What happens when the police are the problem?

The Cabinet removed Inspector General Dan Bahadur Karki and moved him into the role of prime minister’s security adviser. The article presents this as a timely test of police independence, not simply as a personnel change. It asks whether police leadership can remain accountable to the public when its position depends heavily on political decisions.

The change matters because police hold stations, records and much of the evidence in cases involving alleged police abuse. If leaders can be removed or reassigned by political authorities, questions arise about who controls investigations and whether officers can examine their institution honestly. The article connects this concern to Nepal’s longer struggle with police accountability.

The immediate event renewed debate rather than resolving it. Nepal’s Constitution says security organs should be accountable to the people, but difficult questions remain about appointments, transfers, discipline and competing federal and provincial authority. The article argues that accountability must reach beyond the police institution itself.

Police independence means officers and investigators can act lawfully without improper pressure from political leaders, powerful institutions or their own colleagues. It does not mean police should operate without oversight. Democratic policing requires independence alongside public accountability, so investigations can be fair and security powers do not become political tools.

The need is clearest when police are accused of wrongdoing. The article notes that police may control the station, officers, records and most of the evidence. Families can therefore face an institution that is both the subject of a complaint and the gatekeeper of the investigation. Officers may also be reluctant to investigate colleagues.

Nepal’s Constitution says security organs should be accountable to the people, but Article 268 left major questions unresolved. These include who appoints and transfers police leaders and who controls discipline. Stronger independent oversight, protected investigators and enforceable court orders are needed to turn rights on paper into remedies.

Nepal’s police faced severe violence during the Maoist insurgency, which began in 1996. Police posts were attacked and officers were killed, leaving families waiting at home. The Armed Police Force was created in 2001 for counter-insurgency. Amnesty International documented alleged unjustified lethal force, torture, deaths in custody and weak investigations by security forces.

The article gives a specific wartime example: Jhakku Prasad Subedi was reportedly beaten so severely in custody that he could not walk for 25 days. Political unrest also brought heavy losses. Human Rights Watch recorded 25 deaths in five Tarai districts in 2015: nine police officers and 16 members of the public. In Tikapur, eight security personnel and a child died.

These figures show that police and civilians both suffered violence. They also show why accountability must examine police conduct as well as attacks against officers. The article says transitional justice still struggles to establish the truth for both groups of victims.

Justice becomes difficult when the accused institution also controls the place where complaints are made, the officers who investigate, the records that document events and much of the available evidence. This creates a built-in imbalance. Families may have little power to challenge official accounts, especially when the alleged perpetrators remain influential.

Rajendra Prasad Dhakal’s case shows the problem. Police arrested him in 1999, but later told the Supreme Court they knew nothing about his whereabouts. In 2007, the Court accepted that police had disappeared him and ordered legal action. Yet TRIAL International says the ruling has not been meaningfully acted on, and his wife, Bimala, is still waiting.

The article also reports intimidation, weak medical records and officers reluctant to investigate colleagues. These weaknesses make legal rights fragile. Independent investigators, public reporting, protected complainants and court orders that are actually enforced are necessary if families are to obtain meaningful justice.

The cases of Rajendra Prasad Dhakal and Maina Sunuwar reveal a gap between formal justice and effective justice. Courts and laws may recognise wrongdoing, yet families can still wait when powerful security institutions resist investigation, appeal convictions or ignore orders. Accountability therefore depends not only on legal rules, but also on independent institutions able to enforce them.

Police arrested Dhakal in 1999, and the Supreme Court later accepted that he had been disappeared. It ordered Nepal to criminalise enforced disappearance and reject impunity, but TRIAL International says the ruling was not meaningfully implemented. Maina Sunuwar was tortured and killed in 2004; a civilian court convicted three former officers in 2017, but the Army challenged the ruling and the sentences were not carried out.

The supplied article names Suntali Dhami but provides no details about her case. Based only on this text, the broader lesson is clear: convictions, commissions and court orders need independent enforcement to deliver justice.

External accountability routes matter because police should not be the only investigators of alleged police abuse. Courts, independent commissions and international human-rights bodies can review evidence, test official explanations and create findings outside the accused institution. They can also pressure governments to investigate crimes and carry out remedies.

Dhakal’s family petitioned Nepal’s Supreme Court, which ruled in 2007 that police had disappeared him and ordered Nepal to make enforced disappearance a crime. Bimala’s case was later taken to the UN Human Rights Committee by TRIAL International. In Sunuwar’s case, a civilian district court convicted three former Army officers and imposed 20-year sentences.

These alternatives are useful but not automatically effective. The Army challenged the Sunuwar verdict, and the sentences have not been carried out. The Dhakal ruling also has not been meaningfully acted on, according to TRIAL International. Independent mechanisms need authority, transparency and enforcement powers.

Democratic policing is not just about giving police legal powers. It requires security institutions to explain their actions to the people they serve and to accept independent scrutiny. Public accountability helps prevent police from becoming instruments of whichever political party controls the government. It also protects the public from institutions that investigate themselves without meaningful challenge.

Nepal’s post-2006 debates warned that the Home Ministry should not be the only check on police. The 2015 Constitution said security organs should be accountable to the people, but left unresolved questions about appointments, transfers, intelligence and discipline. The unpublished Lal Commission report shows how public knowledge can also be blocked after unrest.

Answerability builds legitimacy. Families of Tikapur’s dead officers and detained Tharu civilians both deserve to know what happened. Publishing findings, protecting investigators and enforcing court decisions would show that accountability reaches beyond political leaders and the police themselves.