Israel political deadlock leaves Netanyahu’s future hanging in the balance

Political deadlock means the election identified leading camps but did not produce a governing majority. Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, so a government needs at least 61. Neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition nor the opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot reached that threshold.

The result was 53 seats for Netanyahu’s camp and 48 for the self-styled Zionist opposition alliance. The remaining 19 seats went to the Arab-led Joint List and Ra’am. Those parties could support an opposing government, avoid voting against it, or remain outside it, but each option carries political costs.

Negotiations remain stuck because both camps need additional partners. The opposition also includes parties with different political positions, while Arab parties remain isolated. President Isaac Herzog will begin consultations after certification and decide who gets the first opportunity to form a government.

The Knesset contains 120 seats, and a governing majority requires 61. The election left both leading blocs below that mark. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition secured 53 seats, while the self-styled Zionist opposition alliance led by former army chief Gadi Eisenkot secured 48.

The remaining 19 seats went to two Arab-led lists: the Joint List and Ra’am, also called the United Arab List. The article does not divide those 19 seats between the two lists. It also does not give seat totals for the ultra-Orthodox parties, although it identifies them as possible coalition partners.

Likud, Netanyahu’s party, finished first with 27 seats. That first-place result gave Netanyahu a political argument for leading, but it did not provide a majority. Either camp must find partners, persuade defectors, or secure cooperation from parties currently outside its bloc.

The balance of power belongs to parties that can help either side cross the 61-seat threshold. Netanyahu’s camp has 53 seats, and the opposition alliance has 48. Since neither can govern alone, the 19 Arab-led seats and the ultra-Orthodox parties become crucial possible sources of support.

The two Arab-led lists achieved their best-ever electoral performance and benefited from unusually high turnout. Yet they remain politically isolated. They may support an Eisenkot-led government, or at least decline to oppose it. The opposition must also consider two ultra-Orthodox parties, which have historically supported Netanyahu in exchange for protecting some members from military service.

This makes coalition arithmetic more important than simply finishing first. Netanyahu would need Arab cooperation or many opposition defections. The opposition would need Arab backing, ultra-Orthodox support, or another complicated combination. None of those arrangements is currently secure.

Certification triggers the formal government-formation process. President Isaac Herzog consults all the parties and considers which Knesset member is best placed to build a coalition. That person does not have to be a party leader, so the process focuses on likely support rather than simply the election’s first-place finisher.

Herzog could ask the Arab parties to recommend Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the centrist Yashar party. If selected, Eisenkot would initially have 28 days to assemble a coalition. The period can be extended by another 14 days. If he fails, Herzog may invite another candidate to try.

The article highlights an unusual complication: Herzog is also considering Netanyahu’s request for a pardon in his corruption trial. Netanyahu argues that Likud’s 27 seats give him a mandate, while the opposition says it can replace his coalition. Formal talks begin only after results are certified.

If Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition cannot assemble 61 seats, neither can immediately form a government. The formal process allows President Isaac Herzog to manage the impasse by inviting a candidate to try, then asking another candidate if the first attempt fails. The article does not state a final outcome if every attempt fails.

The first nominee receives 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension. Herzog may then invite another Knesset member to form a coalition. This mechanism gives negotiations time, but it does not solve the underlying divisions between the opposition’s parties or the controversy around Arab participation.

Meanwhile, the institutional timetable continues. The new Knesset is due to be sworn in on November 10. Netanyahu’s camp is also challenging the results with claims about Arab voting, although police investigated and discounted those allegations; a separate Shin Bet probe remains ongoing.

The article does not provide the historical example in the question about an Arab party previously supporting Israel’s government. It does establish why Arab cooperation is controversial in the current negotiations: the Arab-led lists remain politically isolated, even after their strongest electoral performance.

Their possible support for an Eisenkot-led government, or a decision not to oppose it, divides the opposition alliance. That alliance includes parties led by Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Yair Golan and Avigdor Lieberman, whose positions differ sharply. Netanyahu has also consistently vilified the Arab parties and said partners must not support terrorism.

As a result, Arab backing could help the opposition reach 61 seats but might fracture its coalition. Netanyahu faces the opposite problem: he would also need Arab cooperation or a large wave of defections from the opposition. The article presents both options as politically difficult.

In a parliamentary coalition system, governing power can come from an agreement among several parties rather than one party winning most seats. The coalition must collectively command at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. This allows a bloc below 61 to govern if it wins reliable support from other parties.

The election shows the mechanism clearly. Netanyahu’s camp has 53 seats, while the opposition has 48. Neither reaches the threshold alone. The 19 seats held by the Joint List and Ra’am could therefore become decisive, as could the two ultra-Orthodox parties that have historically supported Netanyahu.

Small parties gain influence because the larger blocs need their votes to form and sustain a government. They can seek policy commitments in return for joining or supporting a coalition. Here, negotiations are especially difficult because potential partners are politically divided, Arab parties are isolated, and the opposition alliance is increasingly fractious.