Will Trump relaunch his war on Iran after the midterm elections? | Mohamad Bazzi

US midterm elections are nationwide elections held halfway through a president’s four-year term. Voters choose members of the House of Representatives and some senators, rather than electing the president. Their outcome can change which party controls Congress and how strongly it can challenge the White House.

The article links the elections to Trump’s military choices through political risk. Before 3 November, he might avoid a new war because Republicans faced anger over rising energy prices and other costs. A conflict could deepen those losses. After voting, that pressure could change.

The article also presents a darker possibility. If Republicans suffered a humiliating defeat, Trump might lash out against Iran, according to one US official quoted by Axios. The source says Democrats winning both houses, with unexpectedly large Senate gains, could look especially humiliating. Thus, elections may affect force through both caution and vengeance.

The reported US-Israeli campaign would target several layers of Iran’s military and national infrastructure. Officials leaked plans for strikes on underground nuclear facilities, missile arsenals and civilian infrastructure. The aim, according to the article, would be a new round of intense pressure after an earlier bombing campaign and stalled negotiations.

The article gives more specific examples of civilian targets Trump might authorize. These include power plants, oil refineries, bridges and factories. Such targets matter because they support everyday life and economic activity, not only military operations. The Pentagon’s proposed mechanism is an intensive, multi-day attack designed to force Iran into new concessions.

The plan remains a reported possibility, not a confirmed operation in the text. Trump could instead pursue an interim agreement through negotiations. But the article warns that attacking civilian infrastructure could further devastate Iran’s economy and likely constitute war crimes under international law.

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical waterway for global energy supplies. The article states that more than a fifth of the world’s oil supply passed through it each day. This gives the narrow route importance far beyond Iran and its neighbors. Any disruption can affect oil movement and global markets.

Iran largely closed the strait after US and Israeli attacks in late February. The article describes the closure as part of the conflict’s economic pressure. Qatar-led negotiations later produced reported progress on an interim deal: Iran offered to reopen the waterway within two days if Washington lifted a blockade on Iranian ports and released billions of dollars in frozen assets.

That proposed arrangement shows why the strait matters in diplomacy as well as trade. An earlier June agreement to reopen it collapsed. Continued mistrust, military threats and failed negotiations leave the waterway vulnerable to renewed restrictions.

When Iran restricts traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, oil shipments face disruption at one of the world’s most important energy routes. The article says more than a fifth of global oil passed through the waterway each day. A restriction therefore creates pressure on energy supplies and can contribute to higher prices.

The political effect is immediate in the article’s account. Rising energy prices helped fuel voter anger in the United States, creating a reason Trump might hesitate before the midterm elections. Iran’s closure also became a bargaining tool. Tehran offered to reopen the strait if Washington lifted its port blockade and released billions of dollars in frozen assets.

The text does not provide a precise price increase or describe specific regional security incidents from the closure. It does show that restricting the route intensifies economic pressure, complicates negotiations and raises the stakes of renewed US-Israeli attacks.

Donald Trump is the US president deciding whether to expand the war or seek an agreement. The article portrays him as shifting between negotiation and threats to “annihilate” Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, urged Trump to restart bombing after Israel’s governing coalition failed to win a parliamentary majority. Netanyahu is fighting for political survival.

Iran’s government is the opposing power in both the conflict and the negotiations. It largely closed the Strait of Hormuz after the attacks, then offered to reopen it within two days if Washington lifted a blockade and released frozen assets. Iran’s leaders also distrust Trump, whose threats make compromise harder.

Qatar acts as a mediator. Its negotiators organized multiple rounds of talks and reportedly helped produce progress toward an interim deal. The arrangement remained fragile because a June agreement collapsed, while other Qatar- and Pakistan-led negotiations stalled for months. The central choice remains escalation or diplomacy.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution matters because it marks the beginning of the Islamic regime described in the article. That regime is the government now confronting the United States and Israel. The source presents the revolution as the political turning point after which Iran’s Islamic Republic rose to power.

The article says Trump initially believed he and Netanyahu could topple the Islamic regime that emerged after the revolution. His expectation was a quick victory, following a surprise attack that killed Iran’s top leadership. Instead, the war became a quagmire and produced continued mistrust and stalled negotiations.

The source does not explain the revolution’s detailed causes, institutions or long-term domestic effects. It does show its strategic importance: the post-1979 regime is the target of proposed regime change, while Iran’s leaders remain central to negotiations over attacks, sanctions, frozen assets and the Strait of Hormuz.

International humanitarian law limits how wars are fought. It protects civilians and civilian objects, requires attacks to distinguish military targets from nonmilitary ones, and prohibits disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks. These rules matter because military victory does not make every method lawful. The article specifically warns about attacks on Iran’s civilian infrastructure.

The proposed targets could include power plants, oil refineries, bridges and factories. Unless a site is a lawful military objective, attacking it would violate the protection owed to civilian objects. Even where military value exists, an attack can be unlawful if expected civilian harm is excessive compared with the concrete military advantage anticipated.

The article says attacks destroying Iran’s infrastructure would likely constitute war crimes under international law. It does not provide a legal ruling on any specific strike. Whether an attack is criminal would depend on its target, purpose, expected harm and the facts surrounding its planning and execution.