Americans voted against Trump's Iran war. Gulf countries hope that means an end to the conflict

The election changes the political calculation around the war. Democrats are expected to control Congress, and Congress can potentially withhold funding for future military operations. That could make another large campaign harder after newly elected lawmakers take office early next year. Gulf states therefore see a possible path away from continued fighting.

Iran’s own behavior could also shift. Some experts believe Tehran delayed decisions to pressure Trump before the midterms. With voting finished, those experts think Iran may be more willing to negotiate a peace deal. Qatar is already trying to mediate between Washington and Tehran, while the UAE is calling for a political off-ramp.

The possibility is not certain. Trump said he was in no rush to resume bombing, but analysts also warn that lame-duck presidents sometimes intensify foreign interventions. Gulf states remain exposed until negotiations produce a durable agreement.

A lame-duck president is a leader who has lost control of Congress and cannot seek another term. The term describes political weakness at home, not necessarily the end of presidential authority. Foreign policy remains largely within the president’s purview, so a lame duck can still order or propose military action.

Trump’s party suffered a resounding midterm defeat, and newly elected Democrats are expected to control Congress. Analysts cited by the article say Congress could withhold money for his military expeditions, but those lawmakers will not take their seats until early next year. The immediate constraint is therefore limited.

The article presents two competing effects. Congress could eventually make attacks harder to finance. Yet professors writing in Foreign Affairs say lame-duck presidents often increase international interventions while shaping their legacy. Iran is identified as one place where Trump might act, although he has said he is in no rush.

Congress’s clearest leverage is the power of the purse. If lawmakers refuse to approve or continue funding, they can make a president’s military campaign harder to sustain. The article says a Democratic-controlled Congress could ostensibly withhold funding for Trump’s military expeditions, even though foreign policy is primarily a presidential responsibility.

That leverage depends on timing and political cooperation. The Democrats who won the midterms have not yet taken their seats, so they cannot immediately use congressional control to block funding. Until early next year, Trump retains greater freedom to direct policy. Congress’s potential limit is therefore significant but delayed.

Funding control does not automatically end a war or prevent every military decision. It can raise the political and practical cost of continuing operations. The article also warns that presidents who become lame ducks may increase foreign interventions before Congress changes the balance, making the timing especially important for Iran.

The war has turned Gulf states into unwilling participants. They have been the main targets of Iranian attacks since the conflict began, and Iran has warned that future strikes could reach regional energy and economic infrastructure. Undersea telecommunications cables and data centers could also be threatened, widening the danger beyond conventional military sites.

The public-safety response is visible. Qatar and the UAE have conducted emergency airport drills. Egypt has reportedly strengthened air defenses around the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia faces pressure on two fronts because the Houthi militia in neighboring Yemen is already attacking it. These steps show how the conflict affects transport, energy security, and civilian protection.

The war is also changing defense planning. Gulf governments are questioning US partnerships because American bases can attract attacks rather than prevent them. They are seeking a political off-ramp, widening contacts with other countries, and considering greater self-reliance while the conflict’s next stage remains uncertain.

US military bases give Washington a physical presence in Gulf countries. During a war involving the United States and Israel, Iran can regard those facilities as useful targets or as platforms supporting attacks. That makes host countries vulnerable even when their governments did not want the conflict.

The article links this risk to Iranian warnings about broader retaliation. Possible targets include regional energy and economic infrastructure, as well as data centers and undersea telecommunications cables. Gulf governments are also conducting emergency drills and strengthening defenses, suggesting that the danger extends beyond bases to airports, infrastructure, and public life.

This exposure is undermining confidence in the US security role. Hasan Alhasan said the region is disappointed by Washington’s conduct and its prioritization of Israel’s defense over Gulf partners. As a result, Gulf states are pursuing strategic autonomy, new defense relationships, and possible non-aggression arrangements with Iran.

The Gulf states are not simply waiting for the United States to restore security. The war has encouraged them to diversify their relationships, strengthen regional cooperation, and develop strategic autonomy. The goal is to reduce the danger created when US protection also makes them targets.

The article gives several examples. The UAE is getting closer to Israel. Saudi Arabia has entered the Mecca defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey. Qatar is trying to negotiate between the United States and Iran, while Gulf states are urged to pressure Washington against attacking Iran. They could then negotiate a non-aggression pact with Tehran without US involvement.

These alternatives do not replace American protection overnight. A Democratic-led Congress might make the United States somewhat more reliable again. Still, analysts say the Gulf states have already moved toward self-reliance, and a lame-duck Trump could accelerate that shift. Their defense planning is becoming more diversified and less US-centered.

Strategic autonomy means having enough independent choices to protect national interests without depending completely on a stronger ally. It can involve defense capabilities, several diplomatic partnerships, and the ability to negotiate directly with rivals. The idea matters here because Gulf governments feel that US protection has not prevented attacks and may have increased their exposure.

The article describes this shift through concrete moves. The UAE is drawing closer to Israel, Saudi Arabia has joined a defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey, and Qatar is mediating between Washington and Tehran. Andreas Krieg says Gulf states have already moved toward strategic autonomy and self-reliance. He also urges them to negotiate a non-aggression pact with Iran without US involvement.

The Persian Gulf is especially important in this article because it contains oil-rich states and infrastructure that Iran could target. Attacks could affect energy and economic systems, airports, data centers, and communications cables. Gulf governments therefore want more control over defense and diplomacy, even if US ties continue.