Will New Zealand’s election reshape its ‘softly-softly’ approach to Trump?

New Zealand’s election could change how Wellington manages its relationship with US President Donald Trump. The central choice is between continuing quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy and pursuing a more independent foreign policy. This matters because analysts consider the second Trump administration unlike previous US administrations.

Under the current National-led coalition, a major shift appears unlikely. Robert Patman said NZ First and ACT are broadly pro-Trump, making continued caution more probable. Wellington previously responded non-confrontationally when Washington rolled back reciprocal tariffs on New Zealand exports.

A Labour-led coalition with the Greens and Opportunity could take a more measured approach, Patman said. It could realign foreign policy with New Zealand’s values and interests, possibly by building closer relationships with middle and small powers. The election result and coalition negotiations will therefore help determine Wellington’s direction.

New Zealand’s major parties may not win enough seats to govern alone. Under the country’s proportional electoral system, National or Labour could need smaller parties to reach a governing majority. Those coalition partners can then negotiate over policy, including foreign affairs and defence.

The current government shows how this works. National governs with ACT and NZ First. Patman said their broadly pro-Trump orientation would make a significant foreign-policy shift less likely if the coalition returned. Their support could therefore affect both Wellington’s tone toward Washington and its wider security priorities.

The next balance of power could look different. Opportunity says it could work with either National or Labour, while the Greens are potential Labour partners. If Opportunity enters Parliament, it could become a “kingmaker,” using coalition talks to influence the next government’s foreign-policy and defence choices.

A mixed-member proportional, or MMP, system combines electorate contests with party votes. Parliament’s composition reflects both local electorate victories and each party’s share of the party vote. This usually makes single-party majorities less common and encourages several parties to enter Parliament.

The article gives the key entry rule: a party generally needs at least 5 percent of the party vote or one electorate seat. Once parties win seats, the major party with the strongest result may still lack enough support to govern. It must negotiate with smaller parties over a coalition or another governing arrangement.

That mechanism makes election night only the first stage. National and Labour were nearly level in a 1News Verian poll, at 30 and 29 percent. If neither can command Parliament, negotiations may determine who governs and which policies survive, including defence and foreign affairs.

Under New Zealand’s mixed-member proportional system, a party generally needs at least 5 percent of the party vote or an electorate seat to enter Parliament. This threshold limits parliamentary representation to parties with meaningful nationwide or local support. It also makes smaller parties important when the main parties are closely matched.

Opportunity is led by Qiulae Wong and is campaigning independently. It says it could work with either National or Labour. If it reaches Parliament and neither major party has enough support to govern, Opportunity could support one side in coalition negotiations or another governing arrangement.

That is why its result could matter far beyond its vote share. David Capie called Opportunity the “wild card” and said it could hold the balance of power. Polls were too close to call, and negotiations could potentially take weeks after Saturday’s election.

The coalition outcome could produce different foreign-policy directions. National, ACT and NZ First are associated in the article with a broadly pro-Trump orientation, so their return would probably preserve Wellington’s cautious approach to Washington. Defence priorities could also remain shaped by those coalition partners.

Patman offered the clearest contrast. He said a National-led coalition would be unlikely to make a significant shift in its approach to Washington. By comparison, a Labour-led coalition involving the Greens and Opportunity could “realign foreign policy” more consistently with New Zealand’s values and interests.

The difference would not necessarily mean an immediate break with the United States. It could mean more measured diplomacy and closer relations with middle and small powers. Canada’s approach under Mark Carney was presented as a possible model. The election’s close result means coalition negotiations may determine which direction prevails.

The alternative to “softly-softly” diplomacy would be a more active and independent foreign policy. Rather than mainly responding quietly to US decisions, Wellington could strengthen relationships with middle and small powers. Patman said this could better reflect New Zealand’s values and interests.

Canada provides the article’s concrete example. Mark Carney has prioritised closer relations with middle and small powers, pursued an “associate membership” framework with the European Union, and helped lead the Partners for Multilateralism initiative. That initiative includes Brazil, the EU, Kenya, India and Australia.

New Zealand could therefore diversify its diplomatic partnerships and cooperate more visibly through multilateral efforts. The article does not present a detailed New Zealand plan, but it identifies this broader network-building as an option. Whether Wellington takes it would depend heavily on the coalition formed after the election.

The post-war, US-led rules-based international order is the network of international rules, institutions and partnerships created after World War II, with the United States playing a leading role. It aimed to make relations more predictable by encouraging cooperation, shared rules and negotiated solutions rather than unchecked power.

The article says Mark Carney argued that this traditional order had collapsed and been replaced by great-power bullying and the weaponisation of trade. To shield Canada from what he called a “geopolitical rupture,” he shifted policy toward middle and small powers. Canada also pursued closer ties with the European Union and other partners.

Smaller countries may cooperate because acting together can provide greater diplomatic weight and reduce dependence on one dominant power. Such partnerships can help them respond to trade pressure and security uncertainty. The article presents this approach as a possible model for New Zealand, not as an announced policy.