Inside an ISI-backed Pak gang's Instagram trap targeting Indian youngsters

The Pakistan-based network allegedly used Instagram Reels and direct messages to find and influence Indian youngsters. It did not begin with an open terror pitch. Instead, operatives used social media content to attract attention, exploit religious feelings and create personal connections. This matters because ordinary online contact could gradually become recruitment.

The investigation named Shahzad Bhatti, Abid Jatt, Ajmal Gujjar, Rana Hussain and Hassan Gujjar as the alleged operatives. They reportedly contacted users through multiple accounts, exchanged messages and built credibility. After that, they offered money, help settling abroad or in Pakistan, religious inducements and assignments. One Delhi influencer was allegedly asked to kill right-wing activist Abhishek Thakur.

Police and central agencies responded after intelligence alerts about the expanding network. Around 700 linked people were arrested, while more than 700 others were detained, counselled and released. The case shows how online contact can become a gateway to real-world criminal activity, especially when trust and personal pressure develop gradually.

ISI stands for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s main intelligence agency. That definition comes from established world knowledge, not from the supplied article. Intelligence agencies generally gather information and support national security objectives. Here, the important point is the allegation that the ISI helped sponsor or direct a criminal network operating from Pakistan.

The article says Shahzad Bhatti led the network under ISI patronage. It identifies four other alleged Pakistan-based operatives: Abid Jatt, Ajmal Gujjar, Rana Hussain and Hassan Gujjar. The network allegedly used Instagram to recruit Indian youngsters, then involved some in killings, bomb attacks and other terrorist activities.

The Union Home Ministry was informed after intelligence agencies detected the network’s social-media expansion. Central agencies and state police then launched an operation. The allegations remain the article’s account of the investigation. They describe an alleged link between Pakistan-based operatives, online recruitment and attacks across several Indian states, including Punjab.

The alleged operation was large enough to involve people across several Indian states. Police forces, working with central agencies, arrested around 700 people linked to Shahzad Bhatti and his network. More than 700 others were detained for questioning, counselled and later released. These figures show both the breadth of the investigation and the effort to stop recruitment before it deepened.

The network reportedly focused mainly on young people aged 18 to 25. Operatives approached them through multiple Instagram accounts and Reels. They gradually established contact, then used money, religious inducements and promises of settling abroad or in Pakistan. Some were allegedly drawn toward terrorist assignments, while others were intercepted before taking further steps.

The article does not provide a precise number of people contacted online or successfully recruited. It does show that agencies combined arrests with counselling and preventive intervention. The operation therefore involved both criminal enforcement and efforts to keep vulnerable youngsters from being drawn deeper into the alleged network.

The investigation linked the alleged network to several forms of violence. These included targeted killings, a bomb blast at the BSF headquarters in Jalandhar and a petrol bomb attack on an RSS office in Jharkhand. The article presents these incidents as activities allegedly carried out in several states at the behest of the ISI.

The Delhi example shows how recruitment could lead to a specific killing plan. A young Instagram influencer with around three lakh followers said Shahzad Bhatti asked for Abhishek Thakur’s address. Bhatti allegedly offered money for killing the right-wing activist and later promised a fake passport and travel to Nepal, Pakistan or Dubai.

The article also describes arrests and agency intervention before some assignments were completed. It does not provide a full list of all alleged offences or explain the outcome of every case. It does show a progression from online contact to proposed killings, attacks using explosives or petrol bombs, and broader terror activity.

The alleged recruiters built trust through gradual contact rather than direct recruitment. They used Instagram accounts and Reels to approach young Indians, present persuasive content and establish credibility. This mattered because a familiar online contact could appear less threatening than an unknown person making a sudden criminal request.

The article says operatives exploited religious sentiments through videos and messages. They also engaged users personally before offering money, religious inducements or help settling abroad or in Pakistan. In one case, Shahzad Bhatti first sent a Delhi influencer a simple “Hi,” introduced himself and asked for information about Abhishek Thakur. The alleged offer to kill Thakur came later.

This pattern allowed the network to move from public content to private communication and then to assignments. Agencies reportedly arrested some people and stopped others from going further. The account highlights why investigators treated online relationship-building as part of the alleged recruitment process, not as harmless conversation alone.

The UAPA is India’s principal law addressing unlawful activities and terrorism. This explanation uses established legal knowledge beyond the supplied article. It allows the government to designate certain organisations as terrorist organisations and creates offences connected with membership, support, funding, recruitment and terrorist acts. Courts and legal procedures still apply to individual cases.

The article says Union Home Minister Amit Shah declared Bhatti’s network a terrorist organisation under the UAPA in a September 16 social-media post. That designation formally places the organisation within the law’s terrorist framework. It is different from merely describing a group as dangerous or investigating its members.

In practical terms, such a declaration can enable restrictions on the organisation and make alleged support or association legally serious. The article does not list the specific consequences of the designation or describe any court findings. It does state that agencies had already arrested people linked to the network and were coordinating across states to disrupt its alleged activities.

Social media can be effective for identifying and influencing vulnerable young people because it combines public reach with private contact. Recruiters can observe interests, respond to emotional or religious content and communicate repeatedly. Repeated contact may make a stranger seem familiar. That gradual process can lower resistance before harmful requests appear.

The investigation describes this exact mechanism. The alleged operatives used Instagram Reels and multiple accounts to attract young Indians. They then established personal contact, exploited religious sentiments and offered money or overseas opportunities. A Delhi influencer first received a simple message from an account linked to Shahzad Bhatti. Later, he was allegedly offered money to kill Abhishek Thakur.

The case also shows why early detection matters. Agencies reportedly stopped some youngsters from going deeper, while arresting others linked to the network. The article does not claim that all online political or religious content leads to radicalisation. It shows how targeted contact, emotional appeals and gradual escalation can turn social-media engagement into alleged recruitment.