Nepal sets up round-the-clock centre to combat online financial scams

Nepal’s Integrated Anti-Cyber Scam Response Centre is a round-the-clock unit for handling online financial fraud. It operates from the Nepal Police Cyber Bureau’s new building in Samakhusi. The centre covers scams linked to digital banking, mobile wallets, online payments and social media. Its main purpose is to stop stolen funds from leaving the financial system.

The centre will receive complaints, create case records and identify the account or wallet that received the money. Officials will then request an immediate freeze. They can also trace later transfers and disable phone numbers, SIM cards, phishing domains and IP addresses connected to the scam.

This system addresses delays that previously slowed investigations. The article says official letters could take months, while victims sometimes pursued cases for up to a year. The new centre is meant to improve coordination, protect victims and strengthen trust in Nepal’s financial system.

The centre will include Nepal Police, Nepal Rastra Bank, commercial and other financial institutions, payment service providers, payment system operators, telecommunications companies and internet service providers. Named participants include Nepal Telecom, Ncell, Khalti, eSewa and the Internet Service Providers Association. Representatives will work in three shifts.

This arrangement connects the people who investigate fraud with those who control accounts, wallets, phone services and internet networks. When a complaint arrives, officials can identify where money went and send freeze requests without waiting for lengthy correspondence between separate offices.

The change matters because the article describes serious past delays. Exchanging official letters could take months, and victims could spend up to a year pursuing cases. By placing the relevant representatives together, Nepal expects faster decisions, quicker account freezes and coordinated action against the wider networks behind scams.

Nepal’s prescribed workflow is built around short response windows. A complaint from the hotline, apps, online portal or another channel must enter the case system within ten minutes. A reference number is generated, and officials classify and prioritise the suspected scam during that same period.

The next stage takes ten to 30 minutes. Bank, wallet and payment officials identify the beneficiary account or wallet, transaction timing and fund trail. Between ten and 60 minutes, the centre sends requests to freeze the account and funds. If money moved again, officials follow it to later destinations.

The same 60-minute window covers parallel technical action. Authorities can seek to deactivate mobile numbers and SIM cards and ask internet providers to block phishing domains and IP addresses. These deadlines are designed to overcome the slow coordination that previously allowed scammers to withdraw or transfer money before action began.

When officials identify the account or wallet that received stolen money, they send a request to the relevant bank or provider to freeze the account and funds. The immediate aim is to keep the money inside the financial system. A freeze can prevent the suspected recipient from withdrawing or transferring the balance before investigators act.

For example, money might first reach one wallet and then move to another account. The centre’s officials will follow the transaction trail and seek a freeze at each subsequent destination. Bank and payment representatives stationed at the centre should make those requests faster than separate agencies working by letter.

A freeze does not automatically mean the victim has recovered the money. The article describes it as a preventive step that gives investigators time to trace funds and investigate the fraud. The centre’s broader purpose is to stop money disappearing while authorities identify the people and networks involved.

The centre treats a digital payment trail as a sequence of linked transactions. Officials first identify the beneficiary account or wallet, determine when the transaction occurred and examine where the money went next. Bank, payment service and payment system representatives are expected to perform this tracing within ten to 30 minutes.

Suppose stolen money enters one account and is quickly divided between two wallets. Investigators can use the recorded transaction details to identify those new destinations. They then ask each relevant bank or wallet provider to freeze the funds. The process continues if either destination sends money onward.

The article does not describe the specific software or investigative techniques used to reconstruct these trails. It does state that officials will follow the transaction trail and seek freezes at each subsequent destination. Having the relevant institutions physically present should make those requests more immediate than the older system of exchanging official letters.

The centre’s response extends beyond financial accounts. Within the same ten-to-60-minute window used for fund-freezing requests, officials can begin parallel action against mobile numbers and SIM cards used in a scam. They can also ask internet service providers to block phishing domains and IP addresses.

For example, if a complaint identifies a scam-linked phone number and a phishing domain, the relevant telecom and internet providers can receive requests while banks trace the money. This coordinated approach aims to disrupt the tools fraudsters use to contact victims or operate online, while financial officials protect the funds.

The article does not list malicious links as a separate category. It specifically names mobile numbers, SIM cards, phishing domains and IP addresses. It also does not describe how long a block lasts or what technical tests are required. The broader goal is to dismantle the digital infrastructure behind fraud as investigations proceed.

Digital payments move value through records held by banks, wallets and payment systems. A sender’s account or wallet is debited, while a recipient’s account or wallet is credited. Those records create transaction details that authorised investigators can use to identify the beneficiary, timing and later destinations. The article relies on this trail but does not explain the underlying technology.

If a scammer receives money and quickly sends it elsewhere, the first account may no longer hold the full amount. Nepal’s centre therefore requires officials to trace the next destination and request freezes there too. Representatives from banks and payment firms will be present to speed up that process.

Timing can determine whether funds remain available when action begins. The article says earlier coordination failures sometimes let money disappear, with official letters taking months. The new workflow targets complaint entry within ten minutes, tracing within ten to 30 minutes and freezing action within 60 minutes.