Police must serve the State, which endures, and not the party in government, which changes: Madras High Court

The Madras High Court said police must not routinely use criminal cases against people who criticise or abuse the ruling party. Justice N. Ramesh said police often act on opposition complaints against critics while seldom registering cases against ruling-party members. He stressed that officers serve the State, which continues, rather than the government party, which changes.

The court was hearing D. Sudha’s anticipatory-bail plea. The DMK councillor allegedly used abusive words against Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay. Although the judge did not approve those words, he said the case did not require arrest or custodial interrogation. He also rejected a proposed gag order.

The ruling sets a constitutional standard for policing political speech. Equal treatment is not optional courtesy, the judge said. It is necessary for police legitimacy. The decision also warns that arrest machinery should not become a political tool, especially when criticism can instead be addressed through defamation law.

Anticipatory bail is a court order protecting a person from arrest in connection with an alleged offence. It does not end the case or declare the person innocent. Instead, it allows investigation to continue while reducing the risk of immediate custody, usually with conditions such as appearing before investigators.

Justice N. Ramesh granted this protection to D. Sudha, a 60-year-old Greater Chennai Corporation Councillor from the DMK. She allegedly abused Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay. The judge agreed with her counsel, A. Damodaran, that arrest and consequent custodial interrogation were unnecessary in this case.

The court still required Sudha to appear before the investigating officer daily until further orders. It refused, however, to impose a gag order on future speeches. The judge recorded her voluntary promise to exercise restraint but did not make that promise a condition of liberty. This balanced continued investigation with protection from unnecessary custody.

Treating political speech as a cognisable criminal offence can activate coercive police powers immediately. A person may be arrested, taken into custody, interrogated, placed in a lock-up, sent for remand and forced to endure a lengthy trial. These consequences can occur before authorities properly establish who made the statement or whether the account belonged to that person.

The judge illustrated this risk through Professor A. Kalaiyarasan’s experience. Plainclothes police picked him up from his Adyar home at 5 a.m. after someone misused his photograph on a fake Instagram account. Officers had no authorisation or First Information Report. They released him only after confirming that the account was fake.

Justice Ramesh contrasted Kalaiyarasan’s quick release with the position of an ordinary citizen lacking influence. He said such a person might have faced lock-up and remand before anyone checked the facts. The warning is clear: criminal procedure itself can punish, even when a complaint is mistaken.

Justice N. Ramesh distinguished insulting speech from conduct that genuinely threatens public order. He said criminal defamation proceedings may be the proper legal route when a public official is insulted. That process focuses on whether the words unlawfully harmed reputation, rather than immediately deploying arrest powers through a cognisable investigation.

The case involved D. Sudha, who allegedly called Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay a “dog” and “corpse.” The judge did not condone the language. Yet he said a dignitary’s office is not so fragile that a ward councillor’s abuse at a party meeting can shake it. He granted anticipatory bail because arrest and custodial questioning were unnecessary.

The broader principle is restraint. A government should answer criticism with argument and mockery with performance. Where abuse crosses the legal line, defamation law supplies a remedy. The approach protects public officials’ reputations while reducing the risk that criminal procedure will silence political opponents.

The judge said political discourse in India is now conducted to a substantial extent on social media. The article does not give a numerical count of parties, users or posts. It does state that all major political parties maintain organised social-media establishments, commonly called IT wings.

These IT wings are presented as regular party structures rather than isolated groups of individual supporters. Their daily work includes trolling and abusing political opponents. That activity forms part of the environment in which complaints, fake accounts and allegations of online abuse arise. The article links this reality to the court’s concern about police responses to political speech.

The immediate implication is that online political disputes can quickly enter the criminal justice system. The judge’s comments suggest police must verify complaints carefully, identify the real account holder and avoid automatic arrest. Political parties’ organised online activity makes even-handed enforcement especially important, because selective action could affect public debate and constitutional rights.

Article 19(1)(a) of India’s Constitution protects every citizen’s freedom of speech and expression. It covers the ability to communicate opinions, criticism and political views. The article specifically invokes Article 19 when rejecting a gag order as a condition of Sudha’s liberty. It says courts should not indirectly do what the State cannot directly do.

That protection is subject to Article 19(2). The State may impose reasonable restrictions through law in the interests of India’s sovereignty and integrity, security, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality. Restrictions may also address contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence. These grounds come from established constitutional law beyond the article’s detailed account.

The limits must be lawful, reasonable and connected to a permitted ground. They do not give officials a general power to suppress embarrassment or criticism. In this case, the judge pointed toward defamation proceedings for genuinely harmful insults, while resisting immediate arrest or a speech gag.

Police neutrality means applying the law evenly to ruling-party members, opposition figures and ordinary citizens. It matters because police control investigation, arrest and custody. If officers favour the government, criticism can become risky while supporters receive protection. That undermines equal treatment, public confidence and the rule of law.

Justice N. Ramesh said police seldom register cases against ruling-party members based on opposition complaints, regardless of which party is in power. He demanded “an even hand” between the ruling party and its opponents. His reference to A. Kalaiyarasan also showed why verification matters: plainclothes officers took him from home over a fake account without authorisation or an FIR.

The court described neutrality as a condition of constitutional legitimacy, not a courtesy. Its practical message is that police must verify complaints, avoid unnecessary arrest and treat unknown citizens as they would eminent people. Without that discipline, accountability depends on access to powerful individuals rather than on law itself.