Israel's main Arab list backs Eisenkot to form government after election

When an Arab party recommends a candidate, it formally tells Israel’s president whom it wants tasked with forming a government. The recommendation helps determine who receives the first opportunity to build a parliamentary majority. It is not the same as joining a coalition or guaranteeing support.

In this election, both Arab-majority lists backed opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot. The Joint List recommended him with 11 seats, while Raam added eight. President Isaac Herzog traditionally chooses the candidate recommended by more parties, although he makes the final decision himself.

Their 19 combined seats could make Eisenkot a potential majority-builder. However, it remained unclear whether his opposition allies would work with Arab parties. Eisenkot’s bloc held 48 seats, compared with 53 for Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc. If chosen, Eisenkot would have 28 days to form a government, with a possible 14-day extension.

Arab-majority lists won 19 seats in Israel’s 120-member Knesset. A majority requires at least 61 seats, so neither main political bloc can govern alone. Their record result gives Arab lawmakers unusual influence over government formation.

The Joint List won 11 seats, while Raam won eight. Together, they endorsed opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot, potentially helping him receive the mandate to form a government. However, Eisenkot would need their support and cooperation from other opposition parties to reach 61 seats.

Currently, Netanyahu’s bloc has 53 seats, compared with 48 for Eisenkot’s bloc. The Arab parties therefore hold 19 seats that could determine which coalition reaches a majority. Their role remains uncertain because some opposition politicians oppose working with Arab lawmakers, while Netanyahu has attacked that possibility.

Israel’s 19 Arab-party seats can decide which larger bloc reaches a governing majority, even though they cannot govern alone. In Israel’s parliamentary system, parties need partners to form a coalition, making these seats crucial support.

After the election, Netanyahu’s bloc held 53 seats, while Eisenkot’s bloc held 48. The Joint List, with 11 seats, and Raam, with eight, both recommended Eisenkot to President Isaac Herzog. If Eisenkot’s other allies accepted Arab-party support, those 19 seats could help him assemble enough backing, though some allies might reject that partnership.

That support did not guarantee a government. Avigdor Liberman could oppose cooperation with Arab lawmakers, while Herzog still chooses whom to authorize. The selected lawmaker gets 28 days, plus a possible 14-day extension, to build a coalition. Thus, Arab parties can influence who gets the mandate and whether a coalition survives, without controlling government alone.

If Herzog gives Eisenkot the mandate, Eisenkot would have 28 days to assemble a governing coalition. Herzog could extend that period by another 14 days. Failing to build a government would therefore pass the responsibility to another candidate, rather than ending the process immediately.

The president traditionally asks the lawmaker recommended by the most parties to try first. In this election, both Arab-majority lists recommended Eisenkot, giving him important support. However, recommendations do not guarantee enough votes to govern.

Eisenkot’s bloc has 48 seats, while Netanyahu’s bloc has 53. The Arab lists hold 19 seats combined, potentially giving Eisenkot enough support for a majority. Yet cooperation could cost him allies such as Avigdor Liberman, who remains hawkish on Palestinian issues. If Eisenkot fails, Herzog would ask someone else to try forming a government.

UTJ refused to recommend Benjamin Netanyahu, but it did not endorse Gadi Eisenkot. The article says this likely punished Netanyahu and showed its seven Knesset votes could not be taken for granted. The decision kept negotiations open with whichever leader formed the next government.

The central issue was military service. UTJ, alongside Shas, wants to preserve exemptions for ultra-Orthodox religious students, while Eisenkot has insisted those exemptions should end. During consultations, UTJ told President Isaac Herzog it would recommend no lawmaker, while its lawmaker Isaac Pindrus said securing Torah students’ status was the party’s immediate priority.

This stance matters because reservists are serving repeated tours in wars, creating strong resentment toward exemptions. Netanyahu had preserved the arrangement but stopped short of putting it into law. UTJ therefore signaled that its support would depend on this issue, even though Netanyahu’s bloc held 53 seats and Eisenkot’s held 48. Any government may need these votes or Arab-party support to reach a majority.

Cooperation is difficult because Eisenkot needs Arab lawmakers’ seats, but some opposition allies oppose their political partnership. It could split his bloc, especially politicians who share hard-line views toward Palestinians.

Arab-majority lists won 19 seats, giving Eisenkot potential support beyond his bloc’s 48 seats. Yet Avigdor Liberman, a former Netanyahu aide and outspoken critic, remains hawkish on Palestinians and could withdraw support from an Arab-backed government. Netanyahu has attacked the opposition for considering cooperation with Arab lawmakers.

That makes Arab support valuable but potentially unstable, rather than a straightforward governing majority. The Joint List won 11 seats and Raam eight, and both recommended Eisenkot. He must risk losing hawkish partners or reject their support, making government formation harder.

Israel uses proportional representation, so parliamentary seats reflect parties’ vote shares rather than producing one dominant winner. The Knesset has 120 seats, and a government needs support from enough parties to command a majority.

After the October 27 election, Netanyahu’s bloc held 53 seats, while Eisenkot’s held 48. Neither reached 61. Smaller parties could influence Herzog’s choice and demand policies from any coalition.

The Arab-majority lists won 19 seats, including 11 for the Joint List and eight for Raam. Both recommended Eisenkot, potentially giving him crucial support, although Liberman might resist cooperation. United Torah Judaism’s seven seats also mattered: it refused to recommend anyone, while seeking protections for religious students. Thus, bargaining determines both the government’s survival and its agenda.