Make technology choice a pillar of 5G policy, govt told

Technology choice means deciding which equipment suppliers can support Malaysia’s 5G networks and preserving genuine alternatives over time. It is broader than having two network operators. The goal is to avoid both networks relying on the same critical suppliers, which could create shared weaknesses or disruptions.

For example, DNB uses Ericsson equipment, while U Mobile appointed Huawei and ZTE for its second network. Samirul Ariff Othman said Malaysia should make meaningful supplier diversity and the ability to change suppliers explicit policy objectives. Supplier nationality alone would not prove security or independence.

The current policy framework supports a dual-network model but does not clearly require a permanent East-West supplier split. Malaysia could make technology choice enforceable through licence or spectrum conditions, procurement rules, reporting, and oversight. Those safeguards would apply to operators and approved successors while respecting existing contracts and transition periods.

Malaysia’s 5G system is organized around a dual-network model. Two operators run separate networks, with arrangements intended to support service continuity and spectrum use. However, two networks do not automatically create two fully independent technology ecosystems.

Digital Nasional Bhd, or DNB, uses equipment from Ericsson. U Mobile appointed Huawei and ZTE for its second network. This creates a visible difference in suppliers, but future procurement, ownership changes, or network-sharing decisions could increase common dependence.

Ministerial Direction No. 7 of 2025 directed MCMC to support the dual-network model, including spectrum arrangements and service continuity. The direction did not itself require a permanent East-West supplier split. The government may therefore need clearer licence, spectrum, procurement, and oversight requirements to preserve meaningful alternatives as the networks develop.

The article identifies two operators in Malaysia’s dual-network 5G model. It also names three major equipment suppliers: Ericsson, Huawei, and ZTE. Counting operators and suppliers separately gives two network operators and three equipment suppliers.

DNB is the operator using Ericsson equipment. U Mobile is the operator that appointed Huawei and ZTE for its second network. These arrangements show different supplier choices, but they do not automatically guarantee that the networks will remain independent in the future.

The number of named companies is not the same as a permanent guarantee of diversity. Supplier changes, ownership changes, or network-sharing arrangements could alter the picture. Samirul said applicable licence conditions, spectrum conditions, or undertakings must be confirmed with MCMC. The article does not identify additional operators or suppliers.

A dual-network structure separates operators, but it does not necessarily separate their supply chains. Both networks could eventually rely on the same critical supplier, software component, support channel, or technical standard. That shared dependence could make a problem affect both networks at once.

For example, a common supplier could expose both networks to the same software vulnerability. A supply disruption or restriction on technical support could also affect both operators simultaneously. Samirul warned that two operators therefore do not automatically guarantee different supplier ecosystems or real independence.

The current framework supports two networks, but the article says it does not itself require a permanent East-West supplier split. Future procurement, network-sharing, ownership, or supplier changes could increase common dependence. Resilience assessments for major changes, continuing oversight, and reporting could help identify and manage these shared risks.

The key safeguard is to preserve a credible ability to change suppliers when security, supply, or technical-support problems arise. That requires more than naming different suppliers today. It requires obligations that continue through future ownership, supplier, and network-sharing changes.

Samirul proposed published policy backed by licence or spectrum conditions, procurement requirements, and continuing oversight. Procurement should test security, compatibility, long-term support, and realistic switching arrangements. Major changes that substantially increase common dependence should receive resilience assessments, while routine purchasing remains management’s responsibility.

Periodic reporting and fair access for eligible wholesale customers could add transparency and competition. Implementation should respect existing contracts and allow reasonable transition periods. The safeguards should apply to both operators and approved successors. The government should also state which instrument creates each obligation and how MCMC will enforce compliance.

MCMC is the regulator that must support Malaysia’s dual-network model, including spectrum arrangements and service continuity. Licence and spectrum conditions can specify what operators must do. Procurement requirements can then shape equipment choices and require security, compatibility, long-term support, and switching plans.

Ministerial Direction No. 7 of 2025 directs MCMC to support the dual-network model. MCMC’s licensing guidelines describe licences as technology- and service-neutral, although individual licences may contain special conditions. Those conditions could address supplier diversity or common dependence if the regulator confirms them.

Samirul said public material did not reveal an explicit binding guarantee of distinct supplier ecosystems through future changes. He called for the government to identify the relevant instrument, its obligations, and enforcement method. Continuing oversight, reporting, and resilience assessments could test compliance as operators, suppliers, or networks change.

5G is the fifth generation of mobile communications technology. It uses cellular networks to connect phones, devices, businesses, and other services. The article does not define 5G, but it focuses on the resilience of the equipment and suppliers behind those networks. Reliable connectivity matters because disruption can affect communications and service continuity.

If both networks depend on the same critical supplier, one software vulnerability could expose both. A supply disruption could delay equipment or repairs across the system. Restrictions on technical support could also affect both operators. These are common points of failure, even when two networks exist.

Malaysia’s dual-network model is intended to support service continuity, but the article says it does not itself guarantee separate supplier ecosystems. Supplier diversity, switching arrangements, procurement controls, resilience assessments, and oversight could reduce shared risks. Farlina Said emphasized reliable access and continuity, while noting diversification helps reduce single points of failure.