Netanyahu 'can no longer be trusted,' Eisenkot says after Trump announces US aid cutoff

President Donald Trump announced that the United States would stop funding Israel after the end of 2026. In practical terms, the cutoff would begin once 2026 has ended, unless a later decision changes the policy. The announcement immediately triggered criticism inside Israel.

The timing and communication were especially important. Gadi Eisenkot said Israel’s defense establishment and citizens learned about the strategic shift through the media. He argued that this showed a dangerous failure in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct.

The announcement creates uncertainty for future defense budgets, weapons purchases, and military planning. Yair Golan said Israel is already facing huge defense expenditures, depleted air-defense capabilities, and a need to replenish offensive weapons. The article does not state whether the cutoff will be delayed or replaced by another arrangement.

The “special relationship” refers to the unusually close strategic partnership between the United States and Israel. It includes political coordination, defense cooperation, military assistance, intelligence links, and access to American weapons and technology. Its importance goes beyond a single funding program because it supports Israel’s ability to deter threats and respond to conflict.

The article gives one clear example of its security value. Eisenkot said the relationship is a central component of Israel’s national security. Golan added that Israel needs to replenish offensive weapons and rebuild air-defense capabilities after a prolonged war. US support can help Israel obtain those capabilities more quickly and predictably.

If funding ends, Israel may need to carry more of the financial burden itself. That could force difficult choices about procurement, readiness, taxation, and other public spending. The article does not describe the full structure of the relationship, but it shows that Israeli leaders view the partnership as strategically essential.

The article identifies US military aid as $3.8 billion per year. Avigdor Liberman called that amount the “price of Trump’s endorsement” of Netanyahu. The figure is large in absolute terms, but the article does not provide Israel’s total defense budget, so it cannot calculate an exact percentage from the supplied text.

Using recent publicly reported Israeli defense-budget levels as a comparison, $3.8 billion is roughly a low-to-mid-teens share of annual defense spending. The exact proportion changes with exchange rates, emergency allocations, and whether war-related costs are included. This comparison is broader context, not a figure stated in the article.

The aid’s importance is not measured only by its percentage. It can support major purchases and reduce pressure on Israel’s own treasury. If it disappears, Israel could still maintain defense spending, but replacing the same purchasing power may require higher taxes, more borrowing, spending cuts, or slower procurement.

Military aid affects whether a country can replace weapons quickly, maintain reserves, and sustain defensive systems during conflict. Losing it could reduce Israel’s ability to buy, repair, or replenish equipment at the same pace. That matters especially when existing stocks have been heavily used or damaged.

Yair Golan gave the article’s concrete example. He said defense expenditures have reached enormous proportions, Israel needs to replenish offensive weapons, and its air-defense capabilities have been depleted after a prolonged war. American assistance can help finance purchases and support the industrial and logistical systems behind them.

Without that support, Israel would need to find replacement money or accept slower rebuilding. Delays could affect readiness and leave less flexibility during a new crisis. The article does not quantify the stockpile shortages or identify specific systems, so the exact operational effect cannot be measured from the available information.

Gadi Eisenkot is the Yashar party leader and a former IDF chief of staff. Yair Golan leads the Democrats Party and is a former IDF deputy chief of staff. Avigdor Liberman leads Yisrael Beytenu. Their backgrounds give the criticism political weight, especially because two speakers previously held senior military command roles.

Their messages focused on different parts of the issue. Eisenkot said Netanyahu could no longer be trusted and should be replaced. Golan described the aid cutoff as a severe blow to security and quality of life. Liberman highlighted the annual $3.8 billion figure and connected it to Netanyahu’s political relationship with Trump.

Together, their statements turn a foreign-policy announcement into a domestic leadership dispute. They argue that Netanyahu failed to protect Israel’s strategic relationship and financial interests. The article does not report Netanyahu’s response, so it cannot establish how his government plans to address the criticism.

Foreign military aid can work through several channels. A government may receive grants or credits for approved defense purchases, obtain weapons directly, or receive help with training, maintenance, and technology. The recipient usually cannot spend military aid like unrestricted household money. Rules depend on the specific program and agreement.

In a US-Israel context, assistance has commonly included purchasing power for American-made equipment and access to established suppliers. It can therefore support missiles, aircraft, air-defense systems, spare parts, and related services, while also linking Israel to American technology and production networks. The article itself only identifies American aid and its security importance, not its detailed structure.

If the aid ends, Israel would lose some combination of funding, procurement flexibility, and supported access, depending on the exact policy. It might still buy weapons with domestic funds or other agreements, but replacement could cost more or take longer. The precise impact requires details that the announcement, as presented, does not provide.

If US aid ends, Israel could finance defense through higher taxes, additional government borrowing, reduced civilian spending, or reallocating money from other programs. It could also seek more domestic weapons production, negotiate other international support, or spread purchases over a longer period. Each route would replace some, but not necessarily all, of the lost support.

The mechanism is a budget trade-off. More domestic funding could preserve weapons purchases and air-defense investment, but it would require money from taxpayers or other government priorities. Borrowing would postpone the cost, while spending cuts would make the cost visible in public services. Slower procurement could reduce immediate pressure but leave capability gaps.

Golan warned that the burden would fall entirely on the Israeli public. He linked the loss of aid to security and quality-of-life risks. The article does not identify a specific Israeli replacement plan, so the eventual mix of taxes, borrowing, cuts, production, or delays remains unknown.