When the government disregards its own laws: The case of India’s Forest Rights Act

The Forest Rights Act, 2006, is a law intended to recognise and protect the forest rights of Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers. It responds to past denial of their rights to forest land and evictions for non-forest purposes. The Act covers individual and community forest rights, livelihood claims, and procedures for recognising those rights.

Its process begins at the gram sabha. Under Section 6(1), the gram sabha determines the nature of individual and community forest rights and passes a resolution for further proceedings. The Act also requires a detailed process for filing, recognising, and verifying claims. For some forest-land diversions, it requires gram sabha recommendations and informed consent.

These protections matter because development projects can affect communities that depend on forests. Section 3(2) allows certain government facilities only when limits on land and tree felling are met and the gram sabha recommends the project. The article highlights continuing disputes over how consistently these rights are implemented.

In August, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs told the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation that the Forest Rights Act contains no provision for obtaining gram sabha consent for forest clearance. It therefore said such matters did not fall under the ministry’s purview. The statement answered a Parliamentary Standing Committee report on the corporation.

The committee had described 100% gram sabha consent under the Act as a critical bottleneck for forest clearance. It recommended talks among the power, tribal affairs, and environment ministries about a lower consent threshold for large hydropower projects. The ministry rejected the premise that the Act itself creates this consent requirement for forest clearance.

The position is controversial because the article identifies provisions requiring gram sabha recommendations for some forest-land diversions. The Act’s guidelines also allow a decision after a meeting with a minimum 50% quorum. The ministry’s recent statement therefore adds to years of contradictory government positions and implementation disputes.

The disagreement concerns three different figures. The Parliamentary Standing Committee described 100% gram sabha consent under the Forest Rights Act as a critical bottleneck for forest clearance. It did not claim that the Act expressly uses those words. Activists and experts also noted that the Act has no specific provision requiring “100% approval.”

The Act’s guidelines provide a different rule. For a development project, the gram sabha can decide after convening a meeting with a minimum quorum of 50%. Quorum means the minimum attendance needed for the meeting. It does not mean that 50% of members must approve the project. The article also cites provisions requiring gram sabha recommendations for certain diversions.

The committee recommended that the power ministry discuss a 70%-75% consent threshold with the tribal affairs and environment ministries. That proposal concerns large hydropower projects of national importance. The ministry’s response instead said the Act contains no forest-clearance consent provision, leaving the dispute unresolved.

In the article, the gram sabha is the local decision-making body at the centre of the Forest Rights Act’s procedures. It determines the nature of individual and community forest rights and passes resolutions for further proceedings. This gives forest communities a formal place in recognising rights that were often denied in the past.

Section 6(1) assigns this authority to the gram sabha. Section 3(2) also says certain government-managed, non-forest facilities may use forest land only after limits are met and the gram sabha recommends the project. The Act and its procedures address claims, verification, informed consent, and resettlement when forest land is diverted.

The article notes that the guidelines permit a development-project decision after a meeting with at least a 50% quorum. However, the Tribal Affairs Ministry recently said the Act does not require gram sabha consent for forest clearance. This conflicting interpretation has made the gram sabha’s practical role contested.

When ministries interpret the Forest Rights Act differently, projects and communities face uncertainty. Infrastructure agencies may treat consent as a bottleneck, while tribal-rights authorities may deny that the Act requires consent for forest clearance. Such conflict can delay decisions, shift responsibility between institutions, and make legal protections difficult to enforce.

The hydropower example shows the mechanism. A Parliamentary Standing Committee urged talks about a 70%-75% consent threshold after calling 100% consent a critical bottleneck. The Tribal Affairs Ministry replied that the Act has no provision for gram sabha consent in forest clearance. Yet the Act includes gram sabha powers over rights and recommendations for some forest-land diversions.

The article links this uncertainty to difficulties implementing the Act over two decades. It calls the pattern “governmental lawlessness” when institutions do not uphold laws consistently. The greatest risk falls on forest-dependent communities, whose rights may receive a different interpretation precisely when projects threaten their land and livelihoods.

The 2013 Supreme Court decision arose from Vedanta’s proposal to mine bauxite in Odisha’s Niyamgiri hills. The hills are sacred to the Dongria Kondh Adivasi community. The case became contentious after the environment ministry granted Vedanta environmental clearance in September 2004.

The Court’s key precedent was that gram sabhas would decide whether the project could receive clearance. This placed the affected village assemblies at the centre of a decision involving sacred hills, forest rights, and proposed mining. The ruling is important because it recognised that local community concerns could determine whether a major project moved forward.

The article says the Tribal Affairs Ministry later gradually withdrew from this precedent. Its recent claim that the Forest Rights Act contains no provision for gram sabha consent contrasts with the Niyamgiri approach. The contrast illustrates the broader conflict between legal protections, infrastructure or mining proposals, and inconsistent positions by government institutions.

“Governmental lawlessness” describes a state and its institutions failing to demonstrate the ability and willingness to uphold their own laws. It does not mean that no laws exist. It means official practice becomes inconsistent with legal duties, allowing institutions to avoid, dilute, or reinterpret protections.

The article applies the term to the Forest Rights Act’s implementation. The Act gives gram sabhas authority over forest-rights claims and requires their recommendations for certain forest-land diversions. Yet the Tribal Affairs Ministry said the Act has no provision for gram sabha consent for forest clearance, while earlier positions and the Niyamgiri precedent supported stronger gram sabha involvement.

This inconsistency especially harms marginalised groups because they depend on legal safeguards against denial of rights, eviction, or land diversion. The article connects this failure to the “ethics of legalism”: the law should be the same for everyone and followed without distortion. Selective implementation weakens trust and protection.