Russia is giving its drones bigger antennas to beat Ukrainian jamming

Russia is changing the navigation hardware carried by some drones. Its Kometa modules use arrays of small receiving elements called patch antennas. The arrays help drones continue receiving satellite-navigation signals when Ukrainian electronic warfare tries to block them. That matters because electronic warfare is one of Ukraine’s most widespread and affordable air-defense layers.

The key change is more antenna elements and improved processing. Kometa modules can identify the direction from which jamming comes and compensate for it. HUR says Russia is using 16-element arrays at scale and preparing serial production of 20-element arrays. A 32-element antenna found on a Shahed was made by combining two 16-element arrays covering different navigation bands.

This does not make the drones invulnerable. Ukraine can jam more satellite bands simultaneously, use networks to send false coordinates, or destroy drones with interceptor drones, jets, and missiles. But those alternatives are generally more expensive than electronic jamming, increasing pressure on Ukraine’s defenses.

Electronic jamming is deliberate radio interference aimed at disrupting a receiver. A drone normally uses signals from navigation satellites to estimate where it is and where it should fly. A jammer transmits competing energy in the same navigation bands. The receiver may then struggle to identify the genuine satellite signals or calculate a dependable position.

The article explains that Kometa modules resist this attack by using multiple patch antennas and a processing chip. The chip helps separate satellite signals from interference and determine the direction of the jamming. More antenna elements can suppress more electronic-warfare signal sources. Ukraine’s specialist Alkhimik said a captured 32-element antenna combined two arrays covering different navigation bands.

Ordinary jamming is not the only option. Ukrainian defense leaders say they can jam more satellite bands at once or spoof the navigation system. Spoofing feeds false coordinates instead of merely blocking signals. The autopilot then follows the false position data and can gradually steer the drone away from cities.

The numbers describe the size of an antenna array, not the drone itself. Each element is a small receiving patch. HUR says Russia is already using Kometa modules with 16-element arrays at scale and is establishing serial production of 20-element arrays. A larger array can better identify where interference comes from and suppress more jamming sources.

The 32-element systems show how the technology has expanded in the field. Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said Shaheds carrying 32-element antennas attacked Kyiv. Alkhimik examined one recovered antenna and said it was two 16-element arrays joined together. One array covered the L1 band, while the other covered L2/L5.

The production figures show that this is not an isolated modification. HUR said Russian defense firms ordered more than 100,000 Kometa modules in various configurations this year. The modules are intended for cruise and ballistic missiles, strike drones, and guided bombs, indicating broad demand across Russia’s weapons programs.

Ukraine’s electronic-warfare shield is described as one of its most affordable and widespread layers of air defense. It normally helps disrupt drone navigation without firing a missile or sending an aircraft. If jam-resistant drones keep their satellite guidance, more of them can continue toward their targets instead of being stopped by that layer.

The article gives the practical consequence clearly. Russia’s better-protected drones can fly through the shield, leaving more targets for interceptor drones, jets, and missiles. Those systems can destroy the drones, but they cost more than electronic countermeasures. The result is greater demand on Ukraine’s limited high-end defenses.

This does not mean the shield becomes useless. Ukrainian officials say drones can still be defeated by jamming several satellite bands at once or by spoofing their coordinates. The defensive challenge is that Russia can upgrade antenna arrays relatively quickly, while Ukraine must add or adapt electronic-warfare sites and preserve more expensive interception capacity.

Ukraine’s first alternative is broader jamming. Instead of targeting only part of a navigation system, Ukrainian forces can interfere with several satellite bands at the same time. Alkhimik said the recovered 32-element antenna combined arrays covering L1 and L2/L5, suggesting that countermeasures must address both parts.

A second method is spoofing. Fly Group Ukraine links multiple devices into a network and uses them to feed a drone false coordinates. The drone still believes it is flying toward its target, but its autopilot relies on the false location data. It then gradually changes course without necessarily recognizing that the coordinates are misleading.

Ukraine can also use physical interception. The article names interceptor drones, jets, and missiles as costlier options for destroying drones that pass through the electronic-warfare shield. These methods remain available, but jam-resistant navigation shifts more of the burden toward them. That makes the defense challenge more expensive and resource-intensive.

The advantage comes from unequal costs and effort. Russia can modify a drone’s navigation module by increasing the number of receiving elements in its antenna array. Ukraine, by contrast, may need to add electronic-warfare sites or expand coverage to counter those upgraded receivers. Beskrestnov called this an asymmetric advantage.

The mechanism is technical but straightforward. Kometa arrays help identify the direction of incoming interference. Their processing chip then helps separate satellite signals from the jamming. According to Beskrestnov, more elements allow the antenna to suppress more electronic-warfare signal sources. That gives a drone a better chance of retaining navigation while flying through an interference zone.

The imbalance affects battlefield resources. More protected drones can pass through an affordable defense layer and require interceptor drones, jets, or missiles instead. Ukraine can respond with wider-band jamming, spoofing, or other adaptations, but those responses may demand additional equipment and coordination. Russia’s ability to scale antenna upgrades therefore puts continued pressure on Ukrainian defenses.

Satellite navigation works by measuring signals sent by several satellites. A receiver uses the signals’ timing to estimate how far away each satellite is. Combining several distance estimates lets it calculate a position, commonly expressed as coordinates. The receiver repeatedly updates that position as the drone moves.

The article does not explain this underlying process in detail, so this description uses established satellite-navigation principles. In the article’s account, a drone’s autopilot relies on the coordinates supplied by its navigation system. It uses them to judge whether the drone is following the intended path. If the reported position differs from the route, the autopilot changes flight direction.

That dependence creates an opening for electronic warfare. Jamming can prevent the receiver from obtaining reliable satellite signals. Spoofing can provide false coordinates instead. Fly Group Ukraine says a drone may continue believing it is heading toward its target while its autopilot gradually changes course based on the false data, steering it toward a safer area.