Cadem: 70% disagree with President Kast's decision to keep Minister Rabat in office

President Kast decided that Minister Rabat would remain in his position. The choice mattered because Rabat had approved sentence reductions that his own regional offices had previously challenged. Keeping him in office therefore became a test of Kast’s political judgment and confidence in the minister.

The controversy centers on Rabat’s approval of reductions in several criminal sentences. Two cases were especially sensitive because they fell under an alert connected to Chile’s law concerning sexual aggressors. That detail made the decision more politically damaging and helped drive criticism from opposition figures and the public.

The dispute is not settled by Kast’s backing. Cadem reported that 70% disagreed with the president’s decision. Vallejo called Rabat’s continuation into question, while Leiva said he would pursue a constitutional accusation even if Rabat resigned. The issue could therefore continue to pressure both the minister and the government.

According to the Cadem poll cited in the article, 70% of respondents disagreed with President Kast’s decision to keep Minister Rabat in office. The figure provides a clear measure of public dissatisfaction. It suggests that the president’s support for Rabat was politically costly, even though the article does not provide the poll’s full methodology or the percentage that agreed.

The poll matters because the dispute involves decisions affecting criminal sentences. Rabat approved reductions that his regional offices had objected to. Two of those cases were under an alert linked to Chile’s law concerning sexual aggressors. That combination made the issue easier for critics to present as a question of public protection and institutional responsibility.

The 70% result does not itself remove Rabat or legally determine misconduct. It does show substantial public opposition to Kast’s position. Alongside criticism from Vallejo and Leiva’s call for a constitutional accusation, the result increases pressure for the government to explain and defend the minister’s decisions.

The article identifies the central action but not every legal detail. Rabat approved sentence reductions after his regional offices had objected to them. In practical terms, the approved decisions made the punishments less severe than the regional offices had supported or accepted. The article does not state the original sentences, the reduced sentences, or the exact legal mechanism used.

The concrete warning sign is that two of the cases were under an alert linked to Chile’s law concerning sexual aggressors. This indicates that the cases involved people covered by a particularly sensitive legal framework. However, the source does not explain whether the regional offices objected because of the offenders, the crimes, procedural concerns, or the amount of each reduction.

That missing detail limits what can responsibly be concluded from the article alone. The political controversy rests on the conflict between Rabat’s approvals and the regional objections, especially in the two alerted cases. Further assessment would require the case records and the legal reasons given by each authority.

The two cases stood out because they were covered by an alert under Chile’s law concerning sexual aggressors. That connection matters because sexual-offender cases involve heightened public concern and specific legal safeguards. A sentence reduction in such a case can therefore receive more scrutiny than an ordinary reduction, particularly when regional offices had objected.

The source gives one concrete mechanism: the alert marked two cases as subject to special attention under that law. Rabat nevertheless approved reductions that his regional offices had challenged. The article does not name the offenders, describe the underlying crimes, or explain whether the alert legally barred reductions. It only identifies the alert as the reason these cases were especially sensitive.

That distinction is important. The article establishes heightened seriousness, not an automatic finding that Rabat acted unlawfully. The controversy will depend on the legal basis for the approvals and the reasons for the regional objections. Those details could shape any administrative, political, or constitutional proceedings that follow.

If the controversy continues, Rabat could face a constitutional accusation, a formal political accountability process. The article reports that Leiva, identified as PS, insists on pursuing that action even if Rabat leaves office. This means resignation might not end the dispute or prevent lawmakers from examining the minister’s conduct.

Kast could also pay a political price. Vallejo questioned Rabat’s continuation and described Kast’s support for the minister as “incomprehensible.” The Cadem result adds public pressure: 70% disagreed with the president’s decision. Together, these developments can weaken the government’s defense of Rabat and make the issue a continuing opposition focus.

The article does not say that an accusation has already succeeded, nor does it predict a final sanction. It shows a possible path: ongoing criticism, a potential constitutional proceeding, and continued scrutiny of the sentence reductions. Leiva’s warning about a “nefasto” precedent suggests the dispute could influence future debates about ministerial responsibility.

In Chile, a constitutional accusation is a political-constitutional proceeding used to hold certain public officials responsible for serious legal or constitutional breaches. It is not the same as an ordinary criminal trial. For a minister, the process can examine alleged violations committed while exercising the office and can lead to political sanctions.

The Chamber of Deputies first evaluates and, if it approves the charge, brings the accusation. The Senate then acts as the deciding body. If senators uphold the accusation, the official can be removed from office and may be barred from holding public positions for a period established by the Constitution. Other civil or criminal consequences may require separate proceedings.

The article does not explain this process; this is established Chilean constitutional knowledge. In the Rabat controversy, Leiva’s proposed accusation would therefore create a formal route for legislative scrutiny. Leiva says it could continue even after resignation, but whether it can proceed and what sanction could result would depend on constitutional rules and the specific allegations.

A sentence reduction is a legal decision that decreases the punishment imposed for a crime. It can shorten imprisonment, lower another penalty, or alter how the punishment is carried out, depending on the applicable rule. The result is a less severe punishment, but the conviction itself does not automatically disappear.

The competent authority depends on the mechanism. A court may modify a sentence when legislation authorizes a judicial remedy or adjustment. In other circumstances, a legally empowered executive authority may grant a pardon or commutation under constitutional or statutory rules. The article does not identify whether Rabat’s approvals were judicial reductions, pardons, commutations, or another form of relief, so his precise legal authority cannot be established from the source.

The reported conflict is that Rabat approved reductions while regional offices had objected. That makes the authority and reasoning central questions. The case records, governing law, and official decisions would be needed to determine whether the reductions followed the correct procedure and what accountability could apply.