Police chief removed after falling out with PM’s office

Dan Bahadur Karki lost his position as Nepal Police inspector general after tensions with Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s secretariat intensified. The Cabinet removed him less than 24 hours after its regular meeting, citing dissatisfaction with his performance and concerns surrounding an investigation. The decision matters because the police chief leads a central law-enforcement institution.

The unusual part was Karki’s immediate appointment as the prime minister’s special security adviser. The government therefore removed him from police leadership while retaining him in a senior security role. Manoj KC became inspector general, although he ranked third in the police hierarchy. Home Minister Sudan Gurung personally pinned KC’s insignia.

The change has fueled accusations of political interference. A retired police chief said disciplinary or legal proceedings should have been used if Karki had broken rules. Instead, transferring him without seeking an explanation suggested that the government wanted to install its preferred leader, potentially weakening police morale and institutional credibility.

An Inspector General of Police is the senior operational leader of a national police organization. The office turns laws and government policy into policing practice. It normally sets priorities, directs major investigations, manages personnel and resources, and oversees public order, crime prevention, and law enforcement. The article does not detail Nepal’s specific statutory powers, so these responsibilities reflect the established role of national police chiefs.

The Nepal Police chief is especially important because the institution investigates crime, prevents crime, and enforces the law. In this case, Karki’s leadership was tied to a sensitive investigation involving fixer Inam Sapkota. The government’s attempt to replace him therefore affected not only an individual officer, but also the direction and perceived independence of police work.

An inspector general must balance accountability with operational independence. Governments may set lawful priorities, but changing the chief because of political preferences can make officers fear displeasing powerful figures. That can damage morale, public confidence, and confidence that investigations are based on evidence rather than influence.

Nepal Police is Nepal’s national law-enforcement institution. It is responsible for investigating and preventing crime and enforcing the law across the country. The article calls it an institution older than the civil service, showing that it is not a small agency but a longstanding pillar of the state. The source does not provide its staffing, budget, or number of stations.

Its importance is clear from the powers and cases described. Police detained Inam Sapkota over alleged money-laundering and banking offences. Officers also questioned journalists at the Cyber Bureau after reports about Sapkota and the possible replacement of Karki. These actions show the force’s reach into financial crime, cyber matters, investigations, and public information disputes.

Because Nepal Police performs these core functions, its leadership should appear professional and stable. Removing a chief amid political controversy can affect internal morale and outside confidence. Even without published scale figures in the article, the institution’s national mandate means leadership decisions can influence policing far beyond one investigation.

The investigation into fixer Inam Sapkota became the central point of conflict between Inspector General Dan Bahadur Karki and Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s secretariat. Sapkota was in police custody over alleged money-laundering and banking offences. The government suspected links between Sapkota and the police chief, and Shah reportedly wanted Karki removed as early as the previous Thursday.

The dispute deepened when reports said Kumar (Ben) Byanjankar, Shah’s chief adviser, kept Sapkota’s mobile phone for two days after the arrest. The phone became important because it was connected to the investigation and to allegations involving people close to the prime minister. Police also detained and questioned journalists reporting on Sapkota’s conversations and Karki’s possible removal.

These events brought the Prime Minister’s Office and police into direct conflict. After information about the adviser’s conduct emerged, an emergency Cabinet meeting was held and Karki was removed. The case therefore became more than a criminal investigation: it became a test of political influence over police operations.

When a government changes police leadership to suit political preferences, officers may conclude that career security depends on pleasing those in power. That weakens morale and can discourage independent decisions. The article quotes former home secretary Umesh Mainali, who said changing leadership instead of strengthening Nepal Police undermines the institution’s credibility and morale.

The mechanism is straightforward. If a chief can be removed during a politically sensitive investigation without a disciplinary hearing or explanation, other officers may avoid cases that threaten influential people. Investigations may then appear selective, even when officers act lawfully. In this case, the dispute involved Sapkota, an adviser’s reported handling of his phone, and journalists questioned over related reports.

The immediate consequence is public doubt about whether police decisions are evidence-based. The longer-term risk is weaker cooperation from citizens and less confidence in the rule of law. The article does not establish that any investigation was improperly changed, but it shows why the timing and circumstances raised serious concerns.

The article says there was a precedent for the dispute: in April 1997, the government of Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand transferred sitting police chief Achyut Krishna Kharel to the National Investigation Department. This shows that moving a serving police chief has happened before. It places Karki’s removal within a longer history of political conflict over police leadership.

However, the supplied article ends mid-sentence at “National Investigation Dep”. It gives no further facts about Kharel’s transfer, the reasons for it, any court decision, or the legal rule that followed. Therefore, the earlier case cannot safely be described as a binding legal precedent based on this text alone.

What the article does establish is a historical comparison. Both cases involve governments changing the position of a sitting police chief rather than describing a completed disciplinary process. The comparison invites questions about institutional independence, but the source does not say whether the 1997 case directly authorized, justified, or legally controlled Karki’s removal.

Democratic systems separate police investigations from day-to-day political control so cases can be guided by evidence and law. This protects equal treatment and makes it harder for officials to stop investigations involving allies or target opponents. It also helps citizens trust that police decisions are professional. The article presents this concern through allegations of political interference in the Sapkota investigation.

The lawful alternative is accountability through a defined process. A suspected police chief can be asked for an explanation, investigated internally, disciplined under applicable rules, or prosecuted if the evidence supports a criminal case. A retired inspector general specifically said authorities could have initiated disciplinary proceedings or filed a case if Karki had violated rules.

Those options create a record and allow the allegation to be tested. They differ from transferring a chief without even seeking an explanation. The article does not claim Karki was legally cleared or guilty. It shows that the absence of a stated process made the government’s decision appear connected to its desire to install someone of its choice.