US Reportedly Seeks to Restore Russian Gas Supplies to Europe Through Ukraine

The US proposal would restore Russian natural-gas deliveries to European customers through Ukraine, reversing Kyiv’s decision to end transit on January 1, 2025. It was discussed during September negotiations as a possible winter “energy ceasefire.” The plan matters because it could reconnect Europe to Russian supplies while linking energy trade to talks over the war.

Under the reported arrangement, a US intermediary would sell the gas. This could help bypass European sanctions and create investment opportunities for American companies. Russia’s proceeds would go into an escrow account in a third country. The account would be designed to stop Moscow from using the money to finance its war against Ukraine.

The proposal faces strong European opposition. Governments have spent years cutting dependence on Russian energy after the full-scale invasion. Washington is also considering reopening Nord Stream, but the article presents that as part of a broader possible deal, not as a confirmed decision.

A natural-gas transit route is a pipeline corridor that moves gas across a country between producers and foreign customers. The transit country usually provides the infrastructure and receives fees. Ukraine became important because its extensive Soviet-era pipeline network connected Russian gas fields in Siberia with European markets. It offered a direct route toward many customers.

Major lines included Bratstvo, or Brotherhood, and Soyuz, or Union. They carried gas through Ukraine toward Slovakia and other destinations. Other routes moved gas through southern Ukraine and Moldova toward the Balkans and Türkiye. This network allowed several European countries to receive Russian gas without a wholly new pipeline system.

The route remained active after Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Naftogaz and Gazprom had signed a five-year transit agreement in December 2019. That agreement expired at 7 a.m. Kyiv time on January 1, 2025, ending the gas flow.

In 2024, the final full year of the transit agreement, about 42 million cubic meters of Russian gas crossed Ukraine each day. That equals approximately 15 billion cubic meters for the year, according to S&P Global. These figures show that the route still carried a substantial amount of gas even after Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The deliveries continued under a five-year agreement signed by Ukraine’s Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom in December 2019. Slovakia, Austria, Moldova and other European markets remained connected to the network. The pipelines carried gas from Russian fields through Ukraine toward customers in Central and Western Europe.

Transit stopped at 7 a.m. Kyiv time on January 1, 2025, when the agreement expired. Kyiv refused to negotiate a replacement, saying continued transit would generate revenue for the Kremlin during the war. Ukraine also lost an important source of income from transit fees.

The proposed US intermediary would sit between Russian gas suppliers and European buyers. According to the article, this structure could help the arrangement circumvent European sanctions. It could also give American companies profitable roles in selling, managing or investing in the energy trade. The intermediary would therefore serve both a political and commercial purpose.

The second safeguard is an escrow account in a third country. Russia’s gas-sale revenue would be deposited there instead of being immediately available to Moscow. Under the plan described by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, this separation would prevent Russia from using the money to finance its war against Ukraine.

The mechanism would not remove the political controversy. It would still restore a major Russian energy link and potentially strengthen Moscow’s position in European markets. It also depends on agreement among the United States, European governments, Ukraine and Russia. The article describes the idea as a proposal under discussion, not an operating system.

Restoring Russian gas is politically difficult because European governments spent years reducing their dependence on Russian energy after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A new supply arrangement could appear to reverse that policy. It would also reconnect European consumers to a supplier whose war triggered the energy shift.

Ukraine ended gas transit when its agreement with Gazprom expired on January 1, 2025. Kyiv refused to negotiate a new deal because it said transit would generate revenue for the Kremlin. The proposed arrangement could therefore revive both the commercial link and the argument over whether energy payments indirectly support Russia’s war effort.

The article also shows that dependence has not disappeared. Hungary and Slovakia continued receiving Russian oil through Druzhba under EU sanctions exemptions. Their pressure on Kyiv after a pipeline disruption demonstrated the political sensitivity of energy supplies. A gas restart could intensify those divisions, even if escrow rules limited Russia’s access to the money.

The supplied article does not list Europe’s gas alternatives. Based on established energy-market knowledge, European countries have used liquefied natural gas, more pipeline gas from Norway and other suppliers, renewable power, energy savings and underground storage to reduce Russian dependence. These options spread supply across more sources instead of relying on one major route.

LNG arrives by ship and requires import terminals, while pipeline gas needs available cross-border connections. Storage can cover shortfalls, and efficiency or renewables can reduce gas use. However, none of these tools automatically replaces every lost pipeline delivery. Their usefulness depends on infrastructure, contracts, weather and available supply.

Winter is the hardest test because heating demand rises sharply during cold periods. Storage can be depleted, and LNG cargoes may be expensive or contested by other buyers. Renewables can reduce gas demand but cannot guarantee constant output. Europe therefore has more resilience than before, but a sudden supply shock could still create price and political pressure.

Energy dependence gives a supplier influence because fuel is essential to heating, transport, industry and national budgets. If buyers lack quick substitutes, a supplier can threaten reduced deliveries, demand concessions or benefit from higher prices. Buyers also gain leverage when they control routes, infrastructure or access to a large market. This broader explanation uses established knowledge beyond the article.

The article provides a clear example. Russian oil moved through Ukraine’s Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia. After infrastructure near Brody was damaged, deliveries stopped on January 27, 2026. Hungary and Slovakia then increased pressure on President Zelensky over the halted supplies, while Ukraine said repairs were necessary.

The dispute showed that energy links can shape diplomacy as well as trade. Hungary and Slovakia maintained reliance on Russian oil and benefited from EU sanctions exemptions. Ukraine controlled the transit network but also faced pressure because the route affected neighboring economies. Similar dependence could make any restored gas route politically powerful.