Can Iran’s new supreme leader make peace from behind the scenes?

Iran’s supreme leader is the country’s top authority in major political, military, and security matters. That role normally depends heavily on direct public leadership. Mojtaba Khamenei is using a different model because he was injured in the February 28 strike that killed his father and was reportedly advised not to appear or release recordings.

“Behind the scenes” means power is being exercised indirectly. Khamenei issues written statements and decrees, appoints commanders, and consults a narrow circle of officials. Others then report his decisions or describe his meetings. His presence is therefore visible through institutions, not through speeches or public appearances.

This approach first reassured Iranians that he was alive and working. The October meetings suggest a broader purpose. They may show a functioning decision system emerging around him. Whether that system can make a major choice, such as accepting a nuclear compromise or preparing for confrontation, remains uncertain.

Khamenei’s consultation effort became systematic in October. Four meetings were announced within 11 days, a sharp change from the isolated meetings reported in May and August. The earlier encounters mainly showed that the new leader was alive and exercising authority. The October sequence suggested active coordination before important decisions.

The consultations reached across Iran’s main power centers. They involved the heads of parliament, the judiciary, and the national security establishment. Senior military commanders also attended. A meeting announced on October 31 included Armed Forces General Staff chief Ali Abdollahi, army commander Amir Hatami, and IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi.

The timing matters because Iran was weighing negotiation against renewed confrontation with the United States and Israel. Foreign mediation was also intensifying. The meetings therefore appear to connect military readiness, constitutional institutions, and diplomatic choices within one emerging decision-making system.

The supreme leader sits at the center of Iran’s major security decisions. Around him are elected institutions, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and parliament speaker Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf. The judiciary and the Supreme National Security Council also form part of the constitutional decision-making structure described in the article.

The military side includes the Armed Forces General Staff, the army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. Mohsen Rezaei became Khamenei’s representative on the security council and later its secretary. Ali Abdollahi, Amir Hatami, and Ahmad Vahidi were among the commanders involved in reported consultations.

These actors handle connected but different tasks. Negotiators assess proposals, the security council coordinates national security, and commanders report military readiness. Khamenei must bring their views together while deciding whether to negotiate, maintain pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, or prepare for renewed conflict. The article presents this coordination as newly taking shape.

The article presents diplomacy abroad and consultation inside Iran as closely linked. Each major external development was followed by a reported meeting involving Khamenei and an Iranian official. This pattern suggests that foreign proposals were being brought into a central internal review process.

On October 20, Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, carried a Qatari-Pakistani proposal to Tehran. It reportedly offered unannounced nuclear inspections for interest on frozen Iranian funds in Qatar. Khamenei’s meeting with negotiator Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf was announced the next day. On October 26, Munir returned with Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.

That visit produced an understanding that regional states should handle regional security. Rezaei also said Tehran had sent Washington a Strait of Hormuz proposal with a seven-day deadline. After 12 hours of Qatari talks on October 30, Khamenei’s meeting with military commanders was announced. The sequence tied mediation to both diplomacy and military planning.

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, was an agreement between Iran and major world powers. Under it, Iran accepted limits and monitoring of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from nuclear-related sanctions. The source does not explain these terms, so this background comes from established knowledge about the agreement.

The comparison concerns how decisions are prepared. Before the 2015 deal, Iran’s leadership had to reconcile diplomatic, security, military, and political concerns. Today, Khamenei is meeting officials from those same broad centers of power while mediators present possible arrangements. The article specifically links Ghalibaf’s meeting to a proposal involving inspections and frozen funds.

The comparison does not prove that a new agreement is imminent. It shows only that Iran’s emerging consultation system is being tested during a similarly consequential dispute. Its effectiveness will depend on whether officials can produce one coordinated position and authorize difficult concessions.

Iran is weighing at least two broad paths: negotiations or renewed confrontation with the United States and Israel. A compromise could create space for inspections, an arrangement over frozen funds, or regional security understandings. Those possibilities are drawn from the proposals described in the article, not from a confirmed agreement.

The reported proposals show how pressure might continue without immediate full-scale war. Tehran sent Washington terms concerning the Strait of Hormuz and attached a seven-day deadline. At the same time, military commanders briefed Khamenei on readiness in the Gulf, the Strait, and the Sea of Oman. Diplomacy and military preparation were therefore proceeding together.

If Iran maintains pressure, talks could remain unresolved while bargaining continues. If confrontation widens, military risks would rise. If compromise succeeds, it could resemble the kind of consequential decision associated with the 2015 nuclear deal. The article gives no confirmed outcome, so these remain possible directions rather than predictions.

Iran’s supreme leader provides the central authority for major strategic decisions. Elected institutions, including the president and parliament, handle governmental and legislative responsibilities. The judiciary and Supreme National Security Council are additional constitutional institutions. The military and IRGC control vital security and defence structures, while commanders advise on operational readiness.

These bodies do not perform the same job, but their interests meet during war and negotiation. Ghalibaf was identified as chief negotiator, Rezaei became secretary of the security council, and commanders reported on readiness. Khamenei’s October meetings brought these separate channels into consultation after new appointments rebuilt the security structure.

This division can improve scrutiny, but it can also slow agreement. A foreign-policy compromise may require political approval, security coordination, military acceptance, and the supreme leader’s authorization. The article suggests that Khamenei is creating a system to manage this complexity. It does not establish how much influence each institution ultimately has.