How the Ban on the Awami League is Being Turned on Bangladesh’s Garment Workers

The Awami League ban is being used beyond party politics. Authorities are applying the same counterterrorism logic to a labor movement, treating alleged political links as grounds for detention. That matters because workers may lose the ability to organize or protest safely, even when their demands concern wages and living costs.

After hundreds of thousands walked out across Mirpur, Ashulia, Gazipur, and Narayanganj, police said the movement had been infiltrated by Awami League supporters. They detained 21 people called activists and thousands of unidentified individuals under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Videos and images also appeared to show beatings and slum raids.

Labor leaders went into hiding as the government blamed Sheikh Hasina’s supporters without evidence, according to AFP. Workers rejected the conspiracy claim, saying food prices, inflation, and energy costs drove the protests. Using the ban this way could weaken labor rights and deepen distrust in Bangladesh’s political and economic institutions.

The Anti-Terrorism Act, or ATA, is Bangladesh’s counterterrorism law. In this article, it is the legal instrument used to ban the Awami League and its student wing. The amended law allows the government to impose a temporary ban, while the ban covers meetings, publications, and online speech supporting the party.

That creates a broad chain of liability. Once a party is prohibited, officials can portray people accused of organizing, speaking, or acting for it as operating within a banned organization. Police used that reasoning during garment protests, detaining people they described as Awami League activists under the ATA. Rights groups say the law is increasingly used against supporters.

The consequences extend beyond arrests. Amnesty International questioned the government’s commitment to freedom of association, while U.N. experts said the executive order did not follow the ordinary party-dissolution procedure. The lack of judicial oversight makes the law especially controversial and risks turning political accusation into a tool for suppressing dissent.

The garment protests were enormous. Since October 31, hundreds of thousands of workers walked out across Mirpur, Ashulia, Gazipur, and Narayanganj. They demanded a monthly minimum wage of 30,000 taka, or $241. The scale shows that the dispute was not a small workplace disagreement, but a broad confrontation over survival and political repression.

The immediate arrests were also wide-ranging. Police said they detained 21 people identified as Awami League activists, plus thousands of unidentified individuals, under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Rights organizations separately documented at least 8,600 arrests during Operation Devil Hunt. Human Rights Watch found ten murder cases filed against more than 8,400 mostly unnamed people.

Hundreds of alleged Awami League supporters were held as murder suspects and routinely denied bail. These figures measure different parts of the crackdown, so they should not simply be added together. Together, however, they show a large system of arrests affecting protesters, suspected party supporters, and many unnamed people.

The interim government first banned the Awami League’s student wing in October 2024. On May 12, 2025, it used the amended Anti-Terrorism Act to impose a temporary ban on the party itself. The stated legal condition is that the ban lasts until leaders accused of crimes committed while in power are tried, a process that could take years.

The ban has practical political effects. The Election Commission suspended the party’s registration, and the BNP later codified the ban after winning the 2026 election without the Awami League on the ballot. Meetings, publications, and online speech supporting the party are also covered. This effectively prevents the party from participating normally in political life.

The decision has raised concerns about freedom of association and due process. U.N. experts said the executive order did not follow the ordinary procedure for dissolving parties under the Political Parties Ordinance 1978. Amnesty International questioned the government’s commitment to association, while limited judicial oversight makes the ban more controversial.

Garment production depends on trust between workers, factories, buyers, and investors. If workers cannot protest safely, disputes may become more disruptive rather than less. Political arrests can also signal that Bangladesh’s institutions are unpredictable. That matters because clothing companies and investors choose sourcing locations partly by judging political and operating risks.

The article already shows signs of strain. Between August 2024 and June 2026, 457 garment and textile factories closed and more than 240,000 jobs disappeared, mostly affecting women. Net foreign direct investment fell to $1.47 billion in FY26, while no company listed on the stock market after mid-2024. U.S. buyers sourcing from Bangladesh fell to about 78 percent from 88 percent.

If confidence continues falling, factories could lose orders, investment, and jobs. Lower production would reduce household incomes and worsen poverty, while weaker foreign investment could limit expansion. The World Bank projects only 3.4 percent growth in FY26 and FY27, leaving little room for another crisis of trust.

The gap between 12,500 taka and 30,000 taka is the immediate reason for the dispute. The 12,500-taka legal entry-level wage is a benchmark set before the current protest, while workers say their actual living costs have risen sharply. The article identifies food prices, inflation, and energy costs as the pressures pushing them into the streets.

Their demand is therefore about purchasing power. A wage can remain legal while becoming inadequate for rent, food, transport, and household needs. Hundreds of thousands of workers across four industrial areas walked out to seek 30,000 taka, equivalent to $241 in the article. They rejected claims that political organizers caused the unrest.

The article does not provide a detailed wage-history calculation or explain how workers arrived at exactly 30,000 taka. It does show why the demand became urgent: formal jobs are disappearing, most lost jobs affect women, and many workers have few alternatives. Suppressing the protest may silence workers temporarily without resolving the cost-of-living problem.

Bangladesh’s garment-export model links factory labor to the wider economy. Workers make clothing for overseas buyers, factories receive export payments in foreign currency, and wages support households and local businesses. The industry also creates formal employment and helps Bangladesh earn money from international trade. These connections make labor stability economically important.

The article shows the scale of the system’s exposure. Between August 2024 and June 2026, 457 garment and textile factories closed and more than 240,000 jobs disappeared, mostly affecting women. U.S. buyers sourcing from Bangladesh fell from 88 percent to about 78 percent. Those changes can reduce factory output, export receipts, household income, and future investment.

This mechanism also explains the wider risk. Net foreign direct investment fell to $1.47 billion in FY26, and the World Bank projects 3.4 percent growth in FY26 and FY27. If political repression damages worker trust and buyer confidence, Bangladesh may lose both the labor capacity and international demand that sustain garment-led growth.