Defense Forces put 15 of Russia's 38 major oil refineries out of operation in late September – Intelligence

Russia’s oil-refining network had suffered a major reduction by the end of September 2026. The Defense Intelligence of Ukraine reported that 15 of 38 major refineries were out of operation. Another 12 were still running but producing fewer petroleum products. This matters because crude oil must be refined before it becomes fuel for domestic use or export.

The disruption affected facilities in the Volga, Central, and Southern Federal Districts. Sites named in the report include Slavneft-YANOS, the Ryazan refinery, the Moscow refinery, and Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez. Together, the affected facilities represent about 33% of Russia’s total refining capacity.

Total refining volumes at the 38 facilities were down 55.4% compared with the beginning of 2026. Remote refineries increased their output and processed 906,000 barrels daily in September, but transport limits restricted their ability to replace the damaged capacity. Russia also faces expensive repairs and possible further declines in 2027.

An oil refinery is an industrial facility that processes crude oil into products people and businesses can use. Crude contains many different hydrocarbons mixed together. Refineries separate and transform them because engines, heating systems, factories, and other users need specific fuels rather than raw crude.

The first major step is usually distillation. The crude is heated, and different components separate according to their boiling points. Refineries then use additional processes to convert heavier fractions into lighter products, remove impurities, and meet fuel-quality requirements. The resulting products can include gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, heating oil, lubricants, and petrochemical feedstocks.

The source focuses on disrupted refining capacity rather than explaining this process. Its figures show why refining matters: when facilities stop working, crude oil cannot automatically replace lost gasoline or diesel production. Russia’s remaining refineries processed more oil, but transport constraints limited how far that extra output could cover shortages.

The reported disruption affected most of Russia’s major refining network. By the end of September 2026, 15 of 38 major refineries had been put out of operation. Another 12 were operating at reduced output. Together, those categories covered 27 facilities, although the report gives the 55.4% decline for total refining volumes at the facilities overall.

The hardest-hit areas were the Volga, Central, and Southern Federal Districts. Shutdowns affected the capacity of named facilities including Slavneft-YANOS, Kirishinefteorgsintez, the Ryazan refinery, the Gazprom Neft Moscow Refinery, and Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez. These facilities together represent about 33% of Russia’s total oil-refining capacity.

Remote refineries partly countered the losses. Six such facilities processed 906,000 barrels per day in September, which was 147,000 barrels more than at the beginning of the year. Even so, the intelligence agency reported a 55.4% overall fall at the major facilities compared with the year’s start.

Crude oil is not the same as gasoline, diesel, or other ready-to-use fuels. Refineries must process crude into specific petroleum products. When refineries are damaged or shut down, the country may retain underground oil supplies but lose the ability to turn enough of that oil into fuel for vehicles, industry, agriculture, and heating.

The reported Russian disruption shows this mechanism. Fifteen major refineries were out of operation, and another 12 had reduced output. Remote facilities increased processing to 906,000 barrels per day in September, but shortages of railway rolling stock and tanker trucks complicated deliveries. Refining capacity and distribution therefore became linked problems.

The intelligence agency said Russia could not fully meet domestic petroleum-product demand while also keeping its export commitments. It also reported that Russians had begun importing fuel through schemes intended to circumvent sanctions. This indicates that crude availability alone cannot prevent shortages when processing, transport, repairs, and distribution are constrained.

Remote Russian refineries could not fully replace damaged plants in the Volga, Central, and Southern districts because they were far from many affected demand centers. Distance makes fuel distribution slower and more dependent on transport capacity. A refinery can produce extra fuel, but that fuel still has to reach cities, industries, and export routes.

The article names Omsk, Achinsk, NefteKhimService, Khabarovsk, Mariysky, and Vanino as operating remote facilities. Together, they processed 906,000 barrels of oil per day in September, 147,000 more than at the start of the year. Their output represented about 24% of all Russian oil refining.

The replacement was therefore only partial. The intelligence agency specifically cited shortages of railway rolling stock and tanker trucks as obstacles to deliveries. It also warned that production at these remote facilities could decline in 2027 because maintenance postponed from 2026 is scheduled for then.

International sanctions complicate refinery repairs by restricting Russia’s access to necessary equipment, according to the report. Refining plants depend on specialized machinery and technical systems, so replacing damaged components is not simply a matter of restarting operations. When equipment is scarce, repairs can take longer and require more expensive alternatives.

The article says Russia is already facing growing difficulties repairing and maintaining damaged facilities. It attributes those problems to international sanctions and the high cost of the required equipment. The estimated cost of replacing damaged equipment could exceed $20 billion. That burden adds to the economic losses caused by strikes against the oil industry.

The pressure may continue beyond the immediate shutdowns. Remote refineries are currently helping offset fuel shortages, but maintenance originally scheduled for 2026 has been postponed until 2027. The intelligence agency said production at those sites could then decline, reducing Russia’s ability to compensate for damaged capacity and meet domestic and export needs.

Refined petroleum products are strategically important because crude oil is not ready to power most vehicles, machinery, or heating systems. Refineries turn crude into products such as gasoline and diesel, which support transport, industry, agriculture, and other economic activity. A refining disruption can therefore affect daily life even when oil production continues.

The article describes this balance in Russia. Damaged refineries reduced petroleum-product output, while remote facilities processed more crude to compensate. Yet shortages of railway rolling stock and tanker trucks hindered deliveries. The report says Russia was unable to fully satisfy domestic demand for petroleum products while also fulfilling its export commitments.

This creates both internal and external pressure. Fuel shortages can disrupt the domestic economy, while failing to meet export commitments can reduce trade reliability and revenue. The article also reports that Russians began importing fuel through “gray schemes” designed to bypass international sanctions, showing the seriousness of the supply problem.