How Trump’s weakened grip on Congress complicates talks with China

Democrats’ control of the House and Senate did not transfer foreign-policy control from Trump to Congress. It did, however, weaken his political position by creating a unified congressional opposition able to investigate, demand information and raise the political cost of his decisions.

The Taiwan arms package shows the mechanism. Trump had held the US$14 billion sale in abeyance after meeting Xi Jinping and called it a bargaining chip. Democratic committees can investigate whether linking the sale to Beijing negotiations departed from established policy, summon officials and seek documents.

Trump could still withhold formal notification, and Democrats lack the two-thirds majorities needed to override a veto. But Republicans who want independence from Trump may join pressure for the sale. Continued resistance could therefore become costlier than releasing the package, especially as Congress debates defence and appropriations legislation.

Foreign Military Sales is a process shared across the executive branch, but its decisive formal steps remain there. The State Department approves individual programmes, while the Defence Department implements them. The executive branch then transmits qualifying sales to Congress for statutory review.

The Taiwan package illustrates the sequence. Congress informally reviewed it, but the administration never formally notified lawmakers. A letter of offer and acceptance normally cannot be issued until formal notification and the review period are complete. Congress therefore cannot simply notify the sale or put it into effect itself.

This arrangement matters because Trump can withhold formal notification. Congress can pass legislation demanding action, attach requirements to defence or appropriations bills, or investigate the delay. Yet Trump could veto such legislation, and overriding him would require two-thirds majorities in both chambers, which Democrats do not possess.

The delayed Taiwan package is valued at US$14 billion. Its size makes the dispute more than a procedural quarrel: it represents a substantial security commitment and a significant test of whether Congress can check presidential power over arms policy.

The reported package includes hundreds of Patriot interceptors, nine National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, and an Integrated Battle Command System. Congress informally reviewed the proposal earlier, but the administration has not formally notified lawmakers, so the normal sales process remains incomplete.

Trump said he was holding the package in abeyance and described it as a bargaining chip after meeting Xi Jinping. A senior State Department official later said the decision did not depend on negotiations with Beijing, but offered no timetable. Democrats can investigate the contradiction, while Republicans may press for release.

Democratic-controlled committees cannot approve the sale themselves, but they can make delaying it politically expensive. Their strongest immediate tool is oversight, which can expose the administration’s reasoning and test whether it followed established policy.

Committees can summon officials, demand documents and issue subpoenas. They can investigate whether the administration improperly connected arms sales to negotiations with Beijing. They can also require reports on Taiwan’s outstanding requests and examine why formal notification has not occurred.

Congress can add pressure through funding legislation. Defence or appropriations bills could include requirements that increase the administrative and political cost of maintaining the hold. These measures would not automatically release the package. Trump could still veto legislation, but hearings, investigations and legislative threats might persuade the White House that continuing the delay costs more than proceeding.

China opposes US arms sales to Taiwan, and the issue is sensitive because weapons transfers directly affect Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability. The Taiwan Relations Act assigns both the president and Congress a role in judging Taiwan’s defence needs.

The delayed package became especially sensitive when Trump described it as a bargaining chip after meeting Xi Jinping. A senior State Department official later said the decision did not depend on negotiations with Beijing. The conflicting signals made the sale part of a wider dispute over how Washington handles China.

Democratic control of Congress could make that handling more contentious, but it does not guarantee delivery. Beijing’s opposition remains, while Trump retains control over formal notification. Congressional pressure may force a public choice between releasing the package and sustaining a politically costly hold.

Taiwan offers Republican lawmakers a relatively convenient way to separate themselves from Trump. They can support a harder position toward Beijing while avoiding endorsement of the Democrats’ domestic programme. The sale is also financed by Taipei and would support orders for American defence manufacturers.

There is already evidence of this approach. Republican senators Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Lisa Murkowski and Thom Tillis urged the administration in September to release more than US$15 billion in stalled security assistance for Taiwan, including the US$14 billion package.

This pressure reflects broader Republican uncertainty after Trump-backed candidates lost several Senate races. Still, Republican support may not produce a veto-proof coalition. Congress may not need one if lawmakers’ public hearings, investigations and legislative threats convince the White House that continuing the hold is more costly than releasing the sale.

The separation of powers divides responsibility rather than giving either branch total control. The executive branch manages the Foreign Military Sales process, while Congress checks presidential decisions through oversight, legislation, funding and statutory review.

For the Taiwan package, committees can summon officials, demand documents and issue subpoenas. Congress can also attach notification requirements to defence or appropriations bills. But the executive branch must formally transmit qualifying sales, and Trump can withhold that notification. Congress cannot notify or implement the package itself.

This balance lets lawmakers challenge policy without directly making the executive decision. A binding requirement could force action only if it became law, survived a presidential veto, or secured a two-thirds override in both chambers. The midterm results created stronger congressional pressure, not automatic congressional control.