Trump’s troubles with Iran could open the door to China

A regional mediator tries to help opposing countries communicate, reduce tensions, and find negotiated solutions. China’s stated aim is to help the Middle East achieve lasting peace and stability, while preventing it from becoming an arena for great-power rivalry. This matters because Beijing wants a larger diplomatic role in a region where the United States has long been influential.

China’s mediation can involve hosting talks, sending envoys, and using relationships with rival governments. In 2023, Beijing brokered a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. After US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February, China was also credited with pushing Tehran toward ceasefire talks in Pakistan.

China’s influence has since been limited, and its diplomatic efforts during the war have been muted. Still, its trade and investment give it influence that cannot be ignored. Beijing may use renewed US-Iran tensions, and Trump’s search for a deal, to present itself as a regional peacemaker before Xi meets Trump.

China has intensified diplomatic contact with Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Xi Jinping held talks with Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq during a historic state visit to Beijing. The visit was the first by an Omani head of state since diplomatic relations began nearly 50 years ago. This signaled that Oman is important to Beijing’s regional outreach.

China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, separately met Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser, Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban, and Iran’s deputy national security council secretary, Ali Bagheri Kani. Wang said China wanted to help the region move beyond the pandemic’s shadow and achieve lasting peace. He also said China supported Iran in safeguarding its sovereignty and security.

China planned another step: sending special envoy Zhai Jun to Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia in early to mid-November. The flurry of meetings came before an expected Trump-Xi meeting in Shenzhen. Together, the actions show Beijing seeking stronger diplomatic relationships and a more visible regional role.

China buys about 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports. That makes Beijing Iran’s dominant customer and gives China substantial economic leverage. If China reduces purchases, Iran can lose export income. If China maintains or increases them, Tehran retains an important outlet for its oil despite wider pressure.

The article gives a striking example. Between April and June, China cut its crude imports from Iran by 30%. Total imports in June fell to their lowest level in a decade. Some estimates said the reduction lowered Brent crude prices by $30 or more per barrel. The move helped prevent a major global inflation spike.

This leverage does not automatically make China a successful peace broker. Beijing has done little to broker peace and has said the conflict is not its responsibility to resolve. Still, its energy relationship gives China a practical channel to influence Tehran and a reason for Iran to value Chinese engagement.

Renewed US military action against Iran could create a diplomatic opening for China. If fighting escalates, Beijing could present itself as a power seeking negotiations rather than expanding the conflict. That would contrast with Washington’s military approach and potentially strengthen China’s image across the region.

The article says Trump has repeatedly threatened to renew military action after the US midterm elections. At the same time, Tehran and Washington are locked in intensive talks that could include reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Trump’s desperation to reach a Middle East deal may give China an opportunity to act as a regional peacemaker.

The opportunity would also serve Xi’s immediate diplomatic interests. China wants to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries and the United States, and those goals are described as mutually reinforcing. Beijing could use the moment to bolster Xi’s status before his expected meeting with Trump in Shenzhen, although its regional influence remains limited.

In 2023, China brokered a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A détente reduces hostility and improves communication between rival states. The agreement gave Beijing credibility as a diplomatic actor able to work with countries that have sharply different interests.

China’s role mattered because it maintained relationships with both sides. That position allowed Beijing to support dialogue rather than align fully with one regional government. Its wider economic connections also strengthened its ability to remain engaged. The article identifies increased Chinese investment and trade as reasons its influence cannot be ignored.

However, the success did not lead to sustained diplomatic dominance. The article says China’s diplomatic impact in the region has been limited since the 2023 détente. During the later war, Beijing’s efforts were muted, and it did little to broker peace. New meetings with Gulf leaders and a planned envoy tour suggest China is trying to rebuild momentum.

The Strait of Hormuz carries much of the world’s oil and gas. A long disruption would therefore threaten energy supplies and make fuel more expensive. For China, the danger is especially serious because energy shortages can create inflation and damage economic growth.

The mechanism runs through prices and demand. If less oil and gas reach global markets, energy costs rise. Higher energy costs cause inflation, leaving consumers and businesses with less money to spend. The article warns that weaker global demand could reduce purchases of Chinese goods. China would thus suffer both from energy pressure and from a slowdown in export demand.

This risk helps explain Beijing’s interest in diplomacy around Iran. Tehran and Washington are in intensive talks that could include reopening the strait. Any renewed US military campaign could cause alarm in Beijing because it might endanger energy flows, global economic stability, and China’s commercial interests.

Diplomatic influence grows when a country can offer benefits or impose costs. Trade creates dependence, energy purchases provide income, and political relationships create channels for negotiation. Perceptions also matter. If governments and publics see one power as more useful or reliable, they may give that power greater diplomatic room.

China’s relationship with Iran illustrates the mechanism. It buys about 90% of Iran’s crude exports, so its purchasing decisions affect Tehran’s revenues. China also invests and trades across the region. Meanwhile, the damage caused by fighting has harmed the US’s global reputation. Pew findings cited in the article showed China viewed more favourably than the US in most of 36 surveyed countries.

These forces do not guarantee Chinese leadership. Beijing’s diplomatic impact has remained limited, and it has done little to broker peace. But economic leverage and changing perceptions can expand its opportunities, especially when US military threats create demand for another channel to negotiation.