Report to Congress on U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile, Nuclear Programs

The operations were joint U.S.-Israeli military actions against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026. Their stated focus was Iran’s nuclear capability and missile forces. This matters because both areas are tied to regional security and to concerns about Iran’s ability to threaten neighbors or develop a nuclear weapon.

President Donald Trump listed three objectives: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, destroying Iran’s missiles, and “[razing] their missile industry to the ground.” The wording describes both immediate military targets and a broader effort to damage the industrial base that produces missiles.

The supplied excerpt does not identify the forces used, the targets struck, the number of attacks, or their results. It does show that some Members of Congress questioned the operations, partly because Trump had previously said June 2025 strikes had eliminated Iran’s key enrichment facilities.

Iran’s missile program is the network of technologies, factories, personnel, and testing needed to design, build, maintain, and deploy missiles. Its nuclear program covers nuclear science and infrastructure, including reactors, research, uranium conversion, and enrichment. These programs matter because missiles can deliver weapons, while nuclear activities can support energy, research, or—if advanced far enough—weapon development.

A key distinction is purpose. A missile is a delivery system, not automatically a nuclear weapon. Likewise, a nuclear program is not automatically a weapons program. Civilian nuclear work can use enriched uranium for fuel, while higher enrichment and weapon-related design would create different risks. The supplied excerpt does not specify Iran’s particular facilities or capabilities.

The February 2026 operations targeted both areas, according to Trump’s stated objectives. The excerpt gives no assessment of whether the strikes damaged production, research, enrichment, or command systems. That uncertainty is important when judging whether military action could achieve lasting results.

Iran’s missile forces include different classes of missiles, launch systems, storage sites, factories, and support networks. Its nuclear infrastructure includes multiple facilities for mining, conversion, enrichment, research, and related work. The supplied excerpt does not state the number of missiles, launchers, sites, or facilities, so it cannot establish an exact scale.

Complete destruction is difficult because military capability is not located in one building. Facilities may be dispersed, buried, hardened, concealed, or supported by backup equipment and skilled personnel. Even a successful strike on visible sites may leave mobile launchers, hidden stockpiles, technical knowledge, or repair capacity. These features make “destroying” a program different from damaging selected targets.

The February 2026 objective of destroying Iran’s missiles therefore raises a broader question: can strikes eliminate an entire industrial system? The excerpt provides no results. In general, lasting effects would depend on the damage, Iran’s remaining capacity, inspections or monitoring, and whether reconstruction follows.

In June 2025, the United States and Israel carried out strikes against Iran, according to the supplied excerpt. The passage does not describe the dates, weapons, targets, damage, casualties, or operational results. It only identifies the strikes as earlier military action connected to later congressional questions.

Trump previously asserted that the June strikes had eliminated Iran’s “key nuclear enrichment facilities.” Enrichment is the process of increasing the concentration of uranium-235 in uranium. The excerpt gives no evidence for his assessment and does not identify which facilities he meant. It also does not say whether inspectors or other governments confirmed the claim.

That earlier assertion matters because Trump later ordered or supported operations with similar goals. Some Members of Congress questioned the February 2026 action in light of the claim that key facilities had already been eliminated. The excerpt leaves unresolved whether the earlier strikes fully achieved their objectives.

Continued strikes could affect four connected areas: Iran’s military capacity, Israel’s security, U.S. forces, and regional stability. Damage to Iranian missiles or nuclear sites might reduce some immediate capabilities. But military action can also provoke retaliation, increase civilian and military casualties, and make diplomacy or monitoring harder. The supplied excerpt does not report any such consequences.

A concrete risk is escalation through repeated exchanges. Iran could respond against Israel, U.S. personnel, or regional bases, while Israel or the United States could conduct further strikes. Attacks near nuclear facilities could also create safety concerns, depending on the materials and systems affected. These are potential mechanisms, not outcomes established by the excerpt.

The political consequences could be substantial. Iran might rebuild, disperse assets, or harden facilities. Israel and the United States could face continuing security demands. Congress may intensify oversight, while regional governments could be pulled into the conflict. The excerpt provides no forecast or post-strike assessment.

The president is commander in chief and directs military operations, including decisions about using forces abroad. Congress has constitutional powers to declare war, authorize military action, appropriate money, regulate the armed forces, and investigate executive decisions. These roles matter because military action combines immediate command with democratic checks.

For example, a president may order an operation under claimed executive authority or an existing authorization. Congress can respond by approving, limiting, or refusing funds, requiring reports, holding hearings, and passing legislation. The War Powers Resolution also requires certain notifications and sets a framework for congressional involvement when U.S. forces enter hostilities. Specific legal details depend on the operation.

The supplied excerpt says some Members questioned the U.S. operations in Iran, but it does not describe votes, funding laws, authorizations, or hearings. Therefore, it establishes congressional concern, not the legal outcome. Continued operations would likely keep questions about authority, money, oversight, and accountability before Congress.

Uranium enrichment separates uranium isotopes to increase the share of uranium-235. Natural uranium contains only a small amount of uranium-235, so enrichment is used to make fuel for some civilian reactors and for other nuclear purposes. The process matters because the same basic technology can support peaceful energy work or create material relevant to a nuclear weapon.

The key mechanism is concentration. Low-enriched uranium can support civilian reactor fuel, while highly enriched uranium contains much more uranium-235 and can be used in weapons. A weapon also requires other difficult steps, including a suitable design and delivery system. Enrichment alone does not prove that a country is building a weapon, but advanced enrichment can shorten the technical path.

That is why enrichment facilities were central to the June 2025 strikes and Trump’s later claims. The excerpt does not state Iran’s enrichment levels, stockpiles, or inspection results. It only shows that preventing a nuclear weapon was a stated objective of the February 2026 operations.