Terrorists down to single digits in Kashmir, IG Sujit Kumar says giving exact figure tough

“Single digits” means the number of locally recruited terrorists in the Kashmir Valley is below 10. This is a major drop in the local militant presence reported by Inspector General Sujit Kumar. It matters because the remaining fighters can still carry out attacks, especially with support from foreign terrorists.

Police cannot provide a precise total because terrorists remain “in transit,” according to the IGP. Some may move between areas, hide temporarily, or avoid detection. The police are tracing active terrorists, but Kumar said giving a fixed figure would be an exaggeration.

The police identified one local terrorist who allegedly orchestrated attacks in Anantnag and Kulgam. He was supported by some foreign terrorists, leaving “footprints” for investigators. The current figure therefore shows a very small local group, not the disappearance of militancy. Security forces must continue tracking changing movements and networks.

A local terrorist is generally a person from Kashmir who joins an armed militant network. A foreign terrorist is generally someone who enters or operates in Kashmir from outside the region or country. The source distinguishes them by origin, but it does not provide a formal definition or identify the foreign fighters by name.

Their roles can overlap. The IGP said one local terrorist had orchestrated attacks in Anantnag and Kulgam while receiving support from some foreign terrorists. This suggests the local fighter may carry out attacks on the ground, while foreign operatives provide assistance through an operating network. The article does not specify the exact form of that support.

The cooperation complicates security operations. Even with local terrorists down to single digits, outside support can help sustain attacks. Police are tracing active terrorists, but Sujit Kumar warned that a fixed total would be an exaggeration because the fighters remain in transit.

Mohammad Lateef Bhat is a 22-year-old whom J&K Police records identify as an active local terrorist. Before joining militancy, he had no recorded criminal antecedents. He went missing from his home in November last year, after which police linked him to deadly attacks.

According to police records, Bhat killed a policeman in one attack and two non-local workers in another. The incidents occurred in South Kashmir during the year described in the article. The source does not name the victims or provide the exact dates and locations of each attack.

Bhat’s case illustrates how an individual with no prior criminal record can later become involved in militancy. Police also identified one local terrorist as having orchestrated attacks in Anantnag and Kulgam, supported by foreign terrorists. The article does not explicitly state whether that person is Bhat, so the identities should not be treated as the same.

Over Ground Workers, commonly called OGWs, are people who operate within support networks connected to militant activity. The article does not give a formal definition, but it describes OGWs as channels through which kingpins distribute illicit earnings. These networks can operate locally or across the border.

The mechanism is financial. The IGP said narcotics kingpins pass money through their OGW networks under various pretexts. The funds come from illicit earnings, including proceeds linked to the narcotics trade. The article does not specify the exact pretexts, recipients, or individual OGWs involved.

This system matters because it can turn drug profits into support for terrorism. Police have frozen 567 bank accounts connected to drug-related activities and recovered one crore in cash. These actions indicate that investigators are targeting not only drugs and sellers, but also the financial channels that may connect narcotics networks with militant support.

The J&K Police crackdown on drug-related activity has been extensive. This year, police arrested over 1,900 people in 1,651 cases across the Valley. They also seized more than 1,700 kilograms of contraband, showing that the operation targeted both suspected participants and drug supplies.

The financial investigation produced additional results. Police recovered one crore in cash and froze 567 bank accounts connected with drug-related activities. These measures target money and banking access, not only physical shipments. The IGP linked this work to concerns that narcotics income can support militancy.

The figures show a broad enforcement campaign involving arrests, prosecutions, seizures, cash recovery, and account restrictions. They do not establish how many people were convicted or how much of the seized material was linked directly to terrorism. Police still describe the narcotics-militancy connection as a substantial challenge requiring continued action.

The IGP said militancy and the illicit narcotics trade are deeply intertwined. A significant portion of narcotics income, he said, directly fuels or supports terrorism. This matters because drug trafficking becomes more than a criminal problem: its profits can strengthen networks involved in violence and militant activity.

The reported mechanism runs through kingpins and Over Ground Workers. Kingpins, operating locally or across the border, distribute illicit earnings through OGW networks under various pretexts. Police also recovered one crore in cash and froze 567 bank accounts connected to drug-related activities, indicating that financial channels are part of the investigation.

This connection creates a wider security challenge. Authorities must seize contraband and arrest suspects while also tracing money and support networks. The police arrested over 1,900 people in 1,651 cases and seized over 1,700 kilograms of contraband this year. The IGP called the problem substantial, suggesting continued pressure on both drug and terror networks.

An improvised explosive device, or IED, is a homemade bomb assembled from available materials rather than produced as standard military equipment. The source does not define IEDs, but it reports that such devices have been recovered around the national highway in Jammu and Kashmir. That makes the route a continuing security concern.

An IED near a busy highway can threaten passing vehicles, security personnel, and other people using the road. It may also force authorities to stop or divert traffic while they search for additional devices and secure the area. The article does not describe a specific explosion or identify who planted the recovered devices.

The IGP said highway security protocols were prepared based on previous terror incidents on the highway. He also said the highway remains under regular threat and that frequent traffic stoppages are sensitive issues. The matter will be discussed with other security forces, suggesting that future traffic and protection measures will be coordinated.