from the immediate 2027 contest.

Analysts say ODM weakened itself by committing its support before agreeing on the price and conditions of cooperation. Once a party promises to rally its bases behind a candidate, that candidate gains a valuable political benefit immediately. The supporting party then has fewer tools to demand guarantees later.

The article says ODM should first have negotiated the terms of the pre-election coalition agreement. Instead, it mobilised its traditional bases for Ruto’s second term before the arrangement was finalised. This reversed the normal bargaining sequence: support was offered before offices, protections, or other interests were documented.

The consequence is visible in the current dispute. ODM now fears it may not secure its interests in the next government, while Ruto and his allies have not commented on a written agreement. UDA has also expanded its grassroots presence. ODM must therefore negotiate from a position analysts regard as weaker than it might have held earlier.

The supplied article does not explain earlier political agreements involving Raila Odinga, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki. It therefore cannot establish, from its own evidence, exactly how those agreements shaped ODM members’ distrust of unwritten promises. The article only describes today’s demand for a written pact with UDA.

Using broader Kenyan political context, distrust is often associated with expectations created by past alliances and power-sharing arrangements that supporters believed were not fully honoured. Raila’s political career included cooperation and rivalry with both Moi and Kibaki, but the specific promises, documents, or disputes are not detailed in the source. Those historical links should not be treated as facts drawn from this article.

The present lesson is explicit, however. ODM leaders want terms recorded before committing further support. Junet Mohamed rejects unconditional backing, while Oburu Oginga warns that divided voices will weaken the party. The current argument reflects concern that political goodwill alone may not protect ODM’s interests.

In coalition negotiations, parties assess what each side contributes to winning and governing. Votes show electoral strength. Parliamentary seats can support legislation and government formation. Regional support and grassroots networks demonstrate the ability to mobilise voters. A party then seeks offices, policy commitments, resources, or other guarantees in return.

The article shows ODM trying to use this mechanism with UDA. Its traditional bases, elected leaders, and political network are assets, but UDA is recruiting within those areas and gaining support through development projects. That reduces the uniqueness of ODM’s contribution. Cabinet participation by five influential ODM figures also complicates the party’s bargaining position.

ODM’s preferred solution is a written coalition agreement. Junet Mohamed calls for a documented coalition government, and Simba Arati says cooperation must have conditions. If ODM remains divided, individual leaders may trade support separately. That can leave the party with fewer seats, offices, and commitments than it could have secured through unified negotiations.