Indian firms, citizens among entities sanctioned by US for ‘supporting’ Iran

The US sanctioned Indian and Turkish entities it said supported Iran while Washington seeks to restrict Tehran’s ability to sell oil and fund the conflict. The action targeted both maritime activity and aviation services linked to Iran.

The main target was a network allegedly run by Chandigarh-based Suniel Kumar Sharma and his wife, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid. The US also sanctioned Indian citizens Ashwani Kumar Dhiman and Ishwinder Singh, who headed two of the couple’s businesses, plus nine related entities. Washington said the network supplied false flags and maritime certifications to vessels carrying Iranian petroleum.

The US also sanctioned Türkiye-based Fugo Ground Services. The Treasury Department said Fugo provided ground handling and other services to US-sanctioned Iranian airlines still flying to Türkiye. The designations show Washington is targeting support routes by land, sea, and air, not only Iran’s own institutions.

A “shadow fleet” is a group of ships used to move sanctioned cargo while obscuring their identity, ownership, registration, or activities. The article connects Iran’s shadow fleet to vessels transporting Iranian petroleum, including shipments linked to the Iranian military and its proxies. Its purpose is to keep oil moving despite sanctions.

The alleged network supplied false flags and fake maritime certifications. A flag identifies the country under whose registration a ship operates, while certifications show that it meets required maritime standards. Misleading documents can make a vessel appear compliant or connected to a different jurisdiction, helping it evade checks and international rules.

The article does not detail every ownership structure used by Iran’s shadow fleet. It does establish that hidden or misleading maritime arrangements support sanctioned oil transport. Washington is therefore targeting the wider service network around these ships, including documentation providers, rather than only the vessels themselves.

The India-linked total was four people and nine entities. The people were Suniel Kumar Sharma, his wife Jaspreet Preeti Shahid, Ashwani Kumar Dhiman, and Ishwinder Singh. The nine entities were businesses linked to Sharma and Shahid, according to the US Treasury Department.

Washington alleged that Sharma and Shahid ran a “vast criminal network” based in Chandigarh. It said Dhiman and Singh headed two of the couple’s businesses. The network allegedly provided false flags and certifications to sanctioned vessels transporting Iranian petroleum, including vessels operating for Iran’s military and its proxies.

The numbers show that the sanctions reached beyond individual ship operators. They covered the alleged organizers, business leaders, and companies connected to the documentation system. The article gives no further breakdown of the nine entities’ names or separate functions, but says they were linked to Sharma and Shahid.

False flags and fake maritime certifications can disguise a ship’s true registration or make it appear to meet safety and environmental requirements. That can help an oil tanker avoid international checks and continue carrying sanctioned petroleum. The article says such documents are used to evade rules protecting crews and the environment.

The mechanism is simple but serious. A false flag gives a vessel a misleading national identity, while fake certification suggests that required standards have been met. Authorities, ports, insurers, and other shipping actors may struggle to identify the ship’s real status. This can allow illicit voyages to continue with less scrutiny.

Washington also warned that falsely flagged vessels carry no valid protection and indemnity insurance. If a shadow-fleet ship causes an accident or pollution, the country whose waters are affected could face massive costs. The Treasury Department said damages to affected economies could reach billions of dollars.

The US strategy focuses on Iran’s oil sales because Washington says petroleum revenue helps Tehran fund the war in West Asia. Restricting those sales is intended to reduce the money available to Iran’s military and its proxies. The sanctions therefore target commercial activity as a route to pressure the government.

The Treasury action focused on services that keep Iranian oil moving. Washington accused an India-linked network of supplying false flags and certifications to vessels carrying Iranian petroleum. It also sanctioned companies and people supporting that system. The goal is to make transport harder, riskier, and more exposed to enforcement.

The article presents this as part of “Operation Economic Outcast,” designed to cut off Tehran’s ability to sell oil. The strategy is continuing even as peace talks between Washington and Tehran have stalled and fighting has periodically increased. In August, four India-based companies were also sanctioned over Iranian petroleum and petrochemical imports.

US sanctions can affect companies outside America because firms often need access to US-linked banks, trade channels, currencies, or business partners. Sanctions can also warn other companies against dealing with a designated entity. The article does not list the precise restrictions imposed on each target, so these broader effects are established sanctions practice.

In this case, Washington sanctioned India-based people and entities over alleged maritime support for Iranian oil shipments. It also sanctioned Türkiye-based Fugo Ground Services for providing ground handling and other services to US-sanctioned Iranian airlines. The targets were not based in the United States, but their alleged links to Iran brought them within the US enforcement campaign.

The political message was explicit. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the US would sanction those supporting the Iranian regime “by land, sea or air.” That suggests foreign companies may face pressure to stop dealing with Iran, even when their operations are located elsewhere.

Protection and indemnity, or P&I, insurance is maritime liability cover. It generally helps pay claims arising from operating a ship, including damage to people, property, or the marine environment. The article specifically highlights its importance for vessels carrying Iranian petroleum under false flags.

A ship with valid P&I insurance has a recognised financial mechanism for handling major liabilities after an accident. A falsely flagged vessel may have no valid cover at all. If it collides, leaks oil, damages infrastructure, or harms people, affected authorities may struggle to recover compensation from the operator.

That creates risks for coastal countries whose waters host these voyages. The Treasury Department warned that shadow-fleet vessels operating under false flags could cause billions of dollars in damage to the economies of countries where they operate. The danger includes financial losses and the environmental harm associated with unsafe or illicit shipping.