Bad to worse? Europe’s relief over US midterms tempered by prospect of Trump backlash

Europe saw the Democratic victory as a public rejection of Trump’s two-year record. That mattered because his policies had weakened the post-war order, strained ties, and created deep divisions inside the Western coalition. Yet the election did not restore trust or guarantee a policy reversal.

Trump remained president and retained control of US foreign policy. He also held veto power over congressional proposals. Democrats could influence legislation, but they could not automatically reverse decisions on Ukraine, Russia, trade, Iran, or European defence. The election backlash also reflected domestic concerns, including prices at the pump, rather than a clear rejection of Trump’s foreign policy.

Europe therefore welcomed the result cautiously. Observers expected pressure on Europe to pay more for defence and predicted continued trade disputes. Some feared a weakened Trump would focus more heavily on foreign policy, seek scapegoats, and reopen business with Russia without considering European interests. The victory offered limited reassurance, not a cure for damaged relations.

US midterm elections choose members of Congress halfway through a president’s four-year term. Voters elect all seats in the House of Representatives and roughly one-third of Senate seats. The result can change which party controls Congress without changing the presidency. In the article, Democrats won both chambers in a major midterm defeat for Trump.

A party controlling the House can shape which bills advance, lead committees, conduct investigations, and control much of the legislative agenda. Senate control allows a party to manage debate and votes on legislation, confirm many presidential nominees, and influence treaty or appointment processes. Together, the chambers control federal legislation and appropriations, subject to constitutional limits.

This control does not equal complete power. The president remains head of the executive branch and directs foreign policy. The president can veto legislation, meaning Congress generally needs enough votes to override that veto. The article therefore presents the Democratic sweep as important, but insufficient to fundamentally change US foreign policy.

The president and Congress have separate constitutional roles. A midterm election replaces or reshapes congressional membership, but it does not remove the sitting president. Trump therefore remained in office after Republicans lost both chambers. His administration continued directing the executive branch and setting the broad course of US foreign policy.

The article specifically notes two powers that mattered. Trump retained control over foreign policy, including decisions involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, trade, and relations with Europe. He also held veto power over proposals from legislators. A veto can block a bill unless Congress gathers a sufficiently large majority to override it, so congressional control does not automatically produce new policy.

The Democratic victory could still affect funding, oversight, and the durability of assistance to Ukraine. However, appropriations faced production, approval, and delivery hurdles. The result was political pressure on Trump, not a transfer of diplomatic authority. Observers therefore expected continued retrenchment from Ukraine, defence pressure on Europe, and possible further confrontation.

The article describes a large economic consequence of Trump’s war against Iran, launched with Israel that year. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the European Union imported €127 billion in additional fossil fuels. She added that this happened “without a single molecule of energy in addition,” meaning the spending increased without expanding the amount of energy available.

The figure works out to roughly €281 for every EU resident. The article uses that comparison to make the cost easier to understand across the bloc’s population. It also connects the expense to Europe’s wider economic strain, alongside tariffs on EU goods and pressure on Brussels over green and digital laws affecting US companies.

The €127 billion was equal to 67 per cent of the EU’s entire annual budget. That scale helps explain why the transatlantic dispute mattered beyond diplomacy. Higher energy costs could limit Europe’s room to respond, while the article noted that economic realities might constrain further confrontation between Trump and European governments.

Continued US retrenchment from Ukraine would leave Europe more responsible for helping Ukraine resist Russia. At the same time, pressure to provide more of its own defence would force European governments to supply greater financial, military, and political support. The article presents this as a lasting burden, not a temporary election issue.

The mechanism is practical. Congressional support might make aid to Ukraine more durable, but funding still had to pass approval stages and overcome production and delivery problems. Until assistance became military capability, Ukraine and Europe could not rely on announced support alone. Europe also had to prepare for its own security needs as US backing became less certain.

For NATO, the article points to uncertainty rather than a definite collapse. Uneven burden-sharing could deepen disagreements between Washington and European capitals. Reduced US engagement could weaken confidence in the alliance’s cohesion, while greater European defence spending might partly offset that risk. Trade disputes and possible US accommodation with Russia could create further friction among allies.

A president weakened by a midterm defeat often has less control over domestic legislation. With fewer chances to pass an agenda at home, foreign policy can become a more prominent arena for action. The article describes this as a pattern of lame-duck presidents during their final two years, when attention shifts toward international affairs.

The proposed mechanism is especially strong in Trump’s case. Analysts said his administration had a radical approach and wanted to disrupt the existing world order. Trump still controlled foreign policy and possessed veto power, even after losing Congress. He could therefore act through executive authority and diplomacy while congressional opposition constrained parts of his domestic program.

Observers feared this would make Europe’s situation worse, not calmer. Max Bergmann predicted many collisions with Europe, while an EU diplomat said Trump might lash out because he had more free time. Trade and foreign policy remained areas where he retained influence. Russia, Ukraine, and European security were especially uncertain.

The transatlantic alliance refers to the partnership between the United States and European countries across the Atlantic. In the article, it is the broader Western coalition whose post-war order has been damaged by disputes over Ukraine, Russia, trade, energy, and defence. Its importance lies in coordinated security and political action between the two sides.

Cooperation makes the alliance effective. The United States has traditionally been a major source of political and military support, while European countries contribute forces, funding, diplomacy, and economic pressure. The article says Trump made clear that Europe must pay for its own defence. It also says assistance to Ukraine required funding, production, approval, and delivery before becoming military capability.

Burden-sharing is therefore central. If Washington retreats while Europe remains unprepared, confidence in NATO and the wider coalition can weaken. If Europe carries more responsibility, it may reduce dependence on the United States, but disputes could continue. The article leaves the alliance’s future uncertain amid trade conflict and possible US accommodation with Russia.