Liberman to back Eisenkot for PM, but rules out minority government with Arab support

The announcement set out Liberman’s preferred leadership plan after the election. He supported Gadi Eisenkot for prime minister and Yair Lapid for speaker of the Knesset. At the same time, he drew a firm line against Benjamin Netanyahu. This matters because coalition arithmetic depends on which candidates parties will support and which partnerships they refuse.

Liberman’s position had three parts. First, Eisenkot should try to form the government. Second, Lapid should hold the Knesset’s presiding role. Third, Liberman would not serve in a Netanyahu-led government under any circumstances. He also rejected a minority government that relied on Arab parties for support without bringing them into the cabinet.

That stance could shape negotiations, but it does not automatically make Eisenkot prime minister. Eisenkot would still need enough lawmakers to support his government, or at least keep it functioning. If the numbers fail, other candidates, coalitions, outside support arrangements, or another election could become relevant.

A minority government is a cabinet supported by fewer than 61 of the Knesset’s 120 members. It can take office if it wins the required confidence vote, then survive issue by issue. It must negotiate constantly because opposition lawmakers can defeat legislation, budgets, or motions that threaten its position.

Arab parties could support such a government from outside. They might vote for its formation, abstain on a confidence vote, or back particular bills. They would not necessarily receive ministers or formally join the coalition. This is different from a majority coalition, where participating parties usually share cabinet responsibility and agree to support the government broadly.

Liberman specifically ruled out this arrangement in the reported political context. That matters because external Arab support could provide crucial votes when no conventional bloc reaches 61. Without it, Eisenkot would need a larger coalition, support from other parties, a different candidate, or a new election. The exact arrangement would depend on later negotiations and votes.

Avigdor Liberman is the leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, a secular nationalist party. He has held senior government posts, including defense and finance. In this episode, his party’s recommendation matters because coalition formation depends on the support of several parties, not just the largest one.

Gadi Eisenkot is a former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff and a National Unity politician. Yair Lapid leads Yesh Atid and has served as prime minister. Liberman backed Eisenkot for prime minister and supported Lapid for Knesset speaker. Those choices placed both men in a proposed leadership arrangement.

Benjamin Netanyahu is Likud’s leader and a former, long-serving prime minister. Liberman said he would not serve in a government with Netanyahu under any circumstances. That refusal narrows the possible coalition map. It also explains why Liberman’s endorsement of Eisenkot matters, even though Eisenkot would still need enough lawmakers to govern.

Israel’s Knesset contains 120 seats. A governing majority therefore requires at least 61 lawmakers. That number is more than half the chamber, so a government with 61 reliable supporters can normally pass confidence votes and govern with greater stability.

For example, if Eisenkot’s bloc held 55 seats, it would be six short of a majority. He would need another party to join the cabinet, or obtain dependable outside support for key votes. A party could support him without entering government, but that arrangement would usually be less predictable. Abstentions can also change the number of votes needed in a particular confidence vote.

The 61-seat figure is a benchmark, not a guarantee of smooth government. Coalition partners can disagree, absent lawmakers can affect votes, and small parties can withdraw support. In the reported situation, Liberman’s backing could help Eisenkot, but it would matter most alongside the seats held by other parties. The final outcome would depend on negotiations and formal Knesset votes.

Liberman’s support would strengthen Eisenkot’s position during the government-forming process. It signals that Liberman’s lawmakers prefer Eisenkot over Netanyahu and may recommend or support him. That can influence which candidate receives the chance to form a government, especially when no bloc has a clear majority.

The key mechanism is coalition arithmetic. Eisenkot would need to gather parties that together control at least 61 seats, or negotiate enough outside support to pass confidence and essential votes. Lapid’s proposed role as Knesset speaker could affect parliamentary proceedings, but it would not itself give Eisenkot the votes needed to govern. Liberman’s refusal to join a Netanyahu government removes one possible coalition route.

The announcement therefore changes the bargaining map rather than settling the result. Eisenkot must still persuade other parties, reconcile policy demands, and secure a viable vote. If he fails, another candidate may receive the opportunity, or politicians may consider a minority arrangement or another election.

If Eisenkot cannot assemble 61 supporters, the first alternative is a different coalition. Parties that oppose one another may form a unity government, or smaller parties may join a new bloc after securing policy or ministerial concessions. A different candidate could also receive the chance to form a government if Eisenkot’s attempt fails.

Another option is a minority government. It could take office with fewer than 61 seats if other parties agree to support confidence votes, budgets, or specific legislation from outside. Arab parties could play that role, although Liberman ruled out relying on such an arrangement. Parties could also abstain, lowering the votes required in a particular contest, but that support may be fragile.

If negotiations produce no viable government, the existing administration may continue temporarily while the political process proceeds. Ultimately, lawmakers could face another election. The precise path depends on Israel’s constitutional timetable, presidential consultations, Knesset votes, and whether parties can accept a common coalition formula.

Israel uses nationwide proportional representation, meaning parties receive Knesset seats broadly according to their share of the vote, subject to the electoral threshold. Voters choose party lists rather than one single governing candidate. This allows several parties to win representation and brings more political viewpoints into the 120-seat Knesset.

The key mechanism is fragmentation. If the largest party wins, for example, 35 seats, it still lacks the 61 needed for a majority. It must negotiate with other parties over policy, budgets, and cabinet positions. Those agreements create a coalition. Parties that stay outside government may still support or oppose particular votes, creating further bargaining.

This system explains why Liberman’s endorsement matters even without making him prime minister. His party’s seats can help one candidate cross the governing threshold or block another coalition. Eisenkot’s path therefore depends on assembling several groups. If no combination works, politicians may attempt a minority government or return to elections.