Indian Navy begins court-martial proceedings against two officers over INS Brahmaputra’s partial capsizing in 2024

INS Brahmaputra partially capsized at Mumbai’s Naval Dockyard in July 2024 while undergoing repairs. A fire broke out aboard the 3,850-tonne guided-missile frigate. Firefighting teams pumped in large amounts of water, and the ship tipped onto its side. Leading Seaman Sitendra Singh drowned. The incident raised concerns about operational oversight and safety procedures.

The Navy has charged the ship’s commanding officer, a captain, with hazarding a naval ship and negligence. The officer of the day, a lieutenant commander, faces a negligence charge. “Hazarding” means putting a naval ship in danger. The proceedings examine whether failures in duty contributed to the fire, the response, or the capsizing.

The military court began proceedings in Mumbai on October 12. The ship has been repaired and is undergoing trials, but it has not returned to service. Officials say it may become seaworthy sometime next year. The Navy has also implemented safety recommendations across its commands and units.

A court-martial is a formal military judicial proceeding. It examines allegations against service personnel and can determine whether charges are proved. The process matters because it assigns individual responsibility after a serious operational accident. In this case, proceedings began in Mumbai on October 12 against two officers involved with INS Brahmaputra.

The commanding officer, a captain, is charged with hazarding an Indian Navy ship and negligence in performing his duties. The article explains that “hazarding” is the Navy’s term for putting a ship in danger. Negligence generally means failing to take required care or perform an expected duty. The officer of the day, a lieutenant commander, faces negligence charges.

A conviction could bring punishment ranging from a reprimand and loss of seniority to imprisonment for up to two years. The court-martial must establish responsibility through its proceedings. The charges are allegations, not findings of guilt, and the article does not report a verdict.

INS Brahmaputra is a substantial guided-missile frigate, measuring 125 metres in length and 16 metres across its beam. It displaces or weighs 3,850 tonnes, according to the article. These figures show why stability and careful control are critical during dock repairs. A ship of this size can still become vulnerable when its normal operating support and balance are changed.

The frigate was built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited in Kolkata. It was commissioned into the Indian Navy in April 2000. Its normal complement was 370 people, including 40 officers. During the 2024 repairs, crew members and workers were aboard when the fire started. Most escaped through the gangway, while some jumped into the water.

The accident killed Leading Seaman Sitendra Singh and severely damaged the ship. It took several months to restore the frigate to an upright position. Repairs are complete, but trials continue. Officials expect it to become seaworthy sometime next year, showing the operational cost of damage to a large warship.

A commanding officer is generally responsible for the ship’s overall safety, readiness, discipline, and the decisions made during operations or repairs. An officer of the day normally supervises the vessel’s immediate watch, monitors conditions, coordinates responses, and reports serious developments. These responsibilities matter especially in a dockyard, where repair work, fire risks, access routes, and stability can change quickly.

The article does not set out the officers’ precise orders or actions during the accident. It identifies the commanding officer as a captain and the officer of the day as a lieutenant commander. The captain faces charges of hazarding a ship and negligence. The junior officer faces a negligence charge. Those allegations concern whether their duties were properly performed.

The court-martial is intended to establish responsibility rather than assume it. The Navy has said that identifying the cause, fixing responsibility, and adding safeguards are essential. Its wider safety task force later issued recommendations on safety, security, and standard operating procedures to all naval commands and units.

A ship stays upright when its weight and buoyancy remain balanced around its centre of gravity. During firefighting, large amounts of water may enter spaces inside the vessel. If that water cannot drain or is not evenly distributed, it adds weight high or to one side. The water can also move as the ship tilts, creating a free-surface effect that reduces stability. This explanation uses established naval-architecture principles; the article reports the water and capsizing but does not analyse the exact physics.

At INS Brahmaputra, firefighting teams pumped large volumes of water aboard to control a fire. The 3,850-tonne frigate then tipped onto its side at the Naval Dockyard. The article does not state how much water entered, where it collected, or whether another factor caused the loss of stability.

The event shows why firefighting during dock repairs requires close control of water, drainage, ship support, and stability. The Navy formed a special task force after the mishap. Its recommendations on safety, security, and standard procedures were issued across naval commands and implemented.

The two officers face potentially serious professional and legal consequences. If convicted by the military court, punishments could range from a reprimand and loss of seniority to imprisonment for up to two years. The captain faces charges of hazarding a naval ship and negligence. The officer of the day faces negligence. The court-martial proceedings must determine whether those allegations are proved.

The human cost was immediate. Leading Seaman Sitendra Singh drowned after the fire during repair work. Most personnel escaped through the gangway, but some jumped into the water and swam to safety. The frigate itself suffered severe damage and took several months to restore to an upright position after partially capsizing.

INS Brahmaputra has been repaired but is still not back in service. It is undergoing trials and may become seaworthy sometime next year. The Navy also created a special task force, whose safety recommendations have been implemented across commands, establishments, and units to reduce future accidents.

The INS Betwa accident provided a clear warning about the dangers of dock repairs. In December 2016, the Brahmaputra-class guided-missile frigate toppled after slipping off its dock blocks at Mumbai’s Naval Dockyard. Two sailors died and 14 were injured. Three officers later faced court-martial proceedings, and each received a loss of seniority ranging from four to six months.

The lesson is that ships must be supported securely and monitored carefully while work changes their weight, balance, or surroundings. Fire response also needs controlled water use, reliable drainage, clear escape routes, and close coordination. These practical safeguards draw on established safety principles; the article specifically reports the Navy’s broader safety and procedure measures, not a full technical checklist.

After the Brahmaputra mishap, Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi formed a special task force under a rear admiral. Its recommendations on safety, security, and standard operating procedures went to all naval commands, establishments, and units. The Navy says they have since been implemented.