No ceasefire with Boko Haram, others — DHQ

The Defence Headquarters rejected reports that the Federal Government had secretly agreed to stop fighting Boko Haram, including the faction led by Bakura Doro. The military said no ceasefire existed with Boko Haram, ISWAP or other criminal groups. This matters because a ceasefire would suggest that military operations had paused or been formally limited.

Instead, Maj. Gen. Samaila Uba said troops were sustaining pressure. He pointed to recent results, including terrorists neutralised, suspects arrested and kidnapped people rescued. The operations covered more than insurgents. They also targeted kidnappers and other armed groups threatening Nigerians. The military said people involved in such crimes would face lawful operations or justice.

The military reported 588 security operations in September and October. It said troops neutralised 435 terrorists and bandits, arrested 809 suspects, secured 198 insurgent surrenders and rescued 717 victims. Uba said pressure would continue, while new formations and units would help close security gaps.

Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP, are armed extremist groups active in Nigeria’s insurgency. They have fought the Nigerian state and threatened civilians. The article treats them as separate groups because it names both individually. Understanding that distinction matters because military operations may target different command structures, locations and networks.

In general, ISWAP emerged from a split within Boko Haram and later became associated with the Islamic State. The groups have shared origins, but they have operated as competing organisations. Their relationship has included rivalry as well as conflict with government forces. These details come from established background knowledge; the supplied article does not describe the split or their ideology.

The Defence Headquarters said operations were not limited to either group. Troops also targeted kidnappers and other armed criminal groups. The article reported 435 terrorists and bandits neutralised, but it did not divide that figure between Boko Haram, ISWAP and other groups.

The reported campaign was broad in both activity and results. Troops executed 588 distinct security operations during September and October. The operations addressed terrorists, bandits, kidnappers and other armed criminal groups. Their scale matters because the military presented the figures as evidence that it was continuing pressure rather than observing a ceasefire.

The reported human effects included 435 terrorists and bandits neutralised, 809 suspects arrested, 198 insurgents who voluntarily surrendered and 717 kidnapped victims and captives rescued. The rescued people included 20 prospective NYSC members in Owerri and 11 individuals in Danko-Wasagu. The article does not say how many separate groups were involved.

Troops also recovered 5,666 arms, ammunition, explosives and improvised explosive devices, plus logistical assets. Major tactical breakthroughs were reported in Buniyadi, Baga, Kukawa, Bittai and the Owo forest. These results suggest disruption across several locations, while the military said operations would continue.

The Defence Headquarters is the central command and coordination centre for Nigeria’s armed forces. It links the military services and helps direct national defence and security operations. This matters because its statements communicate the armed forces’ official position on major security issues, including whether operations have stopped or continued.

In the article, the Defence Headquarters spoke through the Director of Defence Information, Maj. Gen. Samaila Uba. He denied any ceasefire with Boko Haram, ISWAP or criminal groups. He also presented operational figures, discussed insurgent movement and explained adjustments to the Armed Forces’ order of battle. Those adjustments included new formations, battalions and units.

The article does not describe the Defence Headquarters’ full legal structure or every command responsibility. It shows its public and coordinating role in this situation. Uba said the military was mapping possible relocation sites, closing security gaps and sustaining pressure to prevent terrorists from establishing footholds elsewhere in Nigeria.

A foothold is a secure position from which an armed group can organise, recruit, store supplies and launch attacks. If insurgents move into unfamiliar parts of Nigeria and build such positions, violence could spread beyond their former areas. Civilians, transport routes and local institutions could face greater danger. The article presents this risk as a reason for continued military action.

The military said some insurgents were leaving previous locations because of operational pressure. Rather than treating that movement as an end to the threat, troops were mapping places where the fighters might have relocated. They planned proactive measures to stop the groups from establishing bases. A recent high-level terrorist’s neutralisation in a forest area was cited as evidence that safe havens would not be tolerated.

The Armed Forces had also adjusted their order of battle by creating new formations, battalions and units. These changes aim to close security gaps and strengthen presence in vulnerable areas. Uba said operations would continue to prevent expansion into other parts of the country.

A ceasefire is an agreement or arrangement to stop fighting between opposing sides. It may be temporary or indefinite, but it concerns the suspension of hostilities. A peace agreement is broader. It normally addresses the causes of conflict, political arrangements, security guarantees or other terms intended to end the conflict. The article discusses only the alleged ceasefire, not a peace settlement.

A temporary truce is a short pause in fighting. In everyday reporting, the words “ceasefire” and “truce” can overlap, but a truce usually signals a limited pause or specific purpose. Surrender is different again. It is an action by fighters who give themselves up, often handing over weapons or accepting authorities’ control. It does not itself require the opposing sides to stop fighting.

The military denied a ceasefire with Boko Haram. Separately, it reported that 198 insurgents voluntarily surrendered. That figure describes individual fighters leaving the conflict, not an agreement between the government and an armed group.

An insurgency can survive battlefield losses because it is more than a collection of fighters and weapons. It may retain leaders, local networks, recruits, financing, intelligence and places to hide. New fighters can replace those killed or arrested. Unless those supporting systems are disrupted, violence can continue even after major tactical defeats.

The article illustrates this problem through insurgent movement. Uba said some fighters were leaving former locations and might relocate elsewhere. Troops were therefore mapping possible new sites and taking steps to stop new footholds. The military also created formations, battalions and units to close security gaps. These actions show that defeating an insurgency requires continued presence, intelligence and prevention, not only raids.

The reported results were substantial: 435 terrorists and bandits were neutralised, 809 suspects arrested, and 5,666 weapons and related items recovered. Yet operations continued. That combination suggests the military viewed these gains as disruption, not proof that the wider threat had ended.