Mayawati questions EVM-based voting, says people seeking return to ballot papers

An electronic voting machine, or EVM, is a device that lets voters choose candidates electronically. It records each selection in digital memory rather than on a paper ballot. This matters because the machine must preserve the vote accurately, prevent repeated voting, and produce a reliable total. The article focuses on trust in that process, not its technical design.

In India, an EVM generally has a ballot unit for the voter and a control unit operated by polling staff. The voter presses a candidate button, and the control unit records the selection. A Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail system can also print a paper slip for temporary voter verification, while the electronic record remains the counting basis.

At the end of polling, officials close and secure the machine. They later use the control unit to count votes, following election rules and verification procedures. The article provides no technical details, so these mechanisms come from established information about Indian EVMs.

Mayawati questioned the credibility of India’s EVM-based electoral process. She alleged that EVMs were being used to influence free and fair voting, calling them part of a method that emerged after the BSP built unity and awareness among the Bahujan Samaj. Her central concern was whether elections could be trusted.

She said the BSP was the first party to oppose EVM use after noticing concerns about voting credibility. According to her, opposition parties and groups supporting the existing establishment initially rejected that position. She also alleged that money power, muscle power, government machinery and criminalisation had affected elections.

Mayawati claimed that most people in the country no longer considered the EVM system compatible with free and fair elections. She said they were demanding restoration of the earlier ballot-paper arrangement. These are her allegations and claims, not independently established findings presented in the article.

EVMs are used widely across India for elections to Parliament and state legislative assemblies. They affect hundreds of millions of voters and nearly every major election conducted through the national and state electoral systems. This scale makes confidence in their design, custody, testing and counting essential. The article raises that trust question but does not provide national usage figures.

In a large election, machines are deployed across polling stations, with each machine serving voters in its assigned constituency. Election officials prepare, seal and transport them, while votes are recorded during polling and counted after the election. Political parties and candidates observe important stages under election procedures.

The exact number of voters and elections changes as electoral rolls and election schedules change. India’s national electorate has exceeded 900 million in recent election cycles, while state elections add many separate contests. Those figures are general background, not figures supplied by the article, which mentions only Uttar Pradesh’s 75 districts.

The Election Commission of India establishes election procedures, supervises polling and counting, trains officials, and manages safeguards for machines and election materials. Polling officials identify voters, operate the control unit, maintain records, seal equipment, and protect it between polling and counting. Their neutrality and careful documentation matter because small procedural failures can damage confidence.

Political parties and candidates nominate polling and counting agents. These representatives can observe permitted checks, polling, sealing, transport, strong-room security and counting. They can raise objections through formal channels. Technical safeguards, paper-trail verification, randomisation and audits can add evidence, while courts and independent observers provide further review where applicable.

The article does not describe these roles or specific safeguards. It reports Mayawati’s demand for an independent, impartial and accountable electoral system, alongside opposition concerns about EVMs, voter-list revisions and the Election Commission’s functioning. Credibility therefore depends on both actual security and transparent explanations that voters and parties can understand.

India shifted gradually from paper ballots to EVMs to make voting and counting more manageable. Paper elections required printing, transporting, storing and counting enormous quantities of ballot papers. EVMs were intended to reduce invalid votes caused by unclear or incorrect markings, shorten counting time, and simplify handling. The article itself does not explain this historical shift.

A paper ballot can become invalid if a voter marks multiple candidates, marks outside the permitted area, or leaves unclear evidence of a choice. Electronic voting replaces those marking problems with a button-based selection. Machines also reduce the physical volume of election material and allow officials to total votes electronically rather than inspect every paper manually.

The change did not remove the need for safeguards. It shifted attention toward machine testing, secure storage, access controls, audit trails and transparent counting. Mayawati’s remarks show why that trade-off remains politically important: faster administration is useful only if voters, candidates and parties believe the system is independent and credible.

A return to paper ballots would change the voter’s action from pressing a machine button to marking a physical ballot. Counting would move from electronic totals to human examination and tabulation of papers. That could make the record feel more tangible to some voters, but it would increase the need for secure storage, careful handling and transparent counting.

Paper ballots can be rejected when markings are unclear, multiple candidates are selected, or instructions are not followed. Officials would need to sort and count large piles of ballots, resolve doubtful marks under clear rules, record totals and transport materials securely. Printing enough papers for every constituency would also require extensive planning, staff and storage.

The article reports a demand to restore ballot papers but does not assess these operational effects. A return could address concerns held by people who distrust EVMs, yet it would not automatically create trust. Independent oversight, party observation, secure custody, accurate rolls and credible complaint procedures would remain necessary under either system.

A free and fair electoral system needs equal voting rights, accurate voter rolls, secret ballots and protection from intimidation, bribery and coercion. It also needs clear rules that apply equally to parties and candidates. Voters must know their choices cannot be traced or changed, and officials must be trained to follow the same procedures everywhere.

Security should cover the entire chain: machine or ballot preparation, testing, transport, storage, polling, counting and publication of results. Independent observers, party agents, audit trails, random checks and prompt investigation can expose mistakes or wrongdoing. Courts and election authorities need enough independence to resolve disputes without political pressure.

The article connects these safeguards to wider problems, including poverty, unemployment, migration, examination irregularities and corruption. Mayawati said the system must be independent, impartial and accountable, especially for poor people, labourers and unemployed youth. Whether elections use EVMs or paper, transparent evidence and credible remedies are essential for public acceptance.

If widespread doubts about EVMs continue, losing candidates and parties may be less willing to accept results. Repeated allegations could weaken confidence in the Election Commission, encourage political confrontation and shift attention from policy to the legitimacy of elections. Courts, officials and legislatures could face greater pressure to explain procedures, publish evidence and strengthen audits.

A return to paper ballots could reassure voters who believe physical ballots are more trustworthy. It could also bring higher printing, transport, storage and counting demands, along with more invalid ballots and slower results. Changing the technology alone would not remove concerns about voter rolls, money power, government machinery, criminalisation or official impartiality.

The article places these questions within Mayawati’s review of BSP preparations for forthcoming Uttar Pradesh polls. It also notes opposition concerns about EVMs, voter-list revisions and the Election Commission. In Uttar Pradesh, scrutiny of Pilibhit rolls and a Special Summary Revision-2027 enrolment drive show that electoral credibility will involve both machines and voter registration.