In Israel, Arab lawmakers key to unseating Netanyahu amid divided opposition

In Israel’s parliamentary system, unseating Netanyahu means forming a different government that has enough support in the 120-member parliament. The new coalition would replace him as prime minister and take responsibility for governing. It is a parliamentary change, not simply a direct vote against one individual.

Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48 seats, while Netanyahu’s camp secured 53. Neither side alone reached the 61 seats needed for a majority. Eisenkot therefore needs support from other parties, potentially including Arab-majority parties or Orthodox Jewish parties. If those negotiations succeed, the current government can be replaced without Netanyahu’s party being the largest.

The immediate goal is to prevent another election and form a government quickly. However, the coalition must agree on basic principles, including recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and condemnation of Hamas as a terrorist group. Those conditions may exclude some Arab lawmakers, making Netanyahu’s removal politically difficult.

The 120-member parliament is divided without a clear majority. Eisenkot’s diverse opposition bloc won 48 seats. Netanyahu’s camp secured 53, including 27 for Likud. Arab-majority parties won 19 seats. Since a majority requires 61 seats, neither main camp can govern alone.

The arithmetic makes the Arab parties unusually important. If all 19 supported Eisenkot’s coalition, his bloc could reach 67 seats, above the majority threshold. That support could allow the opposition to form a government and remove Netanyahu. The parties might support a government without agreeing on every issue, but Eisenkot’s four benchmarks could block some of them.

The 19 seats are therefore both a political opportunity and a source of conflict. Arab leaders say the opposition must accept political reality. Some Jewish opposition leaders prefer alliances with Orthodox parties instead, even though those parties traditionally support Netanyahu. The final coalition depends on which partners accept Eisenkot’s conditions.

If Eisenkot’s opposition coalition won Arab lawmakers’ support and formed a government, Netanyahu would be removed as prime minister. The new administration would have enough parliamentary backing to govern, provided its partners remained united. It would also meet the bloc’s stated aim of avoiding another election.

The numbers show why this matters. Eisenkot’s bloc has 48 seats, while Arab-majority parties won 19. Together, they could reach 67 seats in the 120-member parliament. That would exceed the 61-seat majority threshold. Arab support could therefore turn a fragmented opposition into a governing coalition.

The partnership would not erase disagreements. Eisenkot’s benchmarks require coalition parties to recognise Israel as a Jewish state and denounce Hamas as a terrorist group. Some Arab leaders reject the first definition or avoid the second. The coalition would also face pressure over the October 7 attack, Arab citizens’ concerns, and the competing demands of its diverse parties.

Israel’s Arab citizens are descendants of Palestinians who remained after Israel was created in 1948. They account for around 20 per cent of the population. Their Arab-majority parliamentary parties won 19 seats in the latest election, giving them substantial influence in a parliament where neither main camp has a majority.

Their parties could provide Eisenkot with the seats needed to govern. His bloc holds 48 seats, so Arab lawmakers’ support could push it above the 61-seat majority threshold. Yet the proposed coalition’s conditions create obstacles. Eisenkot requires partners to recognise Israel as a Jewish state and denounce Hamas as a terrorist group.

The Arab parties have unanimously condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack, but they have not described Hamas as a terror group. Raam’s leader has recognised Israel as a Jewish state, while other Arab-party leaders reject that definition. Their seats could decide the government, but their participation tests the opposition’s political boundaries.

Opposition leaders disagree over whether Arab parties can belong in a government because the dispute combines coalition arithmetic with national identity and security. Eisenkot’s four benchmarks require recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and condemnation of Hamas as a terrorist group. Some Arab leaders do not accept those terms.

Avigdor Liberman has adamantly opposed including Arab parties. Netanyahu also portrayed them as untrustworthy and alleged they support terrorism and deny Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. By contrast, Yair Golan openly supports cooperation and called it racist to exclude the Arab minority. He also promised action on crime, prosperity, and equality in Arab areas.

Public opinion adds pressure. Polls before the election showed Jewish opposition supporters divided over Arab participation, while right-wing Israelis strongly opposed it. The disagreement could determine whether Eisenkot can use the 19 Arab-held seats or must seek another route to a majority.

Without Arab lawmakers, Eisenkot’s bloc must find other partners or fail to form a government. The clearest alternative mentioned is an alliance with Orthodox Jewish parties. Israeli media reports said opposition leaders were placing more emphasis on that route, even though those parties have traditionally supported Netanyahu.

That option is difficult because it requires traditional Netanyahu backers to switch sides. A unity government with Netanyahu is another theoretical route, but no opposition leader has expressed openness to it. They point to Netanyahu’s divisiveness, corruption charges, and failure to prevent the October 7 Hamas attack. Their public commitment to replace him makes such a deal especially unlikely.

The final alternative is another election, but the opposition leaders explicitly want to prevent one. An election could reproduce the same divided result rather than settle the dispute. Eisenkot therefore faces a narrow path: persuade Orthodox parties, secure Arab support despite the benchmarks, or accept continued political uncertainty.

In Israel’s proportional-representation system, parties win seats according to their share of the parliamentary vote. The largest party does not automatically receive a majority or the prime minister’s office. Instead, a leader must assemble partners willing to support a government in the 120-member parliament.

The election figures show the mechanism clearly. Netanyahu’s camp won 53 seats and Eisenkot’s bloc won 48, so neither reached the 61 seats needed for a majority. Eisenkot could still become prime minister if Arab-majority parties or Orthodox parties joined his coalition. His bloc would then govern through the combined strength of its partners.

This system makes coalition bargaining decisive after elections. Parties may cooperate despite major differences, but they must agree on enough shared principles to keep the government functioning. In this case, Eisenkot’s conditions on Israel’s Jewish identity and Hamas could limit his choices. The result is a contest over alliances, not simply which single party finished first.